








































Effectiveness? in? the? Turnaround? Game”,? the? authors? state? that? the? independent? contribution? of?
Krisztina? Timko? is? 80%? of? the? total?work? that? consists? of? the? study? conception? and? design,? data?
collection,? data? analysis? and? interpretation,? drafting? the? manuscript,? critical? revision? of? the?
manuscript?for? important? intellectual?content,?and?final?approval?of?the?version?to?be?submitted?as?
dissertation?chapter.?
Concerning? Chapter? 5? of? this? thesis,? with? the? title? “Elected?Men? and?Women? Equally? Effective?
Leaders?”,?the?authors?state?that?the?independent?contribution?of?Krisztina?Timko?is?80%?of?the?total?







I? thank? Hannu? Vartiainen,? Klaus? Kultti,? and? Vesa? Kanniainen? for? providing?me?with? constructive?
critique,?not?giving?up?on?me,?and?encouraging?me? to?go?my?way.? I? thank? Janne?Tukiainen? for?his?
encouragement?and?his?beneficial?comments.?I’m?glad?for?having?been?invited?to?present?Chapter?4?
of?my? thesis? in? the?Microeconomics?and? Industrial?Organization?Workshop? in?Helsinki,?and? in? the?





first?class? job? in? record? time,?and? that? is?how?he?managed? to?make?me?push?my? limits.?When?my?
work?gets?positive?feedback,?I?know?how?much?I?owe?him.?He?changed?the?map?of?paths?I?could?go,?
and?I?will?go?on?learning?from?the?best.?
I? thank? for? the? access? to? the? Columbia? Experimental? Laboratory? in? the? Social? Sciences? at? the?







Historically,?men? have? held?most? of? the? leadership? positions,? and? up? to? date,?women? are? still? a?
minority? in? top?level? business? positions.? Using? the? turnaround? game? in? controlled? laboratory?
experiments?and?varying?treatment?conditions,?we?investigate?whether?men?and?women?are?equally?
effective?leaders.?
The? first? chapter? reviews? research? from? three? different? perspectives:? coordination? games? in?




chapter? considers? communication? styles? of? leaders? and? finds? that? despite? the? different? paths? in?
communication,? men? and? women? are? equally? effective? leaders.? The? fourth? chapter? varies? the?
selection?process?and?presents?a? replication?of? the?democracy?effect?on? leader?effectiveness? in? a?
laboratory?experiment?using? the? turnaround?game?as? studied?earlier?by?Brandts?et?al.? (2015).?The?
fifth? chapter? finds? that?women? are? elected? at? a? similar? rate? than?men? and? elected?women? are?
marginally? less?effective? leaders?than?elected?men,?although?the?gender?difference?disappears?with?






Kun? talousyksiköillä? on? yhteinen? päämäärä,? joka? edellyttää? koordinaatiota,? johtajuudella? on?
keskeinen? rooli.?Historiallisesti? suurin?osa? johtajista?on?ollut?miehiä,? ja?naisilla?on?nykyäänkin?vain?
murto?osa? johtopaikoista? liike?elämässä.? Tässä? työssä? käytämme? behavioraalisen? taloustieteen?




sukupuolinäkökulmasta? tehtyjä? johtajuustutkimuksia? sekä? tutkimusta? siitä,? miten? niin? sanottu?
demokratiavaikutus? näkyy? johtamisen? tehokkuudessa? ja? sukupuolten? tasa?arvossa.? Työn? toisen?
kappaleen?päätulos?on,?että?sukupuolten?välillä?ei?ole?tehokkuuseroja?johtamisessa?riippumatta?siitä,?
onko? johtajan? sukupuoli? tiedossa? vai? ei.? Kolmannessa? kappaleessa? tutkitaan? johtajien? erilaisia?
kommunikaatiotapoja.?Sen?päätulos?on,?että?vaikka?miehet?ja?naiset?eroavat?kommunikaatiotapojen?
suhteen,?tämä?ei?johda?eroihin?tehokkuudessa.?Neljännessä?kappaleessa?tarkastellaan?erilaisia?tapoja?
valita? johtaja? ja? replikoidaan? tuloksia? demokratiavaikutuksen? merkityksestä? johtamisen?
tehokkuuteen.? Viidennessä? kappaleessa? havaitaan,? että? naiset? ja? miehet? valitaan? kokeellisissa?
tilanteissa? yhtä? usein? johtajiksi.? Valitut?miehet? ovat?marginaalisesti? tehokkaampia? johtajia,?mutta?












































































































































The? thesis? is? subdivided? into? five? chapters.?Chapter?1? contains? the? introduction.?The? introduction?
chapter? is? further? subdivided? into? three? sections?describing? “Why”,? “How”?and? “What”?we? study,?









each? other.? After? a?while? they? adapt? randomly? to? each? other? and? organize? into? a? line? pattern,?
walking?the?same?pace?and?taking?rhythmic?steps.?They?adapt?to?the?rhythm?of?the?traffic,?which? is?
more?than?the?sum?of?the?boys,?it?is?an?organizing?power.?It?leads? its?followers?by?an?invisible?hand?
they? believe? in.1?Why? do?we? follow??When? do?we? adapt,? and?when? is? it? efficient? to? give? up? our?
independence? in?decision?making? in?order? to? trust? the?credibility?of?a? leader??The?weak?link?game?
models?exactly?these?dynamics?of?an?organization.?It?models?a?problem?of?beliefs.?What?makes?the?
decision? maker? believe? that? others? will? follow? the? leader? as? well?? Such? beliefs? drive? whole?
economies.?On?the?macro?level,?the?game?can?model?interaction?between?a?political?leader?and?the?
followers,? and? on? the? micro? level,? it? can? model? the? organization? of? firms,? or? even? family? and?
friendship?structures,?being?relevant?in?everyday?life.?
The? weak?link? game? is? a? coordination? game.? Originally,? it? models? a? production? situation? in? an?
organization?where?individuals?are?interdependent,?and?the?lowest?performing?individual?determines?
group?performance?(Van?Huyck?et?al.?1990).?Therefore?the?game?was?named?“weak?link”?game.?The?
individuals? can? choose? among? different? effort? levels.? To? reach? an? equilibrium? solution,? all? group?
members?have?to?choose?simultaneously?the?same?effort?level.?The?game?has?multiple?equilibria,?one?





losses? from? coordination? failure.? Coordination? failure? and? realization? of? the? most? inefficient?
equilibrium? is?the?usual?outcome? in?weak?link?games? if?communication? is?not?possible?(Kriss?and?Eil?
2012).?Cheap?talk?between?players?improves?coordination?and?efficiency?(Blume?and?Ortmann?2007).?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????








As? real?world?examples,?one? could? think?of?any?production?process? that? is? incomplete?until?every?
worker? made? his? contribution,? and? moreover,? the? production? outcome? is? determined? by? the?
contribution? of? the? worst? performing? individual.? Best? quality? food? might? be? perceived? as? less?
valuable? if? it? is?served?unprofessionally;?an?assembly? line?will?not?be?used?by? its?full?capacity? if? low?
performing? line? workers? hinder? its? process;? reports? or? software? remain? incomplete? until? every?
worker?made? his? contribution;? in? case? of? network? investments,? the? investment? of? firms? into? the?
same? industry? pays? off? only? if? a? sufficient? number? of? firms? choose? to? invest;? the? adoption? of?
standards? or? overcoming? financial? crises? is? only? possible? if? a? large? enough? number? of? followers?
adapts?(Camerer?and?Knez?1997;?Brandts?et?al.?2015;?Heinemann?et?al.?2009).?
Why?do?we?study?the?gender?of? the? leader? in?the?context?of? leadership??Despite?many?changes? in?
regulations,?such?as?gender?quotas,?and?despite?an? increasing?number?of?qualified?women,?women?
are?still?a?minority? in?top?level?business?and?political?positions.?Gender?equality? is?a?major?concern?
for? some? politicians,? international? organizations,? and? the? general? public.? One? of? the? global?
sustainable?development?goals?of?the?United?Nations?is?the?economic?and?political?empowerment?of?
women? (United?Nations?2015).?Our? studies?contribute? to? the? scientific? insights?about? the?possible?
explanations?why?women? are?underrepresented? in? leadership? roles,?and?what? kind?of? changes? to?
expect? if?women?fill?empowering?positions.?Literature?already?showed?that?women?might?shy?away?
from? running? for? leadership? positions? because? the? underlying? system? is? not? democratic? or? not?
transparent? enough? (Kanthak? and?Woon? 2014).? There? is? also? evidence? that? top?down? selection?
procedures,?and?bottom?up?selection?procedures? in?competitive?environments,?favor?men?(Reuben?
et? al.? 2014;? Reuben? et? al.? 2012).? However,? political? science? literature? shows? that,? once?women?
candidate?for?a?leader?position,?bottom?up?selection?procedures?make?it?equally?likely?that?a?man?or?
a?woman?gets?elected? (Darcy?et?al.?1994;?Lau?and?Redlawsk?1997).? In?our? studies?we?are?curious,?
whether?this?also?holds?in?a?behavioral?laboratory?using?an?economic?context.?
Why? do?we? run? laboratory? experiments? to? study? the? gender? gap? in? top? positions?? Experimental?
gender?studies?get?often?criticized?because?gender? is?not?a?treatment?that?could?be?randomized?to?












Technically,? we? did? a? highly? ambitious? job? in? a? very? short? time.? We? made? use? of? my? earlier?
experience? in? conducting? laboratory? experiments? and? programming? the? z?Tree? software? by?
Fischbacher.?We? strived? for? the?best? scientific?practices,?and?we? scheduled? the?programming? task?
and?conduction?of?experiments?as?tightly?as?possible.?The?first?study?was?run?in?February?2015?with?
120?participants,?the?second?study?was?run?in?March?2015?with?165?participants,?and?the?third?study?





month’s? time,?working? full? time? on? the? job.? To? achieve? a? high? level? of? efficiency?was? one? of?my?
personal?goals.?Our?research?proves?that?behavioral?economics?can?be?a?quick?and?accurate?tool?to?
test? policies? before? implication? in? the? field.?Moreover,? in? line? with? the? thesis? requirements? for?
studying? coherent? topics,? all? the? four? studies? investigate? leader? effectiveness? under? different?
treatment?conditions,?so?that?the?robustness?of?our?basic?result?is?confirmed?by?several?independent?
measurements,?further?improving?the?power?of?our?results.?
Besides? using? standard? econometric? methods,? we? make? use? of? a? rather? unusual? approach? in?




both? in? economics? and?multidisciplinary? research? combined?with? economics? (Bollen? et? al.? 2008;?
Sahin? et? al.? 2013;?Krishnakumar? and?Chávez?Juárez?2015).?Newer? versions?of? STATA? already?have?
user?friendly?commands?for?such?analyses.?We?think?that?the?use?of?novel?econometric?methods?is?a?








third?study,?we? focus?on? the?selection?process,?and? in? the? fourth?study,?on? the?gender?differences?
related?to?the?selection?process.?Table?1.1?provides?an?overview?of?the?foci?of?our?studies?and?depicts?











































































































































































































































































































Besides?our? interest? in? the?democracy?effect?on? leader?effectiveness,?we?are?curious?whether? the?
selection?process? affects? volunteering? for? the? leader?position.?Moreover,?we? test?which? channels?
mediate? the? democracy? effect? on? leader? effectiveness:? a? difference? in? leader? behavior? or? a?
difference? in? follower?behavior.?We?predict?that?elected? leaders?are?more?effective? than?randomly?
selected? leaders,?which? is?driven?by?elected? leaders?being?more?active?and? requesting? the?highest?
effort?more? often,? and? being? followed? to? a? greater? extent,? holding? constant? what? leaders? say.?




gender.? Our? observations? related? to? the? gender? of? the? leader? are? within?subjects? descriptive?
statistics,?because?the? leader?assignment? is?endogenous?and? is?collected?as?repeated?measurement?
in? the? same? group.?Our?main? interest? in? the? fourth? study? is? to? reveal? gender? differences? in? the?








Prediction? Result? Study? Related?studies?




Men?request?higher?effort?than?women.? No?support? 1,?2,?4? Reuben?et?al.?(2012)?




























Our?general?finding? is?that?men?and?women?are?equally?effective? leaders.?However,?there? is?mixed?
evidence?about? leader?effectiveness? in? literature.?Eagly?et?al.? (2003)?find?that?women?have?a?small?
advantage? in? leadership? compared? to?men,?because?women?use?a?more?effective? leadership? style?
than?men.??In?contrast,?Grossman?et?al.?(2016)?find?that?men?are?more?effective?leaders?than?women,?
because?followers?find?men?to?be?more?credible.?We?find?that?followers?follow?their? leaders?to?the?
same? extent,? irrespective? of? gender.? Moreover,? men? and? women? send? equally? often? relevant?
messages.? It? seems? that?a?gender?difference? in?overconfidence,?as? found?by?Reuben?et?al.? (2012),?






that?men? volunteer?more? often? than? the? pecuniary? benefits? benchmark? as? they?might? be?more?





condition? is? likely? to? drive? the? volunteering? frequency? close? to? and? even? below? the? pecuniary?
benefits?benchmark.?Decreasing?willingness?to?contribute?to?the?public?good?over?time?is?in?line?with?








effective?than? leaders?who?do?not?receive?follower? input.? In?accordance?with?Merchant?(2012),?we?
find? that? men? communicate? more? assertively,? whereas? women? send? more? often? messages?
emphasizing? that? the? leader? is? an? equal? member? of? the? group.? Despite? the? different? paths? in?
communication?styles,?men?and?women?do?not?differ?in?leader?effectiveness.?
To?our?knowledge,?our?studies?are?among? the? first? to?use?a?weak?link?coordination?game? to?study?
gender? differences? in? leadership? in? economic? experimental? laboratories,? which? is? our? main?
contribution? to? literature.?Using? a?weak?link? game,?Dufwenberg? and?Gneezy? (2005)? study? gender?
differences?in?coordination?due?to?differences?in?the?fraction?of?men?and?women?in?a?team.?They?find?
some?small?differences?in?coordination?in?the?initial?periods?but?not?in?the?final?periods.?The?authors?




perceptions?regarding?the?magnitude?and? limits?of?gender?differences”.? In? light?of?their?statement,?
we?feel?encouraged?that?our?“no?effect”?findings?are?an?important?contribution?to?the?literature.?
Using? a? turnaround? game,? Grossman? et? al.? (2016)? study? gender? differences? in? leadership? and?
attribution? of? coordination? failure.? They? find? that?men? have? a? stronger? impact? on? followers? and?
receive? better? evaluations? than?women.?However,? there? are? some? aspects?which?differ? from?our?
work.?Leaders? in?Grossman?et?al.?(2016)?are?session? leaders?and?not?group? leaders.?Group? leaders?
are? actively? bound? to? the? organization,? rowing? in? the? same? boat? like? their? followers,?which?





Brandts? et? al.? (2014)? showed? earlier? that?messages? of? the? endogenous? group? leader? are?more?
people?oriented? and? effective? than? the? expert? advice.? The? expert? advice? in? Brandts? et? al.? (2014)?
contains?a?detailed?explanation?of?the?causes?of?the?coordination?failure,?similar?to?Fischbacher?and?
Gächter? (2010),? combined?with? an? advice? on? how? to? prevent? coordination? failure.? Brandts? et? al.?











prescribed? style? of? the? talking? points?might? be? perceived? as? less? credible.? The? authors? find? that?




Session? leaders?had?to?talk? in? front?of?their?audience,?which?might?bias?the?results.? In?the?real?
world,?leaders?self?select?at?least?into?candidacy?for?a?leadership?position,?which?means?that?we?
can?assume?that?real?world? leaders?embrace?presenting? in?front?of?an?audience.?Speeches?and?
gestures? in?front?of?an?audience?can?contain?more?or? less?charismatic? leadership?style?features?
(Eagly?et?al.?2003;?Conger?and?Kanungo?1998).?Using?a?field?experiment?with?“temporary?workers?
who? have? to? prepare? envelopes? for? a? fundraising? campaign”? and? “are? exposed? to? speeches? that?

















study?Zizzo? (2010),?which? can?potentially? lead? to? intentional? changes? in?behavior?Camerer? (2011).?
Compared?to?Grossman?et?al.?(2016),?who?reveal?the?person?of?the?leader,?it?seems?that?a?decrease?














experimental? methods,? and? in? subsection? 1.4.3? we? provide? a? brief? review? about? literature?






other?players,?but? is? independent?of?who? is?playing? the? game.? In? contrast,?players? in? asymmetric?
games?are?assigned?to?different?roles?with?different?strategies.?The?ultimatum?game?and?the?dictator?
game?are?commonly?studied?examples?of?asymmetric?games.?The?weak?link?coordination?game?that?
we? study? is? a? symmetric,? non?zero? sum? game,? alongside?with? other? coordination? games? and? the?
prisoner’s?dilemma?game.?The?prisoner’s?dilemma?game?models?a?social?dilemma,?when?cooperation?












does? not?matter?which? standard? is? chosen,? as? long? as? the? players? choose? the? same? standard.? A?
common? example? is? to? choose? the? side? of? the? road? upon?which? to? drive.? A? pure? strategy? Nash?
equilibrium? that? is? adopted? by? all? players? is? an? evolutionarily? stable? strategy.? In? contrast,?mixed?
strategy? Nash? equilibria? are? not? evolutionary? stable,? since? they? are? Pareto? dominated? by? pure?
strategy? Nash? equilibria.5?As? a? third? type? of? coordination? situations? players? can? have? conflicting?
interests.?The?battle?of?sexes?models?such?situations.?The?players?prefer? the?common?activity?over?




but?also? less? risky?alternative?outcome? that? is? independent? from? the? choice?of?other?players.?The?
riskiness? of? the? efficient? outcome? roots? in? strategic? uncertainty? about? the? choice? of? others.? The?
extension?of?the?stag?hunt?game?to?a?multiplayer?situation?is?the?minimum?effort?or?weak?link?game?
that?we?study.6?
The?game? is?played?by? N ?players?organized? into?groups.?The?players?engage? in?a? joint?production?
activity? where? inputs? are? highly? complementary.? Each? player? chooses? independently? and?
simultaneously?an?effort?level,? ieffort .?The?group?outcome?is?determined?by?the?effort?of?the?lowest?
performing?player,? ? ?min 1 2min , ,..., Neffort effort effort effort? .?The?payoff?of?player? i ?in?the?group?
is?given?by?the?equation?(Kriss,?Blume?and?Weber?(forthcoming?b)):?
?? ? ? ? ? ? ????????? ? ? ? ??????? ?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????















where?w ?is?the?fixed?payoff?component,?b ?is?the?player’s?share?of?the?group?outcome,?and?c ?is?the?
player’s?cost?of?effort.?Since?effort?is?costly,?players?prefer?not?to?waste?effort?and?to?choose?exactly?
the?minimum?of?others’?efforts.?On?the?other?hand,?as?long?as?b c? ,?all?players?benefit?from?higher?
output,? thus? from?coordination?on?a?higher?effort? level.?Table?1.3?presents? the?payoff?structure?of?
the?weak?link?game?as?it?was?originally?studied?by?Van?Huyck?et?al.?(1990).?The?game?has?seven?effort?







? 7? 6? 5? 4? 3? 2? 1?
7? 130? 110? 90? 70? 50? 30? 10?
6? ? 120? 100? 80? 60? 40? 20?
5? ? ? 110? 90? 70? 50? 30?
4? ? ? ? 100? 80? 60? 40?
3? ? ? ? ? 90? 70? 50?
2? ? ? ? ? ? 80? 60?
1? ? ? ? ? ? ? 70?
?
Given? the?other?players’?minimum?effort? contribution,? the?equilibrium? solution?of? the? game? is? to?
choose?exactly?the?same?effort?level.?No?player?has?an?incentive?to?deviate?from?choosing?the?group?
minimum? effort? level.? If? a? player?would? choose? a? higher? or? a? lower? effort? level? than? the? others’?
minimum?effort?level,?he?would?make?a?loss?relative?to?others.?Thus?the?diagonal?in?the?payoff?matrix?
represents? the? equilibrium? solutions,?which? are? all?pure?strategy?Nash? equilibria.? The? equilibrium?
points?can?be?Pareto?ranked.?All?players?agree?that?simultaneously?choosing?the?highest?effort?level?is?
the?most?efficient,?payoff?dominant?outcome,?which?yields?130?for?each?player.?However,?there?is?no?
guarantee? that?all?players?will?make? the?same?choice,?and?players?cannot?predict? the?outcome? for?
sure.?Players? face?a?problem?of?beliefs?concerning? the?choice?of?others.7?Moreover,? the?higher? the?






















payoff?dominance,? is?one?deductive? selection?principle,?based?on? the?efficiency?of? an?equilibrium?
point.? Another? related? deductive? selection? principle? is? the? security? principle,? or?maximin? action,?
based?on?the?risk?dominance?of?an?equilibrium?point.?An?action?is?secure?when?it?delivers?the?largest?





Using? experimental? methods,? Van? Huyck? et? al.? (1990)? provided? evidence? for? a? pattern? in? the?







Huyck?et?al.? (1990),?and?Weber?et?al.? (2001)? found? that?pairs?of?players?have?a?higher? chance? to?
coordinate?on?the?efficient?equilibrium,?whereas?large?groups?almost?surely?fail?to?coordinate.?Thus,?
the?higher? the?number?of?players,? the? less? intimate? the?game?becomes,?and? the?more? severe? the?
trust?dilemma?grows.?
The?stag?hunt?game?and?the?weak?link?game?model?a?very?basic?dilemma?between?self?reliance?and?
trust? into? others.? This? conflict? might? be? even? more? fundamental? to? living? organisms? than? the?
prisoner’s?dilemma,?modeling?the?conflict?between?self? interest?and?trust.?Players?of?the?prisoner’s?
dilemma? clearly? cannot? expect?others? to?be? friendly? and? give?up? their? selfish?business.? Since? the?
prisoner’s?dilemma? is?based?on?betrayal,?gathering?and?hiding? information?might?be?crucial? to?win?
the?game.?However,?the?stag?hunt?game?is?about?development?that?is?only?possible?if?players?learn?to?
rely? on? each? other? in? situations? when? all? players? can? win.? In? terms? of? intelligence,? increase? of?












a? weak?link? game,? Kriss? and? Eil? (2012)? show? that? too? much? information? sharing? might? in? fact? increase?
uncertainty?in?the?weak?link?game?where?strategic?uncertainty?is?a?key?problem.?The?authors?find?that?limiting?




either?adapts? to? the?prevailing?evolutionarily? stable? strategy,?or?he? loses?by?exerting?more?or? less?
effort?than?others.9?An?example? for?the? former? is?Galileo?Galilei,?or?any? inventor?who?precedes?his?
time?and?is?misunderstood.?An?example?for?the?latter?is?individuals?who?do?not?believe?that?putting?
effort? into? personal? development? can? integrate? them? to? the? societal? average? during? the? given?
lifetime.10?The? example?of? the? inventor? and? visionary? illustrates?how? effort?put? into?development?
opens? up? new? and? higher? coordination? equilibria.11 ?Schumpeterian? inventors? are? not? simply?
destructive,? rather? demanding? of? others? to? put?more? effort? into? learning.? As? soon? as? the? new?
equilibrium?becomes?common?knowledge?and?enough?followers?believe?that?this?higher?equilibrium?
can? be? achieved,? leadership? can? bring? change,? or? “turnaround”.? However,? to? manage? the?
“turnaround”?is?a?challenging?task?in?spite?of?the?strong?history?dependence?in?the?game.?The?term?
“corporate? turnaround? game”? was? first? coined? in? Brandts? and? Cooper? (2006a),? who? studied?
managerial?interventions?that?can?induce?a?turnaround?after?a?history?of?failure?to?coordinate?on?the?
efficient?equilibrium.?Commonly?used?intervention?tools?are?incentive?changes?and?communication.?
Brandts? and? Cooper? (2007)? showed? that? communication? is?more? effective? than? leaders? varying?
financial?incentives?endogenously.?Later,?Brandts?et?al.?(2015)?showed?that?communication?remains?
more?effective?than?incentives,?even?if?interventions?are?varied?exogenously?in?a?controlled?setting.?
Precondition? for? leader? effectiveness? is? credibility?of? the? leader:?players?have? to?believe? that? the?
other?players?will?follow?the?leader.12?The?chances?that?a?leader?will?be?followed?by?others?is?higher?if?
the?player?believes?that?the? leadership? is?“appropriate,?proper?and? just”,?which? is?the?definition?of?
legitimate? authority? (Tyler? 2006).? A? leader? can? prove? legitimacy? by? competence,? for? instance? by?
sending? relevant? communication? content,? and? through? a? successful? group? history.? Besides?
competence,? the? selection? process? of? the? leader? can? be? important,? as? Brandts? et? al.? (2015)?
demonstrated?with? the? democracy? effect? on? leader? effectiveness.? The? power? of? the? democracy?
effect?roots?in?the?direction?of?the?selection?process.?Instead?of?an?exogenous?top?down?assignment,?





failure? and? an? advice? how? to? prevent? it.? The? group? has?more? skepticism? towards? advisers? than?
leaders.? It?would?be?an? interesting? future?study,? to? find?out?whether?preference? for?authority,? like?





of? the? inventor? illustrates,? striving? for? a? commonly? known? goal? might? awake? goal?oriented?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????









competition.13?The?dynamics?of? such? competition? is?well?known? in?economics:? it? is? rewarded?with?
monopoly? positions,? and? eventually? transformed? into? a? new? standard,? higher? level? coordination?
equilibrium?with? zero? extra? profits.? Thus,? from? an? evolutionary? perspective,?market? forces?might?
invisibly? guide? economies,? as? well? as?micro?level? groups,? towards? higher? coordination? levels.? If?
adaptation? already?drives?outcomes,?why? is? the? coordination?of? action? important?? Srikanth? et? al.?
(2014)? define? “coordination? as? an? outcome? in? which? interacting? individuals? achieve? reciprocal?
predictability?of?action”.?Without?coordinated?action,?adaptation?processes?drive?outcomes?towards?
the? lowest? level? equilibrium,? and? uncertainty? remains? high.? Blume? and?Ortmann? (2007)? showed?
experimentally? that? if? communication? is?mandatory? in? the? weak?link? game,? players? achieve? the?
highest? level?of? coordination,?whereas? if?players?have?no?possibility? to? communicate,? they? fail? to?
achieve?the?Pareto?efficient?outcome.?Kriss?et?al.?(forthcoming?b)?ran?a?similar?experiment?using?the?
weak?link? game,? but? their? treatment? introduced? costly? and? voluntary? communication,? which? is?
unsubsidized,?partially? subsidized,?or? fully? subsidized?by? the?organization.?Although? it?would?have?
been?efficient? for? the?players? to?use?communication?under?each? treatment?condition,? the?authors?
found?that?only?fully?subsidized?communication?is?used?94?percent?of?all?observations,?yielding?high?
minimum? effort? levels,? whereas? small? costs? of? communication? already? decrease? the? use? of?
communication?to?20?25?percent?of?all?observations.?Accordingly,?the?average?minimum?effort?levels?
remain? low.? The? authors? point? out? that? their? results? are? consistent? with? earlier? evidence? of?
“coordination? neglect”,? which? is,? due? to? Heath? and? Staudenmayer? (2000),? “the? tendency? to?
underestimate?the?difficulty?of?coordination?and?assume?that?mechanisms?to?help?facilitate?efficient?
coordination? are? unnecessary”.? Heath? and? Staudenmayer? describe? organizational? coordination?
problems? as? task? division? and? reintegration? of? the? components,? and? they? claim? that? lay? theories?












Stiglitz,? for? the? transition? from? a? low? effort? culture? to? a?high? effort? culture? is? the?developmental?
history?of?South?Korea.14?South?Korea?escaped?poverty,?and?transformed?from?a?rice?grower?to?a?high?














the? group? on? the? successful? developmental? path.15?But?what? happens? if? the? group? grows,? and? if?
outsiders? wish? to? join? to? a? successful? group?? The? review? paper? by? Kriss? and? Weber? (2013)?
summarizes? research? evidence? concerning? organizational? change.? The? authors? outline? the?
importance?of?different?tools?to?manage?growth.?Weber?(2006)?suggested?to?implement?slow?growth?
and? to? provide? new? entrants? with? information? on? group? history.? The? author? found? that? such?
managed?growth?ensures? that?small?groups,?which?coordinated?on?high?effort? levels,?can?maintain?
efficient? coordination? even? after? the? number? of? group?members? gradually? reached? 12,?whereas?
groups? that? start?up?with?12?members?are?predestined? to? fail.?Salmon?and?Weber? (2011)?expand?
these? insights,? and? experiment?with? integrating? entrants? into? high?performing? groups,?while? the?
entrants?come?from?groups?with?a?failure?history,?having?played?the?game?on?a?low?equilibrium.?The?
authors?found?that?slow?growth,?an?entry?quiz,?and?the?combination?of?these?two?tools?work?equally?
well.? For? the? entry? quiz,? entrants? get? trained,? and? during? the? quiz? they? demonstrate? their?
understanding?of?the?production?game?and?the?group?history.?Similarly?to?the?“coordination?neglect”,?




showed? in? the? laboratory? that? the?minimum? effort? level? in? the?merged? group? converges? to? the?










and? they? reveal? that? group?members? underestimate? the? challenge? of? integration? and? are? overly?
optimistic? concerning? the? after?merger? efficiency.? Such? underestimation? is? in? line? with? the?
phenomenon?of?“coordination?neglect”.?On?top?of?that,?group?members?of?the?two?merging?groups?




oriented,?private? training?of? successors.? ?As?Chaudhuri? et? al.? (2009)? show?using? a?weak?link? game,?publicly?
available? advice? facilitates? intergenerational? coordination? more? than? private? advice.? Public? advice?







the? results? are? robust? even? to? a? substantial? increase? in? group? size.? Exclusion? of? neighbors?who?
provide?low?effort?is?an?effective?mechanism?to?enforce?efficient?coordination.?
Coordination? failure?might?not?only?cause?group?members?to?blame?each?other,?but?also?to?blame?
their? leader.?Weber?et?al.? (2001)? study? the?misattribution?of?cause? in? the? turnaround?game.?They?
assign? leaders? to? large? groups? that? previously? failed? to? coordinate.? The? leaders? can? use?
communication? to? encourage? players? and? to? induce? a? turnaround.? The? situation? created? in? the?








weak?link? game,? reestablishing? borders? and? policies? trying? to? protect? the? group?internal?
developmental?stage?make?sense.?On?the?one?hand,?game?theory?seems?to?predict?that?integration?is?
likely?to?fail,?but?on?the?other?hand,?economic?theory?predicts?that?free?trade?and?economic?unions?
lead? to? higher? payoffs? for? all? players.? The? global? melting? pot? is? an? unstoppable? process,? and?
technology?accelerated? its? speed.?Humans? face?new?global?problems? threatening? their?well?being,?
and,? since? the? problems? can? only? be? solved? together,? societal? and? organizational? problems? have?
priority.?Preserving?old?borders?will?not?be?an?efficient?strategy?on?the? long?run.? Instead,?managed?
growth? seems? to?be? a?better? answer.? If? the? speed? of? integration? is? fast,? like? in? case?of?mergers,?
establishing?common? level?of?understanding?and?education?would?be?the?desirable?policy.?Exits?out?
of? political? and? economic? unions,? exclusions,? or? reinforcing? borders? are? tools? to? slow? down? or?
enforce?the?global?integration?process,?but?they?also?strengthen?country?level?integration?processes.?
The?protection?of?useful?developmental?homogeneity?might?be?confused?with?racism,?especially,? if?
players? start? to? blame? each? other? based? on? biased? beliefs.? In? order? to? avoid? the? possibility? of?




In? ancient? times? and?most? societies,?men?went? for? hunting? the? stag.? Hunting? required? physical?
strength?and?was? riskier? for?pregnant?or?breastfeeding?women.?Compared? to?women,?men?had?a?
comparative?advantage? in?hunting.?As?a?consequence,?men?and?women?of?the?village? lived? in? labor?
division?and?task?integration?with?each?other,?which?can?be?seen?as?another?stag?hunt?game?at?home.?
To? facilitate? coordination? in? stag?hunt?games,? leaders?as? coordination?devices?were?assigned,?and?
they?often?simply?enforced?coordination.?In?patriarchal?societies,?men?dominated?women?not?only?at?






and?women? only? perceive? a? societal? pressure? to? fulfill? gender? identity? expectations? of? others? or?
expectations? they?believe?others?have?? In?a?review?paper,?Bertrand? (2011)?overviews?both?gender?
differences? in?preferences,?and?differences? in?gender? identity.?The?author?reviews?studies?showing?
stable? gender? differences? in? risk? attitudes,? attitudes? towards? competition,? social? preferences,?
attitudes? towards? negotiation? and? other? personality? traits.? Concerning? risk? attitude,? Croson? and?




losses,? further? affecting? the? utility? from? a? risky? choice? (Fehr?Duda? et? al. 2006;? Flynn? et? al.? 1994;?
Spigner? et? al.? 1993;? Silverman? and? Kumka? 1987).? Gender? differences? in? the? attitudes? towards?
competition?might?take?part?in?explaining?the?gender?gap?in?top?level?positions,?since?most?of?these?
positions?are?achieved? in? very? competitive?environments.? In?an?experimental? study,?Gneezy?et?al.?
(2003)?show?that?more?competitive?environments? increase?the?performance?of?men,?but? lower?the?
performance?of?women,?even?if?both?genders?are?equally?effective?in?non?competitive?environments.?
The?authors?also? show? that? their? findings?are? stronger? in?mixed?gender?environments,?while?men?
and? women? are? similarly? competitive? in? single?sex? environments.? Combining? field? data? from? a?
television? game? show? called? the? “The?Weakest? Link”?with? laboratory? evidence,?Antonovics? et? al.?
(2009)?show?that?the?gender?gap?in?competitiveness?disappears?with?increasing?stakes.?In?the?game?
show?players?compete? for? large?sums?of?money,?and? in? the? laboratory,? the?stakes?varied?between?
$20? and? $100.? The? authors? also? find? that? in? competitions? of? the? game? show? the? gender? of? the?
opponent?does?not?matter?for?the?competitiveness?of?women.?Leadership?of?an?organization?can?be?
considered?as?a?high?stake,?so?that?real?world?candidacy?for?top?positions?might?not?be?affected?by?
gender? differences? in? competitiveness.? Vandegrift? and? Yavas? (2009)? study? the? robustness? of? the?
gender?gap?in?competitiveness?if?learning?about?absolute?and?relative?performance?is?possible.?They?
find? that? repetition? decreases? the? gender? gap,? suggesting? that? in?many? real?world? environments?
women?might?be?as?competitive?as?men.?
The?next?issue?Bertrand?(2011)?reviews?very?extensively?is?negotiation?for?higher?compensation?and?
promotion.?Women?negotiate? for?others,?but? they?negotiate?much? less? for? the? self? (Bowles?et?al.?
2005).?Bowles?et?al.?(2007)?show?that?one?driver?for?this?phenomenon? is?that?men?and?women?are?
evaluated?differently? if?they?negotiate?for?higher?compensation.? In?their?study,?the?bias?was?driven?
by? male? evaluators,? who? gave? systematically? worse? evaluations? to? women? than? men,? keeping?
constant? that? both?men? and? women? initiated? a? negotiation.?Male? evaluators?made? the? biased?
evaluations,? even? though? that? they? perceived? both? women? who? negotiated? and? who? did? not?






One? example? for? other? personality? differences? that?might? affect? the? career? of?men? and?women?
differently?is?behavioral?problems.?Behavioral?problems?might?be?the?higher?rate?of?attention?deficit?





of? brain? developmental? processes.? From? an? evolutionary? perspective,? it?might? be? that?men? and?
women?differ?in?the?way?they?make?decisions,?and?such?differences?might?already?show?up? in?early?
childhood.?The?stag?hunter?became?task?oriented?and?assertive,?and?the?village?people?(most?of?the?




from? Sweden,? Obschonka? et? al.? (2013)? link? early? rule?breaking? behavior? in? adolescence? with?
entrepreneurship? in? adulthood.? Early? non?conform? behavior,? taking? unusual,? risky? routes,?
questioning?of?standards?and?boundaries,?and?resisting?on?agency? is?often?correlated?with?novelty?
seeking,?and?might?be?one?possible?path?towards?innovative,?visionary?entrepreneurship.?Obschonka?
et? al.? find? many? early? rule?breakers? among? male? entrepreneurs,? but? not? among? female?
entrepreneurs.?Their?finding?supports?the?view?that?women?might?have?a?different?leadership?style,?
and?a?different?developmental?path? than?men.?Girls?have? less?behavioral?problems,?and?even? if? it?
seems?that?they?are?more?submissive,?they?outperform?men?by?college?attendance?and?educational?
achievement? (Bertrand? 2011;?Goldin? et? al.? 2006).? Learning? is? becoming? a? female? advantage? in? a?
changing?world.?
What?exactly?are?the?global?societal?changes?nowadays??Depending?on?the?place?of?the?change,?we?




the? increase? in?college?attendance?and?graduation? rates,? the?change? in? identity?and? relationships,?
and?finally?the?increase?of?female?leadership.?The?U.S.?history?is?a?bottom?up?emancipation?history?in?
a?developed?democratic?framework.?In?contrast,?other?cultures?go?through?different?developmental?
paths,? often? in? a? top?down? direction.? In?many? developing? countries,? international? organizations?
support?the?education?of?girls,?which?then?empowers?women?and?promotes?female?leadership,?and?
finally?has?an?effect?on?economic?growth?and?political?institutions?(Sperling?et?al.?2015).?Sidani?et?al.?
(2015)? study? how? patriarchal? structures? and? assignment? of?women? to? nurturing? roles?within? the?
family?inhibit?real?change?in?female?leadership?in?Lebanon.?Kim?et?al.?(2015)?study?the?effects?of?top?
down?diversity?management? in?the?highly?male?dominated,?performance?oriented?society?of?South?
Korea.? They? find? that? women? perceived? diversity? management? as? more? favorable? than? men,?
although? there? was? no? difference? between? men? and? women? in? organizational? commitment.?
Organizational?commitment?and?diversity?management?measures?boosted?job?performance.?




stag? hunt? game? is?male? leadership.? It? is?mostly?men?who? occupy? positions?with? decision?making?
authority?and?the?influence?over?compensation?and?promotion?of?others?(Smith?2002;?Eagly?and?Carli?
2003).? Concerning? decision? making? rights,? Bartling? et? al.? (2014)? show? theoretically? and?





of? authority? became? relevant? and? turned? the? game? over? time? into? a? prisoner’s? dilemma? game.?
Coordination? based? on?male? leadership? is? still? Pareto? dominating? the? non?cooperation? outcome,?
however,? strategies?are?not?anymore?about?cooperating?or?not,?but? rather?about?decision?making?
rights?over?the?self?versus?over?others.16?In?line?with?the?change?of?the?underlying?game,?the?female?




indirectly,? by? expecting? them? to? fulfill? stereotype? gender? roles.? Educated? women? become?
empowered? and? start? to? fight? for? their? right? to? make? their? own? decisions,? primarily? at? home.?








opens?up?new?developmental? stages? in? the? stag?hunt,?or?weak?link?game.?The?new? levels? require?
reconsideration?of?the?former?gender?based?labor?division,?on?the?family?level?as?well?as?on?highest?
organizational? levels.?The?nature?of? the? leader? task?changes:?hierarchy,? traditional?power? sources,?
controlling?others,?enforcing?coordination,?and?old?motivational? tools? lose? importance,?while? labor?
division? becomes? more? flexible? and? overlapping,? and? efficient? coordination? requires? better?
integration? of? complex,? globally? interdependent? work? (Eagly? and? Carli? 2003;? Heath? and?
Staudenmayer? 2000).?More? interdependence? requires? communication? and? networking? skills.? The?
change? in? the? leader? task?opens?up?new?possibilities? for? typically? interpersonally?and? integration?
oriented? women? striving? for? leadership? positions? (Eagly? and? Carli? 2007;? Borghans? et? al.? 2005;?
Borghans?et?al.?2008).17?
How?do?women? lead?? In?a?meta?analysis?comparing?male?and?female? leadership?styles,?Eagly?et?al.?
(2003)? classify? three? leadership? styles.? These? styles? are? based? on? leader? behavior,? and? are?
independent? of? the? organizational? environment.18?Transformational? leaders? are? future?oriented,?
innovative? leaders,?who?empower?their?followers?to?contribute?more?capably?to?their?organization.?
They?often?act?as? role?models,? they?emphasize? the? importance?of? the?organization’s?mission,? they?






and? Fortin? (2009)? the? evolution? of? women’s? identity? about? the? self? is? linked? to? labor?market? outcomes,?
whereas?Charles?et?al.?(2009)?shows?that?the?gender?role?attitudes?of?the?median?men?drive?the?outcomes.?





to? the? self?interest?of? their? followers? in? that? they?establish?exchange? relationships?with? them:? the?
transactional? leader? clarifies? the? followers’? responsibilities,? and? rewards? followers? if? they? meet?
objectives? or? corrects? them? for? failing? to?meet? objectives.? The? transactional? leadership? style? has?
three?subcategories:?contingent?reward,?active?management?by?exception,?and?passive?management?
by?exception.?Contingent?reward?provides?rewards?if?follower?performance?meets?objectives.?Active?
management?attends? to? followers?only? if? they? fail? to?meet?objectives.?Passive?managers?wait?until?
problems? get? serious? and? intervene? only? then.? Both? transformational? and? transactional? leaders?
recognize? their? pivotal? role? and? take? responsibility? for? the? leadership.? In? contrast,? the? third?
leadership? style? defines? leaders? who? lack? recognition? of? their? situation? and? authority,? and? let?
followers?do?as? they?want.?The? laissez?faire? leader? is? frequently? absent,? lacks? involvement?during?
critical?junctures,?and?generally?fails?to?take?responsibility?for?managing.?Eagly?et?al.?(2003)?find?that?
the? transformational? leadership? style? is? positively? related? to? effectiveness,? and? female? leaders,?
compared?to?their?male?counterparts,?use?more?often?the?transformational?style.?
Eagly? and? Carli? (2003)? show? that? although? women? have? some? advantages? in? leadership,? since?
“women?are?more?likely?than?men?to?lead?in?a?style?that?is?effective?under?contemporary?conditions”,?







their? leadership? style?was? stereotypically?masculine,? like? autocratic? or? directive,? or? if? the? female?
leader?occupied?a?male?dominated?role,?or?if?the?evaluators?were?men.?Eagly?and?Karau?(2002)?show?





change? in? favor? of? female? advantage,? “appointments? of? female? leaders? have? come? to? symbolize?
progressive?organizational?change”?(Eagly?and?Carli?2003;?Eagly?and?Carli?2004).?
The?need? to?symbolize?organizational?change? is?naturally?higher? if? the?organization? is? in?need?of?a?
change,?for? instance,? if?the? leader?task? is?especially?risky.?Glass?and?Cook?(2016)?focused?their?study?




goals,?which? in? turn?often? leads? to?repeated? failure.?The?evidence? in?Glass?and?Cook? (2016)?shows?
that?women? are? often? “the? expendables”?within? an? organization,?which? also? points? to? literature?






pressure? that? favors? gender? equality”? (Eagly? and? Carli? 2003).? As? Besley? et? al.? (2013)? show,? the?
“mediocre?man”?faces?a?crisis?by?gender?quotas.?Nevertheless,?women?still?have?to?face?prejudice?on?
their? path? towards? a? leadership? role.? In? democracies,?women? have? the? free? choice? to? promote?
gender?equality.?The?old?societal?developmental?equilibrium? is?disappearing?and?changing?already,?
while? the?new?equilibrium? is?not? reached? yet.?Bertrand? (2011)? reviews? in? a? separate? chapter? the?















it? is?still?men?who? fill?most?of? the?top?positions.?Economically,? it?would?be?optimal? to? increase?the?
number?of?women?participating? in? leadership,?since?highly?competent?women?challenge?mediocre?





candidates? strategically? to? riskier? positions? on? the? ballot,? sacrificing?women?who? entered? due? to?
gender?quotas.19?The?phenomenon?of?women?being?expendable? is?similar?to?the?findings?described?
in?Glass? and? Cook? (2006)? using? data? on? CEOs.?Using? Swedish? data,? Folke? and? Rickne? (2012)? find?
further? support? for? a?negative?bias? against?women? in? the?promotion?process? for?more? influential?
positions? in?the?political?hierarchy.?The?authors?find?that?the?negative?bias? is?the?main?reason?for?a?
high?turnover?rate?of?women?in?Swedish?municipalities,?while?men?continue?to?rule?in?the?top?levels?
of? power? and? influence? female? careers.? In? a? later? paper,? comparing? gender? inequality? to? racial?
inequality,?Folke?and?Rickne?(2014)?show?that?women?face?a?“glass?ceiling”?throughout?their?careers,?
while?minorities? are? challenged? by? a? “sticky? floor”? early? in? their? career,? but? the? disadvantages?
decrease?over?time.?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????






why? is? it? in?their? interest?to? inhibit?female?participation? in? leadership.?Using?data?from?Sweden,?Dal?




the?elite.?However,?this? is?not?necessarily? inefficient?for?democracies,? if?we?consider?the?findings? in?






highly?educated?daughters?might?also?be?more? likely?not? to?marry?or? to?divorce.20?In?other?words,?












planning? and? successful? coordination,? heterogeneity? might? not? only? mean? the? protection? of?
individual?freedom?and?diversity,?but? it?might?mean?the? lack?of?resolutions?to? inequalities?between?




and?Hoeffler? (2015)? revisit?earlier? results? finding? that? “elections?discipline? leaders? to?deliver?good?
economic?performance”.?Using?a?new?global?data?set?with? information?whether?elections?are? free?
and? fair,? the?authors? show? that? leaders?do?not?matter?as? long?as?elections?are? free?and? fair.?One?
intuitive?explanation?could?be?that?voters?trust?that?their? leaders?are?competent,?and?on?aggregate?
they?vote?randomly,?so?that?two?major?parties?run?head?to?head.? In?a?well?functioning?democracy,?




majority.?Only? their?own? representatives?are? legitimate? to?express?what? they?need? to?enable? them? to? solve?




economic? actors? do?what? they? know? best? to? keep? the? economy? growing.22?However,? Collier? and?
Hoeffler?(2015)?also?show?that?making?use?of?“illicit?tactics”?during?elections?is?widespread,?and?the?
cost? for? the? use? of? illicit? tactics? is? the? neglect? of? the? original? leader? task,? the? delivery? of? good?
economic? performance.? Even?worse,? Kanthak? and?Woon? (2014)? recently? showed? in? a? laboratory?





















Women? are? still? a? minority? in? top?level? business? positions.? Besides? explanations? about? gender?
differences?in?risk?preferences,?attitude?towards?competition?and?negotiation,?or?social?preferences?
(Bertrand?2011),?a?potential?explanation?for?this?gender?gap? is?that?men?are?more?effective? leaders?
than?women.24?With? this? study,?we? test?whether? there?are?differences?between?male?and? female?
leaders? in?how? effective? they? are? in? generating? coordination?between? followers.?Could? it?be? that?
male? leaders?are?better?at?recognizing?their?pivotal?role??Could? it?be?that?male? leaders?are?socially?
more?credible?and?that?followers?follow?male?leaders?to?a?greater?extent??Or?could?it?be?that?there?
are?no?gender?differences?in?this?regard??The?insights?of?our?study?are?useful?for?organizations.?If?we?
confirm?that?male? leaders?are?more?effective,?this?suggests?that? it? is?efficient?to?have?more?men? in?
top?level? positions.? On? the? other? hand,? if? we? do? not? find? a? gender? effect,? this? suggests? that?
organizations?might?benefit?from?reconsidering?their?gender?imbalance?in?top?level?positions.?
To? investigate?our? research?question,?we? run?a? laboratory?experiment?using?a?minimum?effort? (or?
weak?link)? coordination? game.? This? game? is? a? simple? tool? to? study? leadership? in? a? controlled?
laboratory? setting.?The?game?models? coordination?within?organizations? (firms),?where?players?are?
interdependent? and? jointly?engage? in?production? (Van?Huyck?et? al.?1990).?The? lowest?performing?
player?determines?group?performance.?Prominent?examples?are?“the?assembly? line? that?moves?no?
faster? than? the? slowest? line?worker,? collaborative? reports?or? software? that? is? incomplete?until? the?
final?contribution?is?finished,?and?perceptions?of?overall?product?quality?that?is?often?sensitive?to?the?
worst?performing?feature”?(Brandts?et?al.?2015),? like?best?quality?food?might?be?undervalued? if? it? is?
served?unprofessionally.?Another?example? is? investment?of?firms? into?the?same? industry,?when?the?
investment?only?pays?off?if?a?sufficient?number?of?firms?choose?to?invest,?like?network?investments,?










are?more?efficient.?With? respect? to? the?group,?groups,?who?coordinate?on? the?same?effort? level,?are?said? to?
coordinate?more? efficiently.?With? “credibility”? we? refer? to? the? beliefs? of? the? followers? that? the? leader? is?






Coordination? failure? and? failure? to? coordinate? on? the? efficient? equilibrium? are? the? standard?
outcomes?in?minimum?effort?coordination?games?if?communication?is?not?possible?(Van?Huyck?et?al.?
1990).? Costless,? non?binding? pre?play? communication? (cheap? talk)? between? players? improves?
coordination? and? efficiency? (Blume? and? Ortmann? 2007).? However,? in? real? organizations?
communication?between?all?workers?is?typically?unfeasible,?for?example?because?it?would?entail?large?
costs.?Brandts?and?Cooper?(2007)?show,?that?organizational?hierarchy?can?provide?a?partial?solution.?
Leaders? can? improve? coordination? and? efficiency? by? using? costless? communication? (Brandts? and?
Cooper?2007).?We?tie?our?work?up?to?Kriss?and?Eil? (2012)?who?study?centralized?communication? in?
the?minimum?effort?coordination?game,?and?we?allow?randomly?selected? leaders?to?use?cheap?talk?
towards? their? followers.? In? their? paper,? Kriss? and? Eil? view? leaders? as? “coordination? devices”,?
facilitating?coordination?problems?by?using?costly?and?non?binding?pre?play?communication?towards?
followers.?They?find?that? leaders?gain?credibility?when?they?receive? input?messages?from?followers,?
visible? only? to? the? leader,? and? thus? leader? messages? are? more? effective? in? that? case.? In? our?
experimental? design,? messages? are? costless,? and? it? is? only? leaders? who? can? use? pre?play?
communication.?Followers? cannot? send?messages? to? their? leaders.? Leaders? can? suggest?a?numeric?
effort? level? to? their? followers.?Since?we?are?curious?whether?we? find?a?gender?difference? in? leader?
effectiveness,?we?use? the?simple,?numeric,?one?way?communication?and? the? randomization?of? the?
leader?assignment?as?tools?to?study?our?research?question.?The?treatment?variations?are?the?gender?
of? the? leader?and?whether? the?gender?of? the? leader? is? revealed? to? the? followers?or?not.?Note,? the?
game?does?not? require?any? special?ability? (for?example,? like? the?ability? to? solve?math? tasks)?when?
participating.? This? way? we? exclude? the? possibility? that? followers? judge? their? leaders? based? on?
competencies?other?than?their?ability?to?coordinate?the?actions?of?others.?













the? leader?and? the? followers? in?organizational?hierarchies.?We?expect?male? leaders? to?send?higher?
message?values?than? female? leaders,?and,?when?gender? is?observed,?we?predict?that? followers?will?
follow?male?leaders?to?a?greater?extent.?
We?find?female? leaders?to?send?riskier?messages?than?male? leaders? if?gender? is?not?revealed.? If?we?
reveal?gender,?male?and? female? leaders?do?not?differ? in? their?message? sending?behavior.?Further,?
male?and?female? leaders?are?followed?by?an?equally?high?share?of?followers.? In?other?words,?there?
are? no? gender? differences? in? leader? effectiveness.?We? think? that? our? “no? effect”? findings? are? an?
important? contribution? to? the? literature.? In?particular,?as?pointed?out?by?Dufwenberg?and?Gneezy?











In?each?period,?every?participant? i ?in?group? k ?has?to?choose?simultaneously?an?effort? level? ieffort ?
by?picking?a?number?between?1?and?7.?Participant? i ’s?earnings?are?equal?to:?
??? ? ????? ? ????? ? ??????? ? ??? ? ??????????,?
where? minkeffort ?denotes? the?minimum? effort? chosen? by? any? participant? in? group? k .? To? facilitate?
calculations,?we?provide?participants?with?an?Earnings?Table,?reproduced?here?as?Table?2.1.?At? the?
end?of? each?period,?participants? are? informed?of? their? earnings? and? the? group’s?minimum? effort.?






? 7? 6? 5? 4? 3? 2? 1?
7? 0.60? 0.50? 0.40? 0.30? 0.20? 0.10? 0.00?
6? ? 0.575? 0.475? 0.375? 0.275? 0.175? 0.075?
5? ? ? 0.55? 0.45? 0.35? 0.25? 0.15?
4? ? ? ? 0.525? 0.425? 0.325? 0.225?
3? ? ? ? ? 0.50? 0.40? 0.30?
2? ? ? ? ? ? 0.475? 0.375?
1? ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.45?
?
The?game?has?multiple?equilibria:?every?effort?level?if?simultaneously?chosen?by?all?participants?in?the?
same? group? is? an? equilibrium? solution.? The? equilibrium? points? are? strictly? Pareto?ranked.? If? all?
participants?choose?the?highest?effort?(7),?then?the?highest?payoff?obtains?for?everyone?(0.60).?Thus?
this? is? the?most?efficient,?payoff?dominant?outcome? for?each?participant.?However,? if?participants?
cannot?use?communication?to?coordinate?their?actions,?and?since?multiple?equilibria?are?possible?and?









Huyck?et?al.?1990),? therefore? these?principles?arguably?apply? in? the?early?periods?of? the? repeated?
game,?before?a? long?history?of?play? is?established.?The?“efficiency?principle”,?or?concept?of?payoff?
dominance,? is? one? deductive? selection? principle,? based? on? the? efficiency? of? an? equilibrium? point.?
Another?deductive? selection?principle? is? the? “security?principle”,?or?maximin?action,?based?on? the?
riskiness?of?an?equilibrium?point.?An?action?is?secure?when?it?delivers?the?largest?payoff?given?that?the?
worst?possible?outcome?is?selected?(Neumann?and?Morgenstern?1972).?Inductive?selection?principles?
can? be? applied? if? information? from? previous? periods? is? available? and? earlier? experiments? already?
provided?evidence? for?a? strong?history?dependence? in? case?of? repeated? interactions? (Brandts?and?
Cooper?2006a).?
In?our?design,?we?randomly?assign?one?participant?in?each?group?to?take?the?role?of?the?leader,?which?
leaves? the?other?group?members?as? followers.?Leaders?can?have?different? tools? to?move? followers?
away? from? following? the?“security?principle”? towards?more?efficient?coordination.?Commonly?used?
tools?are?incentive?changes?and?communication.?Brandts?et?al.?(2015)?showed,?varying?interventions?
exogenously? in? a? controlled? setting,? that? communication? is?more? effective? than? incentives,?while?
Brandts?and?Cooper?(2007)?showed?earlier,?that?communication?is?more?effective?even?if?leaders?can?
vary?financial?incentives?endogenously.?
We? allow? leaders?only? to?use?pre?play? communication.?Messages? are? costless? and? voluntary.?The?
leader? can?either? send?a?numeric?message? (“7”,? “6”,? “5”,? “4”,? “3”,? “2”,? “1”),?or?no?message? (“No?
suggestion”).?The?leader’s?message?is?visible?to?all?group?members?and?is?sent?in?each?period?before?
group?members?make?their?decisions.?Messages?are?non?binding?in?that?not?following?a?message?has?





position?until? the?end?of?period?10.? In? the? instructions? for?Part?2,?we? inform?participants? that? the?
difference?between?Part?1?and?Part?2? is?that?the?previous? leader?of?Part?1?reverts?to?being?a?group?







the? leader,? is? a?within?subjects? variation,? because?we? repeat? the? role? assignment? in? Part? 2.? The?
second?treatment?variation,?whether?the?gender?of?the? leader? is?observable,? is?a?between?subjects?
variation.?Participants?are?randomly?assigned?either?to?the?Gender?Revealed?treatment?which?reveals?







profile? creator?website? pickaface.net? (see? Figure? B1? in?Appendix? 3B).?All? pictures? have? the? same?
clothing,?facial?expression,?face?form,?and?eye?color.?We?varied?hair?length,?hair?color,?skin?color,?and?
did?small?modifications?to?the?lips,?nose,?eyes,?and?hairstyle?to?match?generic?racial?features.?We?use?
profile? pictures? to? preserve? anonymity?whilst? revealing? gender.?We? opted? for? pictures? that? also?
contain?other?cues?such?as?race?and?hairstyles?to?distract?participants?from?discerning?the?purpose?of?
the?study?(Zizzo?2010),?which?can?potentially?lead?to?intentional?changes?in?behavior?(Camerer?2011).?







be? in? line?with? the? incentives?and? rational? to?do.? If? this?were? true,?we?would? indeed? find?a?strong?
gender? gap? in? effectiveness,? making? us? careful? when? interpreting? results.? On? the? other? hand,?
revealing?gender?could?induce?participants?to?follow?female?leaders?more?often,?even?if?they?sacrifice?
part?of?their?earnings,?only?to?behave? in?a?more?“socially?desirable”?way,?because?they?might?think?




leaders? of? the? opposite? gender? just? to? favor? the? experimenter.? Depending? on? the? treatment?
condition,? we? display? the? profile? picture? of? leaders? along? with? their? messages? visible? to? their?
followers.?
2.2.3?Predictions?
Our?main? interest? in? this? study? is? to? reveal? whether? there? are? any? differences? in? effectiveness?
between?male?and?female?leaders.?In?the?minimum?effort?coordination?game,?the?effectiveness?of?a?
leader? depends? on? the?minimum? effort? level? chosen? by? followers? and? the? number? of? followers.?
Therefore?effective?leaders?are?those?who?are?credible?to?their?followers?and?who?request?high?effort?
levels.?Accordingly,?possible? gender?differences? in? leader? effectiveness? can?have? two?origins:?one?
origin?in?the?message?content?(such?as? leader?behavior)?and?one?origin?in?leader?credibility?(such?as?
how? followers? perceive? their? leaders).? The? following? predictions? are? proposed? for? explaining? any?
differences?in?the?effectiveness?of?male?and?female?leaders:?
Prediction? 1? (leader? behavior? and?message? content):?Male? leaders? are? expected? to? send? higher?
message?values?than?female?leaders,?irrespective?of?whether?the?treatment?reveals?the?gender?or?not.?
Justifications? for? this? prediction? are? earlier? findings? about? gender? differences? in? risk? preferences?




overestimate? the? number? of? their? followers? irrespective? of?whether? gender? is? observed? or? not.?
Leaders,?who?cannot?observe?the?gender?composition?of? the?group,?might?perceive?a?high? level?of?
similarity?with?followers?(for?example,?because?others?are?students?as?well,?or?simply?because?others?
participate? in? the? same? experiment),? and? therefore? they? will? increase? projection? and? reduce?
stereotyping?when?guessing?followers’?intentions?in?the?given?strategic?interaction?(Ames?et?al.?2012),?
which?will? lead? to?male? leaders? requesting?more?often? risky?high?effort? levels? (which? is? the?action?
they?would? themselves? choose).? If? there? are? any? differences? in? the?message? content,? then? these?
differences?should?already?be?observed?in?Gender?Not?Revealed,?and?should?be?present?persistently?
in?Gender?Revealed.?
Prediction? 2? (follower?behavior?and? leader? credibility):? Followers? follow?male? leaders? to?a?greater?










image? (such? as?being?male,?or?dressing? and? acting?masculine)?may,? in? fact,?have? little? to?do?with?














to?each?part.?To? facilitate?calculations? for? the?participants,?we?handed?out?printed?versions?of? the?
instructions?for?Part?1,?which?contained?the?Earnings?Table?showing?how?earnings?were?determined.?




payoff?quiz? to?check?whether?everybody?understood? the?game’s?payoff?structure.? Instructions?and?
screenshots?can?be?found?in?Appendix?1B.?
Although? in? literature?the?most?common?context?for?the?minimum?effort?coordination?game? is?that?











group?members?who?will? follow? the? leader’s?message?by?asking? in?each?period?“Out?of? the? seven?




At? the? end? of? each? period,? participants? saw? their? effort? choice,? the? group?minimum? effort,? their?
earnings? in? that?period,?and? their?accumulated?earnings.?Participants?could?not?observe? individual?
effort?choices.?
At?the?end?of?the?experiment?participants? filled? in?a? final?questionnaire.?We?asked?participants? for?
their? subjective?evaluations?of? the?group’s?performance,? the? leaders’?performance,?and? the?other?
group?members’?performance? for?each?part.?Specifically,? first?we?asked? “Please? rate?your?group’s?
performance?in?Part?1”.?Participants?could?indicate?their?answer?on?a?scale?from?1?for?“very?poor”?to?
5?for?“very?good”.?Second?we?asked?“How?much?do?you?agree/disagree?with?the?following?statement:?
‘My? group’s? performance? in? Part? 1? is? mostly? due? to? the? judgment? of? the? Message? Sender.’”?
Participants? could? indicate? their? answer? on? a? scale? from? 1? for? “completely? disagree”? to? 5? for?
“completely?agree”.?Third?we?asked?“How?much?do?you?agree/disagree?with?the?following?statement:?







































that? revealing?gender?or?not?does?not?matter? for? the?average?minimum?effort? level.?On? the?other?
hand,?gender?matters?for?the?average?minimum?effort? level.? In?Part?1,?groups? led?by?men?perform?
better.? In? Part? 2,? groups? overtaken? by? women? keep? historic? minimum? effort? levels? achieved?
previously?with?male? leaders,?whereas?groups?overtaken?by?men?decline? in?performance.?Overall,?
groups?led?by?women?do?better.?Panel?B?of?Figure?2.1?shows?the?aggregate?treatment?effects?on?the?
suggestion?of?seven? in?each?period.?Initially,?hidden? leaders?suggest?more?often?seven?than? leaders?
whose? gender? is? revealed.? The? difference? in? suggesting? seven? across? revelation? conditions?
disappears? over? all? periods.? Initially,? female? leaders? request?more? often? seven? than? their?male?
counterparts.?Later?in?Part?1,?when?men?become?more?effective?leaders,?the?difference?in?suggesting?












correct?standard?errors? for?clustering?at? the?group? level.?The?explanatory?variables? in?Model?1?are?
indicator? variables? for? the? revelation? treatment? and? the? gender? of? the? leader.? The? revelation?
treatment?has?no?effect?on?minimum?effort?and?thus?on?leader?effectiveness.?Groups?led?by?women,?
rather? than?men,? do? better? by? 0.47? effort? units? (p? =? 0.03).? However,? the? coefficient? for? female?
leadership?decreases?and?loses?significance?if?we?control?for?leader?messages,?as?we?do?in?Model?2.?
Table?2.3? Aggregate?treatment?effects?
? Model?1? Model?2? Model?3?
n?=?300? n?=?300? n?=?300?






















Notes.? For? the? estimations? of?Models? 1&2?we? collapse? by? group? and? period,? and? use? group?level? random?
effects?GLS?regressions.?The?models?contain?300?observations?over?20?periods?and?15?groups.?For?Model?3?we?




Using?Model? 3,?we? analyze? differences? between? the? revelation? conditions? and?male? and? female?
leaders?in?suggesting?seven.?The?model?contains?only?observations?of?leaders?and?we?use?a?subject?
level? regression,?while? correcting? standard?errors? for? clustering?at? the?group? level.?The? revelation?
treatment?has?no? significant? effect?on? suggesting? seven,? although?hidden? leaders? request? slightly?
more?often?seven.?Men?and?women?differ?in?leader?behavior?as?women?request?by?0.17?more?often?















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Period
Non-revealed condition Revealed condition






















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Period
Non-revealed condition Revealed condition




the?same?extent,?choosing?an?effort? level?of?around?four?on?average? (see?Table?A1? in?Appendix?1A?
containing?descriptive?statistics?for?all?the?20?periods?of?the?experiment).?
Next,? as? reported? in? Table? 2.4,?we? look? for? treatment? effects? on? group?minimum? effort? and? the?
suggestion?of?seven?by?treatment?conditions,?adding?interaction?variables?to?the?models?from?Table?
2.3?above.?The?dependent?variable? in?Models?1?and?2? is?the?group?minimum?effort,?so?we?collapse?
the? data? by? group? and? period,? estimate? these?models? using? group?level? regressions,? and? correct?
standard?errors? for? clustering?at? the?group? level.?As?explanatory?variables? in?Model?1?we?use? the?
interaction? of? the? revelation? treatment? and? the? gender? of? the? leader.? In? Gender?Not?Revealed,?
female? leaders?are?more?effective? than? their?male? counterparts?by?0.63?effort?units? (p?=?0.05).? In?
Gender?Revealed,? female? leader?effectiveness?decreases?by?more? than?50%,?compared? to?Gender?
Not?Revealed,?and?the?gender?difference?in?leader?effectiveness?loses?significance?(p?=?0.27?based?on?
the? post?estimation? test).? However,? any? gender? difference? in? Gender?Not?Revealed? can? only? be?




? Model?1? Model?2? Model?3?
n?=?300? n?=?300? n?=?300?




























Notes.? For? the? estimations? of?Models? 1&2?we? collapse? by? group? and? period,? and? use? group?level? random?
effects?GLS?regressions.?The?models?contain?300?observations?over?20?periods?and?15?groups.?For?Model?3?we?




In? Model? 3,? we? analyze? differences? between? male? and? female? leaders? who? request? seven? by?
revelation?conditions.?The?model?contains?only?observations?of? leaders?and?we?use?a?subject?level?
regression,?while?correcting?standard?errors?for?clustering?at?the?group? level.?As?expected?from?the?
previous?models,?non?revealed? female? leaders?are?by?0.26?more? likely? to?suggest?seven? than? their?
male?counterparts?(p?=?0.02).?In?Gender?Revealed,?male?leaders?increase?by?0.05?and?female?leaders?
decrease?by?0.21? the? frequency?of?requesting?seven,?and? thus? the?gender?difference? in?requesting?




Conclusion? 1:? Any? differences? in? leader? effectiveness? between?male? and? female? leaders? can? be?
explained? as? mediated? effects? through? the? leaders’? message? sending? behavior.? In? Gender?Not?




This? section? analyzes?descriptive? statistics?of?all?experimentally?observed? variables?by?all? the? four?
treatment?conditions?in?period?1.?The?first?period?of?the?experiment? is?of?special?interest?and?could?
yield? important? additional? insights,? since? observations? in? that? period? are? independent? from? any?
history,?whereas? in? later? periods? participants? have? already? information? about? previous? outcomes?
which?might? influence? their?decision?making.?Table?2.5?below? contains? the?observations? from? the?




Although? female? leaders? request? higher? effort? than? male? leaders,? the? rank?sum? tests? yield? no?
significant?results?(p?=?0.13?in?Gender?Not?Revealed?and?p?=?0.27?in?Gender?Revealed).?Nevertheless,?
we? can?observe? some?differences? in? leader?behavior.?Male? leaders?do?not? change? their?message?
sending? strategy?across? revelation? conditions.?On?average,? they? request? four.?On? the?other?hand,?
female? leaders?change?their?behavior?to?a?small?extent.? In?Gender?Not?Revealed,?all?female? leaders?
request?the?highest?effort?(7),?but?in?Gender?Revealed?they?become?more?careful,?even?though,?they?
still? request?higher?effort? (6)? than?male? leaders.?The? leaders’?own?effort?choices?are?close? to? their?
suggestions,?except?maybe?for?female?leaders?in?Gender?Revealed.?In?that?treatment?female?leaders?
choose? their?own? effort? level?by? 0.75? units? lower? than? their?own? suggestion.? Their? followers? are?
seemingly?somewhat?reluctant?to?follow?the?suggestions?as?well.?The?difference?between?the?initial?
suggestion?and?the?group?effort?level?is?0.47?units.?
Data? seems? to? tell?us? that? the? revelation?of? the?profile?picture? increases?uncertainty?and? induces?
both? leaders?and? followers? to?act?more?cautiously.?Participants?might? try? to?guess? the?goal?of?our?
study,? so? that?both? followers? and? leaders? get?distracted? to? some? degree? from? the? game?play.? In?
Gender?Revealed,?the?share?of?followers? is? lower:?17?percentage?points? lower?for?male? leaders?and?
10?percentage?points? lower? for? female? leaders,? compared? to?Gender?Not?Revealed,?but? rank?sum?






beliefs? about? the? share? of? followers.? In? Gender?Revealed,? we? find? no? stereotype? bias? in? group?
















































































































































Notes.? The? table? reports? the?mean,? standard?deviation? (in?parentheses),? and?p?values?of?non?parametric?
Wilcoxon? rank?sum? test? results.?We? test? for? treatment?differences?with? the?null?hypothesis? that? the? two?
samples? come? from? the? same? population.? The? suggestion? variable? contains? only? positive? numeric?
suggestions?and?has?missing?values?if?no?message?was?sent.?The?belief?variables?contain?missing?values?if?the?
question?was?omitted?during?the?experiment?due?to?leaders?who?sent?no?message.?Overestimation?refers?to?








leaders,? we? do? not? find? that? male? leaders? would? significantly? overestimate? the? share? of? their?
followers?across? revelation? conditions? (p?>?0.31).?On? the?other?hand,? female? leaders? change? their?




Anyhow,? in?Gender?Revealed,?women?become?more? careful? in? their?beliefs,? suggestions? and?own?
effort?choices.?
Usually? in? the?minimum? effort? coordination? game,? if? centralized? communication? is? possible,?we?
would?expect?to?see?high?group?average?effort,?high?minimum?effort?and?high?average?earnings?as?a?
consequence?of?high?suggestions?(Kriss?and?Eil?2012).?Instead,?especially?in?Gender?Not?Revealed,?we?
find? that? female? leaders? requesting? seven? lead? their?groups? into? coordination? failure,?and? thus? to?
losses?and?the?outstandingly?low?mean?earnings?of?$0.19?in?the?first?period.?Mean?earnings?of?those?
women?led?groups?differ?significantly?across?revelation?conditions?(p?=?0.00)?and?compared?to?male?
leaders?(p?=?0.00).?In? line?with?the?severe? losses,?women? initially?overestimate?the?number?of?their?
followers,? and? adjust? their?beliefs?by? learning? in? later?periods? (see?Panel?B? in? Figure?2.2? showing?
overestimation?by? leaders?under?different?treatment?conditions).?The?severe? initial? failure?reminds?
followers?of?the?riskiness?to?follow?a?high?suggestion,?and?experiencing?an?unsuccessful?first?period?










are?more? eager? than?male? leaders? to? reach? the? very? best? outcome,? so? that? they? start?with? high?
ambitions? and? request? the? highest? possible? effort? (Kay? and? Shipman? 2014).?However,? once? their?






















1 2 3 4
Quartiles of all 20 periods
Non-revealed, Male leader Non-revealed, Female leader

























1 2 3 4
Quartiles of all 20 periods
Non-revealed, Male leader Non-revealed, Female leader
Revealed, Male leader Revealed, Female leader
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?
judge? the? number? of? their? followers,? and? they?make?more? careful? (less? risky)? decisions.? Another?
explanation?for?the?change?in?female?leaders’?behavior?across?the?revelation?conditions?could?be?that?
revealing?the?profile?picture?makes?the?leader’s?interaction?with?the?group?more?personal,?and?since?






This? section?analyzes?how? followers? react? to? their? leaders’? suggestions,?and?whether? the?different?
strategies?of?male?and?female?leaders?result?in?similar?leader?credibility?across?revelation?conditions.?





































1st?period?minimum?effort? ? ? 0.17**?
(0.08)?
















higher? the? suggestion? the?higher? the?average?group?effort,?which? is? in? line?with?earlier? findings? in?
literature?(Cooper?2007).?A?one?unit?higher?first?period?suggestion?has?a?significant?negative?effect?on?
effectiveness? in?all? three?models.?From?Model?2?we? can? see? that?although?a?one?unit?higher? first?
period?suggestion?destroys?effectiveness?by?0.28?units,?a?one?unit?higher?suggestion? in? the?second?
period?increases?effectiveness?by?0.24?units.?However,?the?result?for?the?second?period?suggestion?is?
not? robust? if?we? include? the?minimum? effort? levels? of? the? first? two? periods? in?Model? 3.? Group?
performance?history?in?early?periods?affects?outcomes?significantly,?which?confirms?the?effect?of?the?
inductive?selection?principle?in?the?game.?We?can?observe?that?strategies?of?starting?with?low?effort?




only.? Table? 2.7? summarizes? the? regression? results? in? Gender?Not?Revealed.?We? cluster? standard?
errors?at?the?individual?level.?The?dependent?variable?is?individual?effort?in?all?four?models.?
In?Model? 1,? the? explanatory? variables? are? the? gender? of? the? leader,? interaction? variables? of? the?
gender?of?the? leader?and?a?dummy?which?takes?the?value?of?1? if?the? leader?sent?no?message?and?0?
otherwise,?and?interaction?variables?of?the?gender?of?the?leader?and?the?message?value.?The?gender?
of? the? leader? in?Gender?Not?Revealed? is?only? a? control? variable,?which? allows?us? to? compare? the?
estimation?results?across?revelation?conditions.?Trivially,?we?expect?to?find?no?gender?differences?in?
the?effects?of?sending?no?message?or?another?message?than?zero.?In?Gender?Not?Revealed,?followers?
could?have?perceived?any?difference?between?male?and? female? leaders?only? through? the? leaders’?
message?sending?behavior,?as?a?difference?in?message?values.?Indeed,?we?find?that?the?coefficient?for?
having? a? female? leader? who? requests? zero? is? not? significant.? According? to? the? results? of? the?
corresponding?post?estimation?tests,?the?effects?of?sending?no?message?or?sending?another?message?
than? zero? do? not? differ? by? the? gender? of? the? leader.?Moreover,? the? post?estimation? test? on? the?









In?Model?2,?we?extend?Model?1?and?add? interaction?variables?of?the?gender?of?the? leader?and? the?









higher?message?value?decreases? stronger? for? female? rather? than?male? leaders.?The? coefficient? for?









Model?1? Model?2? Model?3? Model?4?


























































Post?estimation?test? ? p?=?0.01? p?=?0.00? p?=?0.00?
Gender?x?Difference?between?previous?message?and?previous?minimum?effort?

















Notes.?Subject?level? random?and? fixed?effects?GLS? regressions.?All?models? contain?1120?observations?of?56?








between? the? leader’s? previous?message? and? the? group’s? previous?minimum? effort? tells? us? how?









to?be? followed.?The?effects?of?group?history?remain?stable?and? the?difference?between? the?effects?
remains?significant?(p?=?0.00),?compared?to?the?results?of?Model?2.?Similarly,?the?effects?of?message?
value?remain?stable?and?the?difference?between?the?effects?becomes?even?more?significant?(p?=?0.01).?
Thus,? we? can? observe? that? followers? rely? more? on? group? history? than? on? the? female? leader’s?
suggestion,? although? gender? is? hidden.? One? obvious? reason? for? this? observation? is? that?women?
request?higher?effort?than?men,?even?after?a?failure?to?coordinate?on?the?requested?effort?level.?
Male?and? female? leaders?differ? in? their?message? sending? strategy.?From?Panel?B? in?Figure?2.2?and?
Figures?A3?and?A2?in?Appendix?1A,?it?gets?graphically?obvious?that?female?leaders?fail?to?adjust?their?
suggestions? to? the? established? group? history:? the? minimum? effort? in? their? groups? is? low,? their?
suggestions? are?high,?but? the? share?of? their? followers? is? low? as?well.?Once? followers? experienced?
coordination?failure,?they?are?less?willing?to?follow?high?suggestions.?Female?leaders?seem?to?ignore?
group?history,?and?we?will? further?explore? this?behavior? in? the? section?on? leader?behavior.?Group?
history? is? important? to? a? smaller? extent? in? the? groups? lead? by?male? leaders.?However,? followers?





and? other? subject?specific? variables?we? did? not? ask? for? during? the? experiment.?We? find? that? our?





Revealed,? there? are? two? sources? for? gender? differences? perceived? by? the? followers:? the?message?
sending?strategy?of?the?leader?and?the?gender?information?revealed?by?the?profile?pictures.?In?order?
to?separate?these?effects,?we?control?in?all?the?four?models?for?the?message?values?and?whether?any?
message? was? sent.? Holding? leader? messages? constant,? we? compare? whether? followers? behave?
differently?based?on?the?leader’s?gender.?
In?Model?1,?we?find?that?followers?significantly?decrease?their?effort?contribution?by?0.34?(p?=?0.00)?if?














Model?1? Model?2? Model?3? Model?4?


























































Post?estimation?test? ? p?=?0.05? p?=?0.04? p?=?0.00?
Gender?x?Difference?between?previous?message?and?previous?minimum?effort?

















Notes.? Subject?level? random? and? fixed? effects?GLS? regressions.?All?models? contain? 980? observations? of? 49?




In?Model?2,?we?add? interaction? variables?of? the?gender?of? the? leader?and? the?previous?minimum?
effort.?Similarly,?like?in?Gender?Not?Revealed,?the?previous?minimum?effort?has?a?significant?positive?
effect?on? follower?effort,? in?case?of?both?male?and? female? leaders.?Again,? followers? led?by?women?
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previous?message?value?and? the?previous?minimum?effort,? to?which?we?also? referred?as?previous?
leader? effectiveness.? Like? in? Gender?Not?Revealed,? the? previous? leader? effectiveness? has? only?
insignificant?small?effects?on?follower?effort.?The?effects?are?the?same?with?male?and?female?leaders?
(p?=?0.98).?The?effects?of?group?history?remain?stable?and?the?difference?between?the?effects?remains?
significant? (p?=?0.04),?compared? to? the? results?of?Model?2.?Similarly,? the?effects?of?message?value?
remain?stable?and?the?difference?between?the?effects?remains?significant?(p?=?0.09).?
Finally,?in?Model?4,?we?estimate?the?regression?of?Model?3?with?subjects?fixed?effects?to?control?for?
everything?else? concerning?participants.?We? find? that? the? coefficient? for? the?gender?of? the? leader?
decreases? to? ?0.14? and? is? not? significant? anymore? (p? =? 0.32).? The? effect? of? the?message? value?
increases? for?male? leaders?and?the?standard?errors? for?both?male?and? female? leaders?decrease,?so?
that? the?difference? in?message?value?effects? is?magnified? (p?=?0.00).?The?other? results?of?Model?3?
remain?robust.?From?the?fixed?effects?regression?it?gets?clear?that,?just?like?in?Gender?Not?Revealed,?it?
is?the?message?value?and?the?group?history?which?matter?the?most?for?the?effort?choice?of?followers,?
and? the?effects?of? the?message?value?and? the?group?history?differ? significantly?between?male?and?
female?leaders.?
Like?we?speculated?above,?gender?might?have? its?main?effect?through?the?chosen?message?sending?
strategy? of? the? leader,? like? which? suggestion? to? send? first? and? whether? to? switch? to? another?
suggestion?later.?In?the?descriptive?section?we?found?that?female?leaders?start?in?the?first?period?with?
requesting?higher?effort? levels? than?male? leaders,?under?both? revelation?conditions? (Table?2.5).? In?
Gender?Revealed,?women? send? on? average? lower,?more? careful? suggestions? than? in?Gender?Not?
Revealed,?and?this?could?explain?why?we?observe?a?smaller?gender?gap?in?the?message?value?effects.?




effectiveness.? Indeed,?we? find? that? the?effect?of? group?history?matters?more? for? followers? led?by?
women.?Male? leaders’?willingness? to? switch? to? a? lower?message? and? optimize? earnings? that?way?
similarly?supports?male?leader?effectiveness.?Sending?any?suggestion,?even?a?low?message?of?only?1,?














treatment,?the?gender?of?the? leader,?and?a?dummy? for?requesting?seven.?We? find?that?under?both?
revelation?conditions,?men?and?women?are?followed?to?the?same?extent?after?a?failure?period.?
Conclusion?2:?We? find?only?partially?support? for?Prediction?2.?Men?and?women?are? followed? to? the?
same?extent,?both?in?Gender?Not?Revealed?and?Gender?Revealed.?
2.3.4?Leader?Behavior?
This? section? analyzes? how? the? leaders? react? to? the? observed? behavior? of? their? followers,? namely?
group?history,?and?which?are?the?different?strategies?of?male?and?female?leaders.?Figure?2.3?depicts?
the?mean?message?value?by?treatment?conditions.?The?figure?shows?that?female? leaders?send?both?






















1 2 3 4
Quartiles of all 20 periods
Non-revealed, Male leader Non-revealed, Female leader











Model?1? Model?2? Model?3? Model?4?






















Post?estimation?test? ? p?=?0.74? p?=?0.99? p?=?0.94?
Gender?x?Difference?between?previous?message?and?previous?minimum?effort?








Post?estimation?test? ? ? p?=?0.03? p?=?0.00?
Gender?x?Previous?guessed?share?of?followers?
Male?leader? ? ? ? ?2.60**?
(1.27)?
Female?leader? ? ? ? ?0.06?
(0.87)?














In?Model? 1,? the? only? explanatory? variable? is? the? gender? of? the? leader.? The? coefficient? for? being?
female? is?1.38,?but?not? significant? (p?=?0.21).?Although? female? leaders? send?higher?messages? than?
their?male? counterparts,?male?and? female? leaders?do?not? send? significantly?different?messages? to?
their?followers.25?
In?Model?2,?we?extend?Model?1?by?including?interaction?variables?of?the?gender?of?the?leader?and?the?
previous? message? value.? The? previously? sent? message? value? has? significant? positive? effects? on?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
25?If?we?modify?Model?1?by? clustering? at? the? group? level,?we? find? that? the? coefficient?of?1.38?has? a? robust?
standard?error?of?0.71?and?is?significant?(p?=?0.05),?which?means?that?female?leaders?send?significantly?higher?











who?experienced? coordination? failure,? significantly? reduce? the?message?value?by?0.75,?while? their?
female? counterparts? significantly? reduce? the?message? value? by? only? 0.31.? In? other?words,?male?




Panel?A? of? Figure? 2.2?with? Figure? 2.3,?we? can? see? that? female? leaders? persistently? stick? to? send?
message? values?higher? than? the?average?group?effort,?whereas?male? leaders?are?more? flexible? to?
adapt?to?the?group’s?average?effort?level.?The?strategy?of?male?leaders?minimizes?individual?losses?by?
switching? their? suggestions? to? coordination? on? a? lower? effort? level? after? a? failure? period,? or? by?
switching?to?a?higher?suggestion?after?initial?trust?is?established?at?a?lower?level.?Since?followers?try?
to?avoid?losses,?suggestions?of?male?leaders?are?followed?more?often.?The?strategy?of?female?leaders?






belief.?The? leader’s?belief? in? the?previous?period?has?a? significant?negative?effect?on? the?message?


















Model?1? Model?2? Model?3? Model?4?






















Post?estimation?test? ? p?=?0.43? p?=?0.05? p?=?0.58?
Gender?x?Difference?between?previous?message?and?previous?minimum?effort?








Post?estimation?test? ? ? p?=?0.90? p?=?0.57?
Gender?x?Previous?guessed?share?of?followers?
Male?leader? ? ? ? 0.26?
(0.87)?
Female?leader? ? ? ? 2.17?
(1.69)?










parentheses)?are? corrected? for? clustering?at? the? individual? level.?***Statistically? significant?at? the?1%? level,?




send?higher?messages?by?0.57,?compared? to? their?male?counterparts,?male?and? female? leaders?do?
not?send?significantly?different?messages?to?their?followers?(p?=?0.69).26?
From?Model? 2,? similarly? to? the? findings? in? Gender?Not?Revealed,? we? can? see? that? the? previous?
message?value?has?significant?positive?effects?on?message?value,?and?the?effects?do?not?differ?based?





picture? than? in? Gender?Not?Revealed.? Again,? both? male? and? female? leaders,? who? experienced?
coordination?failure,?significantly?reduce?the?message?value,?but?male?and?female?leaders?in?Gender?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
26?If?we?modify?Model?1?by? clustering? at? the? group? level,?we? find? that? the? coefficient?of?0.57?has? a? robust?
standard?error?of?0.31?and?is?significant?(p?=?0.07),?which?means?that?female?leaders?send?significantly?higher?





to? adjust? their? suggestion? to? group? history? to? the? same? extent? (p? =? 0.90).? In? exchange,? and? in?
comparison?to?Model?2,?the?effects?of?the?previous?message?value?become?significantly?different?for?
male?and?female?leaders?(p?=?0.05),?showing?a?stronger?effect?with?male? leaders.?The?coefficient?of?








positive? for? both?male? and? female? leaders,? and? this?means? that? if? leaders? believe? to? have?more?
followers,?they?send?a?suggestion?with?a?higher?value.?Although?the?belief?effect?is?larger?for?women,?
the?coefficients?are?not?significant?and?the?gender?difference? in?the?effects? is?not?significant?either.?











trials? fail? and? 2? turnarounds? are? successful? (Table? A2? in? Appendix? 1A).? Data? tells? that? the?male?
strategy?works?well?if?gender?is?hidden,?but?it?is?less?efficient?in?Gender?Revealed.?Obviously,?if?more?
information?is?revealed?about?the?leader,?it?gets?less?necessary?to?establish?initial?trust?and?to?follow?
a? less? risky? strategy.? Accordingly,? female? leaders? are?more? efficient?with? their?message? sending?
strategy? in?Gender?revealed,?compared?to?Gender?Not?Revealed.? It?might?be?easier?for?followers?to?
follow? an? early? period,? risky? suggestion? if? they? get? more? information? about? the? leader.? More?
information?might?increase?credibility.27?
The?fact?that?hidden?female?leaders?have?to?bear?more?coordination?failures?as?a?result?of?more?risky?
suggestions?might? seem,? at? first? glance,? to? be? in? contradiction?with? earlier? findings? in? literature,?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????












forthcoming).?However,? to? turn?around?outcomes?after?a? severe? failure?experience? is?harder? than?
doing? so?after?a? first?period?of? successful? coordination?on?a? low? level,?which? speaks? for? the?male?
strategy.? Justifying? the? female? strategy,?we? have? also? observed? that? ambitious? leaders? get?more?
credible?and?successful?if?gender?is?revealed.?Thereby?the?effectiveness?of?the?female?strategy?gives?












Appendix?1A),?and? the? failure? to?adapt? to?group?history,?we?would?expect? that? female? leaders? in?






































































Evaluation of the leader
48?
?
To?ease?comprehension,?we? interpret? the?original?answer?keys?as?“very?poor”? for?1,?“poor”? for?2,?
“average”?for?3,?“good”?for?4,?and?“very?good”?for?5.?We?compare?evaluations?of?male?and?female?
leaders?using?two?sample?Wilcoxon?rank?sum?(Mann?Whitney)?tests?by?revelation?treatment.?Table?
A4? in? Appendix? 1A? contains? the? results.? Female? leaders? in? Gender?Not?Revealed? receive? worse?









































Post?estimation?test? ? p?=?0.04? p?=?0.16? ? p?=?0.00? p?=?0.32?
Gender?x?No?message?sent?








Post?estimation?test? ? ? p?=?0.21? ? ? p?=?0.68?
Gender?x?Suggestion?



































history? is? the?same? for?male?and? female? leaders.? In?Gender?Not?Revealed,?we? find? that?a?one?unit?
increase?of?group?history?significantly? increases?the?evaluation?of?male? leaders?by?0.24?and?that?of?
female? leaders? by? 0.35.? In? Gender?Revealed,? we? find? that? a? one? unit? increase? of? group? history?
decreases?the?evaluation?of?male?leaders?by?0.01,?which?is?not?significant,?and?significantly?increases?
the?evaluation?of?female?leaders?by?0.22.?Thus,?the?evaluations?of?female?leaders?with?an?increasing?
history? improve? significantly?more? than? the? evaluations? of? their?male? counterparts? (p? =? 0.04? in?
Gender?Not?Revealed,?and?p?=?0.00?in?Gender?Revealed).?Nevertheless,?there?seems?to?be?a?trace?of?
discrimination? in? Gender?Revealed.? In?Model? 5,? when? groups? underperform,? female? leaders? get?








the? leader,?under?none?of? the? revelation? conditions.? In?Gender?Not?Revealed,? the? female? leader’s?
evaluation? robustly? and? significantly? increases? with? an? increase? in? group? performance? and?
significantly? decreases? with? an? increase? in? message? value.? The? male? leader? significantly? loses?
evaluation?points? if?he?fails?to?send?any?message.?In?Gender?Revealed,?the?male? leader’s?evaluation?
significantly? increases?with? an? increase? in? group?performance? and? significantly?decreases?with? an?






the? sensibility? (focus? on? empathy)? of? females? concerning? the? leader’s? hard? situation? under? that?
treatment?condition.?
2.4?Conclusion?and?Discussion?





are? equally? credible? to? their? followers,? no?matter? if? gender? is? revealed? or? not.? The? only? trace? of?




al.? (2016).?However,?such?an?effect? is?counterbalanced?by?women? requesting?slightly?higher?effort?
than?men.?The?higher?effectiveness?of? the? female?strategy?gives? reason? to?believe? that?men?could?
improve?the?performance?of?their?groups?by?requesting?more?ambitious?effort?levels.?
The? results? should? be? interpreted? carefully? because? of? the? low? number? of? observations? in? the?
laboratory?experiment,?which? influences? the?power?of? the? results.?Another?concern? related? to? the?
laboratory? experiment,?which? cannot? be? ruled? out,? is? a? potential? negative? experimenter? demand?
effect? that? could? have? been? awakened? when? participants? chose? a? profile? picture.? As? one?
consequence,? followers? could?have? followed?women? to?a?greater?extent?and?evaluated? them? less?
harshly,?which?the?data?does?not?really?support.?However,?as?another?consequence,?female?leaders?
could?have?become?alerted? to?act?more?assertive?and? request? risky?high?efforts,?compensating?an?
expected? low? share?of? followers,?which? behavior? is? indeed? found.? Since? a? negative? experimenter?
demand?effect?works? in?the?opposite?direction?to?the?experimental?objectives,? it?would?strengthen?
the? interpretation? of? the? results? as?weak? evidence? supporting? the? predictions? of?men? requesting?
more?often?higher?effort?levels?than?women?(Zizzo?2010;?Camerer?2011).?On?the?other?hand,?women?





experienced?managers? do? better? to? overcome? coordination? failure? than? undergraduate? students.?
Moreover,? the? group? creation? in? the? study? might? have? had? an? effect? on? the? findings.? Several?




interest? relative? to? team? interest? (Eckel?and?Grossman?2005),?and? it? can? increase?other?regarding?





remains? an?open? question? is?whether? the? female? leadership? style?has? its?origin? in? group? identity?
perceptions,? which? might? be? stronger? in? family? businesses? or? mission?driven? organizations.?
Concerning?the?existing?gender?gap? in?top?positions,?we?have? to? look? further? for?explanations,? like?









public.? In?many?parts?of? the?world?girls?and?women?have? limited?access? to?education,?health?care,?
and?the?labor?market,?and?they?have?limited?rights?to?individual?decision?making?and?representation?
in? political? and? economic? decision?making? processes.? Gender? gaps? in? labor? force? participation,?
compensation,? and? career?development? are? still? a? concern? in?Western? societies? as?well.?Globally,?
about? three? quarters? of? working?age? men? participate? in? the? labor? force,? compared? to? half? of?
working?age?women? (ILO?2013;?OECD?2016).?The?global?gender?pay?gap? is?around?15?20%,?and?the?
annual?pay?for?women?reached?only?today?the?amount?men?were?earning?ten?years?ago?(OECD?2014;?
Eurostat? 2014;? World? Economic? Forum? 2015).? While? gender? parity? is? reached? in? university?
attendance,?the?gender?gap? in?taking?skilled?roles? is?25%,?and?the?gender?gap? in? leadership?roles? is?
huge?with?72%?(World?Economic?Forum?2015).?One?of?the?global?sustainable?development?goals?of?
the?United?Nations? is?the?economic?and?political?empowerment?of?women?and? to?close?significant?
gender? gaps? in? terms? of? labor?market,? compensation,? and? access? to? and? control? over? decision?
making,?as?well?as? to? support?women? in?participating?more? fully? in?political?processes,? spheres?of?
public?life,?and?in?taking?on?more?leadership?roles?(United?Nations?2015).?
Our? study? contributes? to? the? scientific? insights? about? the? possible? explanations?why?women? are?
underrepresented?in?leadership?roles,?and?what?kind?of?changes?to?expect?if?women?fill?empowering?
positions?(Goldin?2002;?Akerlof?and?Kranton?2005;?Eagly?and?Johannesen?Schmidt?2007;?Wang?et?al.?
2011;? Dezs?? and? Ross? 2012).?We? study? the? interaction? of? followers? and? leaders? in? a? laboratory?
experiment? using? the? turnaround? game,? a? variation? of? the? weak?link? (or? minimum? effort)?
coordination? game? (Brandts? and? Cooper? 2007).? In? particular,? we? study? whether? there? are? any?
differences? in? the?way?male?and? female? leaders?communicate? to?their? followers,?and?whether? this?
affects?their?effectiveness.28?
The? basic? weak?link? game? by? Van? Huyck? et? al.? (1990)? models? a? coordination? problem? in? an?
organizational? setting,? where? a? group? of? players? engages? in? a? joint? economic? activity? with?







are?more?efficient.?With? respect? to? the?group,?groups,?who?coordinate?on? the?same?effort? level,?are?said? to?
coordinate?more? efficiently.?With? “credibility”? we? refer? to? the? beliefs? of? the? followers? that? the? leader? is?






work? that? is? incomplete? until? the? final? contribution? is? finished,? “perceptions? of? overall? product?
quality? that? is? sensitive? to? the?worst?performing? feature”,?network? investments,? and? adoption?of?
standards? (Brandts?et?al.?2015;?Heinemann?et?al.?2009).?The?weak?link?game?has?multiple?Pareto?
ranked?Nash?equilibria?on?every?effort? level?that? is?simultaneously?chosen?by?all?players.?The?most?





















free? form.? Our? treatment? variations? consist? of? the? gender? of? the? leader,? and? whether? the?
communication?is?one?way?or?two?way.?One?way?communication?means?that?we?allow?only?leaders?
to? send?public?messages?visible? to?all?of? their? followers.?Two?way? communication?means? that?we?
allow? first? followers? to?send?private?messages? to? their? leaders,?while? these? follower?messages?are?
only?visible?for?the?leader,?and?subsequently?we?allow?leaders?to?send?public?messages?visible?to?all?
of? their? followers.? Both? communication? conditions?model? a? centralized? organizational? structure.?
Under?the?one?way?communication?condition?the?direction?of?communication?is?top?down?only,?for?





messages? are?not?possible? (one?way? communication),? visible?only? to? the? leader? (private? two?way?
communication),? or? visible? to? all? group?members? (public? two?way? communication).? All?messages?
have? a? low? cost.29?The? authors? find? that? private? follower? communication? to? the? leader? leads? to?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
29?In? a? related? study,? Kriss? et? al.? (forthcoming?b)? show? that? even? small? costs? can? reduce? the? use? of?




and?prohibited? follower? communication? leads? to?more?efficient? coordination? than?public? follower?
communication.?Public?visibility?of?follower?messages?and?public?disagreement?among?followers?can?
undermine? leader? communication? trying? to? induce? common?beliefs?and?efficient? coordination.?An?
authoritarian? leader? could? prohibit? follower? communication,?which?would? lead? to? an? increase? in?
leader?credibility.?However,?some?followers?might?still?not?rely?on?others?following?the?leader?as?well,?
since? a? leader?message?without? any? follower? input? is? only? a? suggestion? or? request,? and? cannot?
credibly?claim?to?represent?follower?intentions.?Limiting?the?visibility?of?follower?messages?instead?of?
prohibiting? those,? improves? coordination.? The? authors? call? the? possibility? of? private? follower?
communication? “open? door”? or? “suggestion? box”? of? the? leader.? The? “open? door”? facilitates? for?
followers? to? recognize? their? leader?as?a? “coordination?device”,?who? can?hear? the? followers?and? is?
perceived? to? have? the? support? of? the? group,? and? this? makes? leaders? more? credible? and? more?
influential.?Those?leaders?who?recognize?their?pivotal?role?and?that?the?“open?door”?improves?leader?
credibility?can?use?this?fact?to?send?messages?suggesting?the?highest?effort?level?aiming?for?maximum?
effectiveness.? Though,? incoming? follower? messages? suggesting? low? effort? levels? might? also?
undermine? the?confidence?of? the? leader? to? take?advantage?of? the?boosted? influence?by? the?“open?
door”.?Kriss?and?Eil?say?that?leaders?whose?messages?are?more?a?consequence?of?follower?input?lack?
“thick? skin”.? The? authors? assume? that? successful? real?world? leaders? develop? such? a? “thick? skin”,?
which?enables?them?to?“appropriately?disregard?counterproductive? input?while?still?recognizing?the?
broader?value?of?communication?within?the?organizational?hierarchy”.?
Another? close? paper? to? our?work? is? Cooper? (2007),?who? studies? communication? strategies,? and?
compares? the?behavior?of?experienced?managers? and?undergraduate? students.? The?proportion?of?
men?in?his?study?was?much?higher?among?the?experienced?managers?than?the?undergraduates.?The?
scarcity?of?women?in?Cooper’s?study?reflects?the?male?dominated?manager?population.?Cooper?finds?
that? experienced? managers? are? more? likely? to? use? the? “good”? communication? strategy,? and?





add? gender?specific? coding? aspects? based? on? the? stereotypes? of?men? tending? to? be?more? task?
oriented? and? assertive,? and?women? to?be?more? relationship?oriented? and? expressive? (Bem? 1974;?
Bem?1993;?Merchant?2012).?
We?also?analyze?the?message?content?based?on?the?classification?of? leadership?styles? in?Eagly?et?al.?
(2003).? Eagly? et? al.? conducted? a?meta?analysis? of? 45? studies? and? classify? three? leadership? styles:?
transformational,? transactional,? and? laissez?faire? leadership? style.? The? transformational? leadership?
style?was? first? described? by?Burns? (1978)? and? elaborated? by?Bass? (1985,? 1998).? Transformational?
leaders?are? future?oriented,? innovative? leaders,?who?empower? their? followers? to? contribute?more?
capably?to?their?organization.?They?often?act?as?role?models,?they?emphasize?the?importance?of?the?
















failing? to?meet? objectives.? The? transactional? leadership? style? has? three? subcategories:? contingent?
reward,? active? management? by? exception,? and? passive? management? by? exception.? Contingent?





in?our? study,?we? could? think?of? a? leader?who? sends?no?message? in? the? first?message?period,?but?
intervenes? later.?Both? transformational? and? transactional? leaders? recognize? their?pivotal? role? and?
take?responsibility?for?the?leadership.?In?contrast,?the?third?leadership?style?defines?leaders?who?lack?
recognition? of? their? situation? and? authority,? and? let? followers? do? as? they?want.? The? laissez?faire?
leader? is? frequently?absent,? lacks? involvement?during? critical? junctures,?and?generally? fails? to? take?
responsibility? for?managing.? In?our? study,? this? type?would?either? send?no?message?or?only?banter,?
without?trying?the?turnaround.?
Eagly? et? al.? find? that? leader? effectiveness? relates? positively? to? transformational? leadership? and?
contingent?reward?behavior?as?a?subcategory?of?transactional?leadership?style.30?Other?subcategories?
of?transactional?leadership,?namely?active?and?passive?management,?and?the?laissez?faire?leadership?
style? relate? negatively? to? the? performance? of? the? organization.? According? to? Eagly? et? al.,? earlier?
studies?on? leadership?styles?before?1990?distinguished?democratic?and?autocratic? leadership?styles?
(Lewin?and?Lippitt?1938;?Vroom?and?Yetton?1973).?Democratic?leaders?allow?followers?to?participate?
in? decision? making,? whereas? autocratic? leaders? discourage? their? followers? from? participating? in?
decision? making.? However,? the? democratic?autocratic? classification? of? leadership? style? does? not?
describe? leader? behavior,? and? the? implications? for? leader? effectiveness? depend? much? on? the?
organizational? structure,? for? example,? whether? participation? in? decision? making? is? feasible? and?
allowed? (Foels? et? al.? 2000;?Gastil? 1994;?Vroom? and? Yetton? 1973).? Therefore? the? above?described?
contemporary?classification?is?more?suitable?to?be?linked?to?leader?effectiveness.?
Eagly?et?al.?(2003)?show?small?gender?differences? in? leadership?styles.?The?authors?find?that?female?
leaders? engage?more? often? than?male? leaders? in? transformational? leadership? and? in? contingent?
reward? behavior? as? part? of? the? transactional? leadership? style,? and? both? styles? predict? leader?
effectiveness.? These? findings? are? in? line? with? earlier? research? findings? and? claims? of? a? female?
leadership?advantage?(Sharpe?2000;?Bass?et?al.?1996;?Lowe?et?al.?1996).?Later,?Eagly?and?Johannesen?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
30?Concerning? charismatic? leadership,? Antonakis? et? al.? (2015)? show? in? a? field? experiment? that? charismatic?





even? if? gender? differences? in? leadership? styles? are? small,? they? are? important.? In? a?meta?analytic?
review?of?25?years?of?research,?Wang?et?al.?(2011)?find?that?the?transformational?leadership?style?is?





(2007).?Cooper?points?out,? that? “good”? communication? is? likely? to?be? effective.?We? find? that? the?
suggestion?of?the?highest?effort?level?combined?with?assertive?content?and?expressions?of?being?part?





Our? findings? further? suggest? that? there?will? be? a? change? on? the? global? stage? in? the?way? leaders?
interact?and?communicate?with?followers?if?women?would?fill?more?top?positions.?
3.2?Experimental?Design?and?Procedures?
Each? experimental? session? consists? of? 26? periods.?At? the? beginning? of? a? session,? participants? are?
randomly?matched? into? groups? of? five? and? are? informed? that? their? group’s? composition?will? not?
change? throughout? the? session.? In? each? period,? every? participant? i ?in? group? k ?simultaneously?
chooses?an?effort?level? ? ?0,10,20,30,40ieffort ? .?Participant? i ’s?earnings?in?a?period?are?equal?to:?
??? ? ??? ? ? ? ??????? ? ? ? ??????????,?
where? minkeffort ?is? the?minimum?effort? chosen? in? the?group.?To? facilitate? calculations,?we?provide?
participants?with?an?Earnings?Table,?reproduced?as?Table?3.1.?At?the?end?of?each?period,?participants?
are?informed?of?their?earnings?and?the?group’s?minimum?effort.?Participants?cannot?observe?others’?





In? Part? 1,? participants? play? the?weak?link? game?without? a? leader.?Using? the?weak?link? game? in? a?
laboratory?experiment,?Van?Huyck?et?al.?(1990)?show?that?decision?makers?are?more?likely?to?play?the?










the? probability? of? a? simultaneous? effort? choice? of? 10? is? at? least? 5/6? to?make? the? choice? of? 10?
attractive.?Since?effort? levels?are?chosen? independently,? the?decision?maker?would?have? to?expect?
that?everyone?else?in?the?group?chooses?10?with?a?probability?of?more?than?95%,?which?means?that?
the?decision?maker?would?have? to?be? almost? sure? that? each? and?every?other? group?member?will?
choose? the?higher?effort? level?as?well.?Thus,? the?parameters?of? the?payoff?equation?are?chosen? to?
make? it? almost? certain? that? by? the? end? of? the? eighth? period? all? groups? are? coordinating? on? an?




? ? 40? 30? 20? 10? 0?
Your?
effort?
40? 240? 180? 120? 60? 0?
30? ? 230? 170? 110? 50?
20? ? ? 220? 160? 100?
10? ? ? ? 210? 150?
0? ? ? ? ? 200?
?
Part?2? introduces? leaders.?At?the?beginning?of?period?9,?one?participant? in?each?group? is?randomly?
assigned?to?be?the?group’s? leader,?which? leaves?the?other?group?members?as?followers.?The? leader?
holds?the?position?until?the?end?of?the?session.?Every?three?periods,?which?we?refer?to?as?message?
cycle,? the? leader?has? the?option? to?send?a?written?message?visible? to?all? followers.?The?message? is?
sent?before?effort?choices?are?made.?Leaders?can?write?anything?they?wish,?including?nothing,?except?
for? content? that? can?be?used? to? identify? them.?Messages? are?non?binding? in? that?not? following? a?








written?message? visible? to? the? leader? only.? The?message? is? sent? before? leaders? can? send? their?
messages.?Followers?can?write?anything?they?wish,? including?nothing,?except?for?content?that?could?
be?used?to?identify?them.?
The?second? treatment?variation? is? the?gender?of? the? leader.?By? randomly?assigning? the? leadership?
position? we? randomly? vary? the? leader’s? gender? across? the? groups.? To? reveal? information? about?







the? lips,? nose,? eyes,? and? hairstyle? to?match? generic? racial? features.?We? use? profile? pictures? to?
preserve?anonymity?whilst?revealing?gender.?We?opted?for?pictures?that?also?contain?other?cues?such?
as?race?and?hairstyles?to?distract?participants?from?discerning?the?purpose?of?the?study?(Zizzo?2010),?
which? can? potentially? lead? to? intentional? changes? in? behavior? (Camerer? 2011).?We? displayed? the?
profile?pictures?of?leaders?along?with?their?messages?visible?to?their?followers.?
3.2.2?Procedures?
The? experiment?was? conducted? at? the? Columbia? Experimental? Laboratory? in? the? Social? Sciences?
(CELSS)?at?Columbia?University? in?March?2015.?Participants?were?recruited?through?ORSEE? (Greiner?
2015)?and? the?experiment?was?programmed?with? z?Tree? (Fischbacher?2007).?We? ran?10? sessions,?







to?each?part.?To? facilitate?calculations? for? the?participants,?we?handed?out?printed?versions?of? the?
instructions?for?Part?1,?which?contained?the?Earnings?Table?showing?how?earnings?were?determined?
in? each? period.? The? same? table? applied? in? Part? 2.? Instructions?were? displayed? on? the? computer?
screens? and? were? read? aloud? by? the? experimenter.? After? reading? the? instructions? for? Part? 1,?
participants? completed? a?payoff?quiz? to? check?whether? everybody?understood? the? game’s?payoff?
structure.?Instructions?and?screenshots?can?be?found?in?Appendix?2B.?
The? game? was? described? using? a? workplace? context? to? be? in? line? with? earlier? papers,? ease?
comprehension?of?the?task,?and?enrich?the?wording?and?analysis?of?the?free?form?messages?(Cooper?
2007;?Brandts?et?al.?2015).?As?in?Brandts?et?al.?(2015),?individual?group?members?were?referred?to?as?















on? the? leader’s?message?screen.?Participants?knew? from? the? instructions?of?Part?2? that? the?profile?
picture?of?the?leader?will?be?displayed.?
In?Part?2,?after?participants?made?their?effort?choice,?we?elicited?their?belief?concerning?the?number?





















At? the? end? of? each? period,? participants? saw? their? effort? choice,? the? group?minimum? effort,? their?
earnings? in? that?period,?and? their?accumulated?earnings.?Participants?could?not?observe? individual?
effort?choices.?
At? the? end? of? the? experiment? participants? filled? in? a? final? questionnaire.?We? asked? which? role?
assignment?(“Manager”?or?“Employee”)?participants?would?prefer?if?they?could?choose?(“If?you?were?
to? play? Part? 2? again? and? you? could? choose? your? role,? which? role? would? you? choose?”).? After?
reminding? the? individual?average?earnings?of?the?participant? in?Part?2,?we?asked? for?the?subjective?
evaluation?about?the?performance?of?the?leader?on?a?five?point?scale?from?“completely?disagree”?to?











The?main? interest? in? this? study? is? to?show?whether?men?and?women?differ? in? leader?effectiveness?
across?communication?conditions?and?which? channels?explain? leader?effectiveness:?a?difference? in?
leader?behavior?or?a?difference? in? follower?behavior.?Naturally,?all?predictions? refer? to?behavior? in?
Part?2.?
Kriss?and?Eil? (2012)?already?showed? that? incoming? follower?messages? increase? leader?credibility? in?




stereotype? beliefs? that? consider?men? to? be? better,?more? competent? and?more? credible? leaders?
(Ridgeway?2001;?Day?2014;?Goldin?2002;?Akerlof?and?Kranton?2005).?Reuben?et?al.?(2014)?show?that,?
in?an?experimental?market,?stereotypes?make?both?male?and?female?participants?twice?more?likely?to?
hire?a?man? than?a?woman?when?no?other? information? is?available? than?a? candidate’s?appearance?
(which?makes?gender? clear),?despite? the? fact? that?on?average?both?genders?perform?equally?well.?
Grossman?et?al.? (2016)?show,?using? the? turnaround?game,? that? followers?are?more? likely? to? follow?
men? than?women,?holding? leader?messages?constant.?Even? if? followers?do?not?hold?biased?beliefs?
themselves,?it?might?be?rational?to?adapt?to?the?supposed?bias?if?they?expect?others?to?follow?men?to?
a?greater?extent?than?women.?Further,?in?Two?way,?followers?might?send?for?the?same?reason?lower?
effort? level? suggestions? to? female? rather? than?male? leaders.? The? low? follower? suggestions?might?
affect? leaders?negatively?(Kriss?and?Eil?2012),?but?even? if? leaders? ignore?the?follower?messages,?the?
followers,?who?sent?the?low?suggestions,?might?doubt?the?leaders’?credibility?more?if?leaders?request?
a? high? rather? than? low? effort? level.? Thus,? in? Two?way,? the? leader? credibility? of?men,? rather? than?
women,?might?be?boosted?more.?
Prediction? 2:? In?both?One?way?and? Two?way,?male? leaders?are? followed? to?a?greater? extent? than?
female?leaders.?In?Two?way,?the?gender?gap?is?larger.?
Leaders?will?tend?to?send?messages?in?line?with?their?own?effort?choices?at?least?in?the?first?period?of?







32?Leaders? can?minimize? the?exploration? cost? if? they? communicate? a? conditional? strategy,? for?example,? that?
they?will?follow?their?own?message?in?the?first?period?of?the?message?cycle,?but?they?will?stop?doing?so?if?others?
do?not?follow?as?well.?
33?In? a? recent? related?paper,?Cooper? et? al.? (2016)? study? the? “social? credibility”?of? leaders? in? an? experiment?
where?leaders?try?to?induce?followers?to?invest?in?a?joint?venture.?The?authors?find?that?“leaders?manage?social?
credibility? by? forgoing? potentially? profitable? requests? for? investment? in? order? to?make? it?more? likely? that?
subsequent?recommendations?to?invest?are?followed”.?Leaders?in?our?study?might?also?recognize?the?need?to?
build? up? credibility,? which? is?more? than? having? other? regarding? preferences.? For? example,? less? confident?
60?
?
more? risk? averse?or? less? confident? leaders?might? request? and? choose? a? low? effort? level,?whereas?







Prediction?4:? In?both?One?way?and?Two?way,?men?are?more?effective? leaders?than?women.? In?Two?
way,?the?gender?gap?is?larger.?




goal?oriented.? In? interactions,?women? tend? to?be?more?social,?while?men?value? independence?and?
remain?unemotional?and?less?attached?to?conversations.?Therefore,?the?language?that?women?use?is?
more? expressive? and? polite,?while?men? use? a?more? assertive? and? dominating? language,? signaling?
status?and?overconfidence.?Merchant?(2012)?shows?that?gender?differences?in?communication?styles?
are?often?persistent?in?leadership?styles?as?well.?
Eagly?et?al.? (2003)?classify?three? leadership?styles:?transformational,?transactional,?and? laissez?faire?
leadership? style,? described? in? more? detail? in? the? introduction.? In? our? context,? transformational?
leaders?would?request?a?high?effort?level?and?emphasize?the?mutual?benefit?argument?and?being?part?
of?the?group.?We?call?such?“transformational”?messages?“relevant?messages”,?since?Eagly?et?al.?find?
that? leader? effectiveness? relates? positively? to? the? transformational? leadership? style,? and? Cooper?
(2007)? also? finds? the? same?message? strategy? leading? to? effectiveness.? Transactional? leaders,?who?
engage? in?contingent? reward?behavior,?would? request?a?high?effort? level? in?an?ordering?style,?give?
more?often?positive?feedback,?and?encourage?their?followers?with?positive?emotional?content,?rather?
than?long?explanations.?Both?transformational?and?transactional?leaders?recognize?their?pivotal?role?
and? are? likely? to? communicate? assertively.? Eagly? et? al.? (2003)? show? small? gender? differences? in?
leadership? styles.? The? authors? find? that? female? leaders? engage?more? often? than?male? leaders? in?
transformational? leadership? and? in? contingent? reward? behavior? as? part? of? the? transactional?
leadership?style.?
Prediction?5:?Male?leaders?send?assertive,?goal?oriented?messages?and?clear?orders?more?often?than?
their? female? counterparts.? Female? leaders? send?more? often? relevant?messages? containing?mutual?
benefit?arguments,?along?with?encouraging,?positive?emotional?content?and?expressions?emphasizing?
that?the?leader?is?an?equal?member?of?the?group?(using?the?personal?pronoun?“we”?more?often).?We?










which? is? a? gender? ratio? of? 4:6? and? corresponds? to? the? gender? ratio? in? the? subject? pool? and? the?




treatment? conditions.?Figure?3.1?depicts? the?group?minimum?effort?by? treatment? conditions? in?all?
periods.? In?periods?1?to?8,?without?a? leader,?31?of?the?33?groups?converged?to?the?most? inefficient?
effort? level,?so? the? first?part?of? the? turnaround?game? reliably? induced? failure? to?coordinate?on? the?
efficient?equilibrium?(Brandts?and?Cooper?2006a).?The?second?part?of?the?turnaround?game?started?
in?period?9,?when?all? leaders? successfully?managed? the? turnaround?on?average?at? least?above? the?




Table? 3.3? summarizes? the? results? from? regressions? containing? aggregate? treatment? effects? and?
comparing?treatment?conditions.?For?the?estimations?we?use?group?level?random?effects?generalized?
least? squares? (GLS)? regressions.? Both?models? contain? 594? observations? over? 18? periods? and? 33?
groups.?We?correct?standard?errors?for?clustering?at?the?group?level.?The?dependent?variable?is?group?
minimum? effort? in? both? models.? Model? 1? contains? two? indicator? variables,? one? for? the?
communication?treatment?and?one?for?the?gender?of?the?leader,?as?explanatory?variables.?Minimum?













1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Period
One-way, male leader One-way, female leader
Two-way, male leader Two-way, female leader
62?
?
effective? if? they?receive? input? from? followers,?but? this?difference? is?not?statistically?significant.?The?
difference? between? male? and? female? leaders? has? a? similar? magnitude.? Male? leaders? achieve?
























Notes.? For? the? estimations?we? use? group?level? random? effects? GLS? regressions.? Both?models?
contain?594?observations?over?18?periods?and?33?groups.?Standard?errors? (in?parentheses)?are?




interaction? of? the? two? indicator? variables.? In? Two?way,? male? leaders? are? by? around? 5.9? more?
effective?than?female? leaders,?but?although?this?difference? is?noticeable? in?economic?terms,? it? is?far?








In? this? section? we? present? the? message? content? analysis? and? compare? leader? behavior? across?
treatment? conditions.? Additional? summary? statistics? are? available? in? Table? A1? in? Appendix? 2A,?


















No?message?sent? ? 0.131? 0.331?













Our? content? analysis? is?based?on? the? scheme? in?Brandts?et? al.? (2015).? If? a?message? is? ambiguous?
concerning?its?numeric?value,?we?indicate?this?in?the?variable?for?ambiguous?content,?however?such?
messages?are?rare.35?Compared?to?Brandts?et?al.?(2015),?we?do?not?include?the?category?for?appeals?







et? al.? (2015),?we? code? especially? for? the?mutual? benefit? argument? if? an? explanation? emphasizes?
collective? action? and? the? resulting? benefit? for? each? group?member.?We? code?whether? the? leader?
emphasizes?being?part?of? the?group,?whether? the?content? is?assertive,?whether? it?contains?orders,?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
34?Among? the? variables? for? any? explanation? and?mutual? benefit? argument,?we? include? the?mutual? benefit?
argument,?since?it?is?considered?to?be?more?relevant?for?leader?effectiveness?(Cooper?2007).?
35?When?translating?the?message?content?to?numeric?values,?we?distinguish?ambiguous?and?indecisive?content.?
Ambiguous? content? is? ambiguous? to? interpret.? Indecisive? content? is? clear? to? interpret,? but? the? leader?
communicates?own?doubts,?so?that?the?message?contains?several?parallel?options,?for?example?“choose?20?or?
higher”?or?“choose?30?or?40”.?Such?content?is?interpreted?as?indecisive,?but?not?necessarily?as?ambiguous,?if?we?
assume? that? participants? are? risk? averse,? and? choose? the? lower? suggestion? when? receiving? the? uncertain?
message?content.?For?example,?if?the?suggestion?says?to?choose?“20?or?higher”,?we?coded?the?numeric?message?
content?as?20,?not?ambiguous,?but? indecisive;? “work?more?hours”? is? interpreted?as?40,?ambiguous,?but?not?
indecisive?(since?the?leader?might?have?had?a?clear?goal?in?mind,?but?communicated?in?a?way?that?is?ambiguous?




and?whether? it? is?more? requesting?a? favor.?We?also?code?whether? the? leader?blames?others? for?a?
coordination? failure,? and? has? a? laissez?faire? style,? in? the? sense? that? the?message? content? is? not?
explicitly?concerned?with?leading?the?followers.36?In?Two?way,?we?code?whether?the?leader?refers?to?
follower?messages.?One? category? is? coded?especially? for? followers.? Specifically,?whether? followers?
send?orders?and?try?to?rule?their?leaders?in?a?persuasive?style.?
We? run?Wilcoxon? rank?sum? tests,?after? collapsing? the?data?by?group,? to? compare?averages?of? the?
message? content? variables? across? treatment? conditions.? In? Two?way,? leaders? seems? to? be?more?
active,?in?that?they?send?any?message?(p?=?0.00),?request?more?often?forty?(p?=?0.01),?communicate?













We? conduct?a? correlation?analysis? to? reveal? the? relations?of? the?often?occurring?message? content?
categories? (see? Table?A3? in?Appendix? 2A).? Suggesting? forty? is? positively? correlated?with? all? other?
categories,?so?that?none?of?the?other?message?categories?has?an?independent?effect.?The?correlation?
coefficient? for? assertive? style? is? the? highest? (0.72),? second? highest? is? positive? emotional? content?
(0.46),? followed? by? sending? orders? (0.30),? being? part? of? the? group? (0.20),? and? finally? the?mutual?
benefit?argument? (0.18).?The?mutual?benefit?argument?has?a? low,?negative?correlation? to?positive?
emotional? content? (?0.12),? which? makes? sense? if? we? assume? that? more? explanation? might? be?
necessary? in?groups?that?need?a?turnaround,?and? in? line?with?a?previous?coordination?failure,?some?
negative? emotions? might? be? expressed.? Some? assertive? leaders? are? likely? to? express? positive?
emotions? (0.32),?and?others?are? likely? to? send?a? clear?order?without?any?explanation? (0.45).37?The?
mutual? benefit? argument? is? highly? correlated?with? being? part? of? the? group? (0.49),?which? is? not?
surprising.? Leaders,?who? try? to? help? their? groups?with? explaining?mutual? benefits,? often? express?
coequality?with?the?group,?rather?than?standing?above?the?group.?
Figure?3.2?depicts?those?categories?that?we? find?so? far?to?be?most? interesting?as?carrying?potential?




36?The? laissez?faire? style? is? positively? and? highly? correlated? with? negative? emotional? content,? ambiguous?









Being? part? of? the? group? represents? a? feature? of? the? transformational? leadership? style,? whereas?
orders?represent?a? feature?of?the?transactional? leadership?style.? Initially? the? frequency?of?orders? is?
very?low?in?any?of?the?treatment?conditions.?After?establishment?of?a?group?history,?the?frequency?of?
orders?increases?in?all?treatment?conditions.?The?opposite?is?true?for?being?part?of?the?group,?which?




the? same.?Similarly,? in? real? life,? teams? that? face? less?novelty?during? the?production?process?might?
require? the? transactional,? rather? than? the? innovative? transformational? leadership? style? to? sustain?
high?performance.?Assertive?style?and?forty?have?stable?trends?over?time?in?all?treatment?conditions.?
Based?on? the? insights? from? the? analysis? above,?we? create? three?new? variables? for? the?use? in? the?
subsequent?analysis:?assertive?forty,?forty?as?team,?and?relevant?message.?For?all?new?variables,?we?
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binary?variable? that? takes? the?value?of?1? if? the?message?contains?both? forty?and? is?assertive?and?0?
otherwise.?





presented? in? Table? 3.5,? we? use? as? explanatory? variables? the? interaction? of? the? communication?
treatment?and?the?gender?of?the?leader.?The?treatment?coefficients?in?all?basic?models?are?far?from?






Model?1? Model?2? Model?3? Model?4?


































Notes.? For? the? estimations?we? use? subject?level? random? effects?GLS? regressions.?We? collapse? the? data? by?
leader?and?three?period?message?cycles.?All?models?contain?198?observations?over?6?message?periods?and?33?
groups.? Standard? errors? (in? parentheses)? are? corrected? for? clustering? at? the? group? level.? ***Statistically?
significant?at?the?1%?level,?**statistically?significant?at?the?5%?level,?*statistically?significant?at?the?10%?level.?
?
Subsequently,?we? run? a? sequence?of? regressions? to? analyze? the? effects?of? group?history,? leaders’?
beliefs? about? their? own? effectiveness,? previous?message? content,? and? successfulness? of? previous?
message? content? on? leader?messages.?We? add? each? variable,? one? at? a? time,? to? the? basic?model?
described? above,? both? separately? and? in? interaction?with? the? communication? treatment? and? the?





2006a,?Devetag? and?Ortmann? 2007).? Table? 3.6? contains? our? results.? A? one? unit? change? in? group?
history?indicates?a?change?of?10?effort?level?units,?for?example,?an?increase?from?effort?level?0?to?10.?
Group?history?has? its?strongest?effect?on? forty? (p?=?0.00).?A? leader? is?by?11?percent?more? likely? to?
67?
?
request? forty,? if? the? group? had? an? average?minimum? effort? increase? of? 10? in? the? previous? three?












Forty? Assertive?forty? Forty?as?team? Relevant?message?








































































































Notes.? For? the? estimations?we? use? subject?level? random? effects?GLS? regressions.?We? collapse? the? data? by?
leader?and?three?period?message?cycles.?All?models?contain?198?observations?over?6?message?periods?and?33?
groups.? Standard? errors? (in? parentheses)? are? corrected? for? clustering? at? the? group? level.? ***Statistically?
significant?at?the?1%?level,?**statistically?significant?at?the?5%?level,?*statistically?significant?at?the?10%?level.?
?
When? group? history? is? interacted?with? treatment? conditions,?we? find? for? forty? that? the? effect? of?
group?history?is?stable?across?treatment?conditions.?After?running?pairwise?post?estimation?tests,?we?
find?no?differences?across? treatment?conditions,?neither? in? levels,?nor? in? the? coefficients?of?group?
history.? For? assertive? forty?we? find? that? group?history?has? a?quite? stable? effect? for?men,?but?not?
women,? across? treatment? conditions.? In? One?way,? the? post?estimation? test? comparing?men? and?




female? reaction? is? boosted? as? an? increase? of? group? history? by? 10? effort? level? units? increases? the?
68?
?
likelihood? that? a? female? leader? sends? assertive? forty? by? 13? percent.? For? forty? as? team? and? for?
relevant?messages,?we? find? that?group?history?has?a?stable?effect?across? treatment?conditions.?For?
relevant? messages,? the? pairwise? post?estimation? tests? reveal? only? one? significant? (p? =? 0.08)?
difference,?when?comparing?the?effects?of?a?change?in?group?history?between?genders?in?Two?way.?In?
Two?way,?men?are? slightly?more? likely? to? send? relevant?messages? if?group?history? is?negative? (p?=?
0.13),?so?that?they?tend?to?change?their? leadership?style?depending?on?the?circumstances,?whereas?
women? have? a? stable? trait? of? using? relevant?messages? and? the? corresponding? transformational?
leadership?style?(p?=?0.48).?
In?sum,?adding?group?history?to?the?basic?models?of?Table?3.5?did?not?alter?the?findings?of?the?basic?
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for? the? lagged? variable? and? 18? missing? values? in? cases? when? leaders? indicated? that? the? belief?
question?is?not?applicable.?Table?3.7?shows?that?although?the?effect?sizes?of?lagged?beliefs?are?large?
for?forty?and?assertive?forty,?the?huge?variance?in?the?belief?variable?makes?the?effects?insignificant.?
When?we? interact? lagged?belief?with? treatment?conditions,?we? find? for? forty? that? the?effect?of? the?
lagged?beliefs?varies?heavily?across?treatment?conditions.?In?One?way,?genders?differ?significantly?(p?







of? lagged? beliefs,? for? both? genders,? although? the? gender? difference? in? leader? reactions? remains?
similar? like? in?One?way? (p?=?0.01).? In?Two?way,?the?coefficient? for? lagged?beliefs?of?male? leaders? is?
small?and?not?significant,?as? if? they?are?not?very? impressed?by? their?own? increase? in?confidence.? It?
might? be? that? they? rather? focus? on? follower? input? through? the? “open? door”.? The? coefficient? for?
lagged?beliefs?of?female?leaders?is?large?and?highly?significant,?which?means?that?almost?every?female?















with? the? same? increase? in? their? confidence? show?no? reaction? in? their?message? sending?behavior.?
Women? with? a? 0%? confidence? are? less? likely? to? send? forty? as? team? than? men? with? the? same?











send? a? relevant?message? than?men?with? the? same? confidence? (p? =? 0.08).? Thus,?men?with? a? low?
confidence? in? followership? make? use? of? the? transformational? style,? whereas? men? with? a? high?
confidence?are? less? likely?to?do?so.?Women?with?a? low?confidence?do?not?use?the?transformational?
style,?and?an?increase?in?their?confidence?has?no?effect?on?their?leadership?style.?
In?sum,?adding?lagged?beliefs?to?the?basic?models?of?Table?3.5?did?not?alter?the?findings?of?the?basic?
regressions?and?post?estimation? tests,?but?we?gained?some?new? insights? related? to? the?behavioral?
reactions?of? leaders? to?a?change? in? their? lagged?beliefs.?High? confidence?boosts? female? leaders? to?







Forty? Assertive?forty? Forty?as?team? Relevant?message?


















































































































Notes.? For? the? estimations?we? use? subject?level? random? effects?GLS? regressions.?We? collapse? the? data? by?
leader?and?three?period?message?cycles.?All?models?contain?165?observations?over?6?message?periods?and?33?
groups.?We?have?33?missing? values? for? lagged? variables.? Standard?errors? (in?parentheses)?are? corrected? for?











no?matter?which?message? content? the?dependent? variable? is.? The?effect? size? is?more? than? three?
times?larger?if?the?dependent?variable?is?forty?or?assertive?forty,?rather?than?forty?as?team?or?relevant?
message.? Consistency? explains? a? high? share? of? 0.62? of? requesting? forty,?while? a? previously? sent?
assertive?suggestion?of?forty?has?a?similar?effect?of?0.53?on?assertive?forty.?
When?lagged?content?is?interacted?with?treatment?conditions,?we?find?for?forty?that?the?effect?of?an?
increase? in?the? lagged?content? is?slightly?higher?for?men?rather?than?women,?and?slightly?higher? in?


















To? study?persistence,?we?extend? the?basic?models?of?Table?3.5?with? the?variable? “lagged? failure”.?
Lagged?failure?is?a?binary?variable,?which?takes?the?value?of?1?if?the?previously?sent?message?content?
was? not? followed? and? the? group? experienced? coordination? failure,? and? 0? if? the? previously? sent?
message?content,?or?some?other?message?content,?resulted?in?successful?followership.?Followership?
is?successful? if? the? lagged?average?of? the?group?minimum?effort? in? the?previous? three?periods?was?
forty.?Lagged?failure?basically?analyzes?persistence? in?message?use?from?one?message?period?to?the?












significant? (p? =? 0.07).? Thus,? the? “open? door”? causes? a? change? in? leader? behavior? to? its? opposite.?
Women,?who?are?persistent? if? they?do?not? receive? follower? input,?become? less?persistent?with?an?
“open?door”,?whereas?men,?who?are? less?persistent? if? they?do?not?receive? follower? input,?become?
more?persistent?with?an?“open?door”.?The?change?in?male?behavior?across?communication?conditions?
is?significant?(p?=?0.00)?based?on?the?results?of?the?post?estimation?tests.?For?assertive?forty,?we?find?
that?women?are?more?persistently? sending?assertive? forty? than?men,?especially? in?One?way,?when?
the?result?of?the?post?estimation?test?for?the?gender?difference?is?significant?(p?=?0.00).?In?One?way,?
the? likelihood?that?men?who?previously?sent?assertive?forty?and?failed?repeat?forty?decreases?by?35?
percent? (p?=?0.00),?whereas? for?women? the?same? likelihood? increases?by?32?percent? (p?=?0.00).? In?
Two?way,? leaders? are? less? persistently? assertive.? The? change? in? leaders’? behavior? across?
communication?conditions?is?significant?in?case?of?women?(p?=?0.06).?For?forty?as?team?and?relevant?






Forty? Assertive?forty? Forty?as?team? Relevant?message?










































































































Notes.? For? the? estimations?we? use? subject?level? random? effects?GLS? regressions.?We? collapse? the? data? by?
leader?and?three?period?message?cycles.?All?models?contain?165?observations?over?6?message?periods?and?33?
groups.?We?have?33?missing? values? for? lagged? variables.? Standard?errors? (in?parentheses)?are? corrected? for?










persistence? in?case?of?assertive? forty,?as? if? the?conversation?with? followers?would?be?a?better? tool?
than?assertiveness?to?try?a?turnaround?after?a?failure?history.?
Next,?we?analyze?how? followers’?suggestions?of? forty? influence? leader?behavior? in?Two?way.?Based?
on?the?graphical?analysis?in?Figure?A1?in?Appendix?2A,?we?think?that?follower?messages?might?play?an?
important? role? in?explaining? leader?behavior,?especially? if? the? leader? lacks? “thick? skin”? to? follower?
messages? suggesting? less? than? forty.38?Initially,? in? period? 9,? followers? do? not? differentiate? their?
messages?due?to?the?gender?of?the? leader,?and? they?send?suggestions?around?35?on?average.?As?a?
reply,?leaders?send?suggestions?close?to?40.?In?period?12,?followers?start?to?follow?the?communication?
of?male? leaders,? and? their? suggestions? converge? to? 40? over? time,? just? in? line?with?male? leaders?
continuously?suggesting?40.?On?the?other?hand,?the?communication?of?female?leaders?is?not?followed?
that?easily.? In?period?12,? followers?suggest?on?average?30,?and? female? leaders?start? to?adapt? their?
suggestions?to?this?trend.?In?period?15,?as?if?followers?would?recognize?the?importance?of?their?input,?
they?start? to?send?higher?suggestions,?and? the?average?converges? to?35.?From?period?18?onwards,?























38?Using? random?effects? regressions,?we? thoroughly? test?whether? followers?differentiate? their?suggestions?of?
forty?based?on?the?gender?of?the?leader.?Our?results?are?negative?and?robust?to?additional?control?variables?like?
history?of?Part?1,?lagged?group?minimum?effort,?lagged?follower?beliefs,?diverse?lagged?leader?message?content,?









Forty? Assertive?forty? Forty?as?team? Relevant?message?



























































Notes.? For? the? estimations?we? use? subject?level random? effects?GLS? regressions.?We? collapse? the? data? by?
leader?and? three?period?message? cycles.?After? restricting? for?Two?way,?all?models? contain?102?observations?
over?6?message?periods?and?17?groups.?Standard?errors? (in?parentheses)?are?corrected? for?clustering?at? the?





of? the? transformational? leadership? style? (Eagly? et? al.? 2003).?We? run? four? separate? subject?level?
random? effects? GLS? regressions?with? effort? as? the? dependent? variable.39?We? use? as? explanatory?
variables? the? communication? treatment,? the? gender? of? the? leader,? and? the? interaction? of? the?
treatment? indicators?and? the?message?content.?We?vary? the?message?content? in?each?of? the? four?
regressions?using?either? forty,?assertive? forty,? forty?as?team,?or?relevant?message.?We?collapse?the?
data? by? leader? and? three?period?message? cycles,? so? that? every?model? contains? 198? observations?
which?correspond?to?the? leaders? in?the?33?groups?over?all?the?6?periods?when?communication?was?
possible.?We?correct?standard?errors? for?clustering?at?the?group? level.?Treatment?coefficients? in?all?
models? are? far? from? significant,? and? none? of? the? pairwise? post?estimation? tests? has? a? significant?
















leaders? request?equally?often? the?highest?effort? level.?We?confirm? the?main?points?of?Prediction?5.?





This? section? analyzes? leader? credibility,?which? is? the? followers’? reaction? to? the? leaders’?messages.?
Figure?3.3?compares?the?followers’?reactions,?measured?by?the?minimum?of?followers’?effort?choices,?









Next,?we? analyze?whether? followers? differentiate? between? leaders? based? on? their? gender? or? the?
communication? treatment,?when?making? their?effort? choices.?Table?3.11?presents?estimates? from?
group?level? random?effects?GLS? regressions?with? the?minimum?of? followers’?effort? choices? as? the?
dependent? variable.? As? explanatory? variables? we? use? the? interaction? of? the? communication?
treatment?and? the?gender?of? the? leader.? In?all?regressions,?we?restrict? the?data? to?observations?of?
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after? “failure? cycles”.? Previous? failure? cycles? indicate? whether? the? group? experienced? failure? to?
coordinate? on? the? efficient? equilibrium? in? the? previous?message? cycle? or? in? the? end? of? Part? 1.?
Specifically,?previous?failure?cycles?indicate?whether?the?group?minimum?effort?was?less?than?forty?in?
at?least?one?of?the?three?periods?of?the?previous?message?cycle,?and?one?of?the?last?three?periods?of?
Part? 1,? respectively.? Previous? failure? cycles?make? leader?messages? and? their? effectiveness?more?
meaningful? as? leaders? can? try? to? turnaround? a? previous? history? of? coordination? failure.? In? every?
second?regression,?we?drop?one?group? from?our?observations,?because? that?group?coordinated?on?
level? forty?by?period?4? already? and? continued?with? forty?until? the?end?of? the? session.?We? cluster?
standard?errors?on?groups.?
After? all? regressions,?we? run? post?estimation? tests? for? both?One?way? and? Two?way,? and? find? no?
differences? in? leader?effectiveness?by?the?gender?of?the? leader,?holding?constant?that? leaders?send?
forty? (p? >? 0.42),? assertive? forty? (p? >? 0.14),? and? forty? as? team? (p? >? 0.28),? respectively.? If?we?hold?
constant? that? leaders? send? relevant?messages,?we? find? in? Two?way? that?men? are? followed? to? a?
greater?extent?than?women?(in?any?case:?p?=?0.06,?after?a?failure?cycle:?p?=?0.02).?This?might?be?due?to?
our? finding?above,? saying? that?men? tend? to? increase? the?use?of? relevant?messages? if? the?previous?
group?coordination?was?unsuccessful.? In?One?way,?we?find?no?significant?difference? in?followership?
based? on? the? leaders’? gender? (p? >? 0.28).? However,? since? leaders? can? switch? between?message?
contents,?we?have?too?few?observations?if?we?hold?relevant?messages?constant,?and?thus?our?results?
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Finally,?we? analyze? the? explanatory? factors?of? follower?behavior.? Instead?of? analyzing? group?level?
data,?we?run?subject?level?random?effects?GLS?regressions?with?followers’?individual?effort?choices?in?




? Model?1? Model?2? Model?3? Model?4?






















































































Notes.? For? the?estimations?we?use? subject?level? random?effects?GLS? regressions.? The?dependent? variable? is?
followers’?effort.?We?restrict?the?data?to?follower?observations?in?Part?2.?All?models?contain?2376?observations?
of?132?followers?over?18?periods?and?33?groups.?We?have?132?missing?values?for?lagged?variables,?312?missing?
values? if? leaders?sent?no?message?and? thus? the?belief?question?was?not?applicable,?and?21?missing?values? if?









the? interaction? of? the? treatment? indicators?with? sending? no?message,? and? the? interaction? of? the?
78?
?
treatment? indicators?with? forty.?“No?message”? is?a?binary?variable? that? takes? the?value?of?1? if? the?
leader?sent?no?message?and?0?otherwise.?“Forty”?is?a?binary?variable?too,?that?takes?the?value?of?1?if?
the?leader?requests?forty?and?0?otherwise.?The?coefficient?for?the?gender?of?the?leader?is?significant?









forty?was?not? followed,?and?0? if? the?previously? requested? forty,?or? some?other?message? content,?
resulted? in? successful? followership.? Followership? is? successful? if? the? lagged? average? of? the? group?
minimum?effort?in?the?previous?three?periods?was?forty.?Lagged?failure?basically?analyzes?persistence?
in?message? use? from? one?message? period? to? the? next,?with? respect? to? the? successfulness? of? the?
previous?message.? The? interaction? term?with? lagged? failure? indicates? the? likelihood? of? followers?
following?a? leader?who?requests?forty?again?after?the?group?experienced?coordination? failure.?Only?












of? the? gender?of? the? leader?or? the? communication? treatment.?Although? the? coefficients? for?male?
leaders?are?higher? than? for? female? leaders,? the? results?of? the?post?estimation? tests?comparing? the?
coefficients?are?far?from?significant?in?both?One?way?(p?=?0.60)?and?Two?way?(p?=?0.35).?Similarly,?we?
















worse?evaluations? than? their?male?counterparts,?neither? in?One?way? (p?=?0.79),?nor?Two?way? (p?=?
0.19).41?However,? if?we?restrict?the?estimation?to?successful?coordination?on? level?forty,?we?confirm?
that?female?leaders?in?Two?way,?who?requested?forty?and?whose?groups?succeeded?to?coordinate?on?
forty,? receive?by?0.68?points?worse? evaluations? than? their?male? counterparts? (p? =?0.03).? In?other?
words,?in?Two?way,?women?get?harsher?evaluations?than?men,?despite?a?successful?group?history.?
In?contrast,?if?we?restrict?the?estimation?to?unsuccessful?coordination,?we?find?that?female?leaders?in?
Two?way,?who? requested? forty? but?whose? groups? failed? to? coordinate? on? forty,? receive? by? 1.30?
points?better?evaluations?than?their?male?counterparts?(p?=?0.00).?In?other?words,?in?Two?way,?men?
get? blamed?more? for? a? failure? history? than?women.? If?we? restrict? the? estimation? to? cases?when?
leaders? sent?no?message?or? requested?an?effort? level?below? forty,?we? find? that? female? leaders? in?
Two?way? get?by? 1.63?points? better? evaluations? than? their?male? counterparts? (p? =? 0.00).? In?other?
words,?in?Two?way,?men?get?blamed?more?for?not?requesting?forty?than?women.?
In? sum,? followers? in? Two?way? do? not? acknowledge? successful? women? to? the? same? extent? as?






relevant?messages,?which? represent? the? transformational? leadership?style,?while?men?use? relevant?
messages?more? as? a? tool? if? necessary? for? the? improvement? of? group? coordination.? Despite? the?
differences?in?the?communication?paths?of?the?leaders,?men?and?women?are?equally?likely?to?use?the?
transformational? leadership? style,? in? that? they? send? relevant?messages,?which? relates?positively? to?
leader?effectiveness.?Men?and?women?are?equally?effective? leaders,?who?are?equally?credible?and?
equally? likely?to?request?forty.?We?find?a?weak?hint?that?women?with?an?“open?door”?might?have? it?
harder? to?make? their? followers? adapt? to? them,? as? followers?might? perceive? to? have? a? stronger?
influence?on?women?rather?than?men.?However,?over?time,?women?gain?credibility?and?their?groups?
become?successful.?As?one?of?the?female?leaders?expressed?it?“everyone?is?on?board?now”,?after?she?
finally?managed? in? the? last?periods? that?her?group? simultaneously? chose? the?most?efficient?effort?
level.? Initially,?before? followers? learn? that?women? can?be?as?effective? leaders?as?men,? they?might?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????












requested? forty? if? they? sent? any?message.? Thus,? the? limitation? of? our? data? is? that? we? have? no?
variation? in?the?observations?for?male? leaders.?We?cannot?compare?the?whole?spectrum?of?male?to?
female? behavior,? or? the? impact? of?message? value?within? gender.?What?we? can? compare? is?male?
leaders? requesting? forty? to? female? leaders? requesting? forty,?and? follower?behavior? in? these? cases.?
Another?shortcoming?might?be?the?presence?of?a?negative?experimenter?demand?effect?(Zizzo?2010).?




since? leaders? are? forced? into? leadership.? Followers? might? stereotypically? think? that? the? female?
leaders?in?the?laboratory?are?less?effective?leaders,?who?are?only?forced?into?the?position,?which?they?
would? not? hold? in? the? real? world.42?In? the? real? world,? leaders? rather? voluntarily? self?select? into?




that?elected? leaders? are?more?effective? than? randomly? selected? leaders,?while? leaving? it? an?open?





underlying? organizational? structure.? In? our? study,? the? organizational? structure? is? rather? flat.? The?
leader? is?closely? tied? to? the?group,?and? faces? the?same? incentives?as?other?group?members.?These?
circumstances?might?ease?the?use?of?the?transformational?leadership?style?for?both?men?and?women,?
and?therefore?might?not?bring?gender?differences?onto?the?surface.?A?more?competitive?setting?or?a?
stronger? hierarchy?might?magnify?male?dominated? leadership? qualities.?Nevertheless,? due? to? the?
findings?in?our?present?study?we?see?no?reason?why?women?should?not?be?empowered?to?the?same?
extent? like?men.?Women?have?a?different?style?to?communicate?and?to? lead,?and?since?we?showed?
that? followers?adapt?over? time? to? their? leaders,?we?have? reason? to?expect? that?an? increase? in? the?
number?of? female? leaders?could?also?affect? the?structure?of?organizations?on? the? long? run.?Such?a?
“feminine”?development?might? lead? to?more?balanced,?more? diverse,? and?more? effective? leader?
follower?interactions?within?organizations.? ?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????










lowest?performing? actor? is? likely? to?determine? group?performance? (Brandts?et? al.?2015).?Globally,?
exerting?effort?to?reduce?emissions?would?be?efficient?for?everyone?if?others?act?in?the?same?way.?In?
a?small?organization,? like?a?project? team?or?a?start?up? team,?economic?actors? team?up? to?be?more?
successful? and? achieve? higher? outcomes? through? coordinated? action.? Leaders? can? be? useful?
“coordination?devices”?in?such?situations?(Kriss?and?Eil?2012).?
What?makes?some?leaders?more?effective?than?others??Leadership?is?one?of?the?most?widely?studied?
universal?phenomena?of?human?behavior? (Burns?1978;?Bass? and?Bass?2008).43?Our? interest? lies? in?
exploring? the? determinants? of? leader? effectiveness,? and? in? this? study?we? focus? on? the? selection?
process? of? leaders.?How? does? a?more? democratic? selection? procedure? alter? leader? effectiveness??
First,? democracy? can? have? a? selection? effect? on? the? leader’s? abilities,? as? democracy? attracts? and?
strongly?positively?selects?more?competent?leaders?(Dal?Bó?et?al.?2015b).?Dal?Bó?et?al.?(2015b)?show,?















Internal? leaders?have?a? lower? social?distance? from? the?group,?which? grants? them? increased? social?
credibility,? so? that? followers? follow? them? to? a? greater? extent.? Additionally,? the? authors? compare?
randomly? selected? internal? leaders? with? internally? elected? leaders,? and,? after? controlling? for?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
43?Recent? reviews? of? studies? from? psychology,? political? science,? economics? and? management? provide? an?
overview?about?the?development?in?leadership?literature?(Avolio?et?al.?2009;?Ahlquist?and?Levi?2011).?




observable? leader? characteristics? and? content? of? leader?messages,? they? find? that? the? increased?
effectiveness?of?elected?leaders?roots?in?follower?reactions.?
We?decided? to?replicate? the?paper?by?Brandts?et?al.? (2015),?since? the?context?and?methodology? in?
their? paper? comes? close? to? our? interests.?We? share? the? common? view? that? reproducibility? is? an?
important?principle? in? science:? if?a? result? is?valid,? then? it? is?possible? to? replicate? it? independently.?
Previewing?our? results,?our?main? contribution? is? that?we?are?able? to? replicate? the?main? finding? in?
Brandts? et? al.? (2015).?We? also? contribute? to? the? strand? of? literature? on? democratic? institutions?





2007).? The? basic? minimum? effort? coordination? game? models? an? organization’s? production? with?
strong? complementarities? (Van? Huyck? et? al.? 1990).? Individuals? simultaneously? choose? among?
different?effort?levels?and?the?lowest?individual?effort?determines?group?performance.?The?game?has?
multiple?equilibria,?one?at?every?effort?level?that?is?simultaneously?chosen?by?all?group?members.?To?
choose? the?highest?effort? is? the?most?efficient,?payoff?dominant?outcome? for?all?group?members.?
Though?there?is?a?trade?off,?the?higher?the?individual?effort?choice?is,?the?riskier?it?becomes,?since?the?
possibility? increases?that?other?group?members?choose?a? lower?effort.?A?very?risk?averse? individual?
could?secure?the?lowest?equilibrium?payoff?by?choosing?the?lowest?effort,?and?thus?avoid?losses?from?
coordination? failure.? Coordination? on? the? lowest? effort? is? the? usual? outcome? if? pre?play?
communication? is? not? possible? (Blume? and? Ortmann? 2007).? The? turnaround? game? introduces?









vary? the? tools? leaders?can?use.?We?allow?selected? leaders?only? to?use?voluntary,?non?binding,? free?
form?pre?play?communication.?Effective? leaders? in? the?game?manage? to?convince?others? to? take?a?
certain?course?of?action,?but?this?is?more?than?pure?authority?over?others.?Orders?alone?would?not?be?
sufficient? to?move? followers.? To? be? effective,? leaders? have? to? create? the? belief? in? followers? that?




the? leader?has? legitimate?authority? to?make?decisions,? to? send?orders,?and? to?expect? followers? to?
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follow? her? orders.45 ?Moreover,? also? followers? expect? others? to? follow? the? leader.? Therefore,?
credibility? roots? in? the? legitimacy?of? the? leader.?A? leader? can?prove?her? legitimacy?by? sending? the?
relevant?message? content,? and? through? a? successful? group? history.? However,? besides? legitimacy?
rooting? in? competence,? the? selection?process? itself? can?be? important.?Election?might? increase? the?
legitimacy?of? the? leader,? and?Brandts? et? al.? (2015)? already? showed? that? election? increases? leader?
effectiveness.? In? their? study,?more? legitimate? leaders? send?more? relevant?messages? that? facilitate?
efficient? coordination.? Thus,? in? their?paper,? it? is?not? the?property?of?being? elected? that? improves?
leader? effectiveness.? Rather,? it? is? elected? leaders? who? become?more? active? in? influencing? their?
followers?by? sending?more? relevant?messages,? as? if? elected? leaders?would?be?more?motivated? to?
prove?that?they?deserved?the?followers’?trust,?and?that?the?result?of?the?election?was?“appropriate,?
proper?and?just”?(Tyler?2006).?
One? change? we?made? compared? to? the? design? in? Brandts? et? al.? (2015)? is? that? group?members?
volunteer? before? the? leader? selection? process? takes? place.? Volunteering? is? an? important? feature?
present?in?real?world?environments.?Not?everyone?has?a?preference?to?become?a?leader,?and?usually?




performance? compared? to? exogenous? leadership? (Rivas? and? Sutter? 2011).?However,? this? fact? just?




Dal? Bó? (2014)? reviews? studies? using? different? experimental? methods? to? study? the? effect? of?
institutional?change?to?overcome?social?dilemmas.?Many?contexts?have?already?been?studied,?such?as?





on? different? formal? sanction? schemes? related? to? the? free?rider? problem.? Through? voting,? groups?
quickly? converged? to? the? efficient? outcome.? In? Sutter? et? al.? (2010),? participants? under? the?
endogenous? institutional? choice? condition?had? the?options?of? rewarding?or?punishing?other?group?
members.? Although? groups? had? no? leaders,? the? authors? show? that? voting? on? institutions? has? a?
positive?effect?on?the?level?of?cooperation?compared?with?the?same?institutions?implemented?under?
the?exogenous?choice?condition.?Thus,?participation?rights?trigger?a?cooperation?premium.?Similarly,?
Kosfeld? et? al.? (2009)? studies? the? endogenous? formation?of? institutions,? and? the? authors? find? that?
participants? may? choose? sanctioning? institutions? to? overcome? social? dilemmas,? but? they? are?
reluctant?to?implement?equilibrium?institutions?in?which?free?riding?is?possible,?stressing?the?role?of?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????




fairness? in? the? institution? formation? process.?However,? the? endogenous? formation? of? institutions?











a? public? good? game? with? voluntary? contribution,? is? Levy? et? al.? (2011).? This? paper? shows? that?
democratically? elected? leaders? are?more? likely? to? be? followed? by? group?members? than? randomly?
selected? leaders.?Moreover,? elected? leaders? send?higher? suggestions,? and? as? a? consequence? they?
also? follow? their?own? contribution? suggestion?more? closely? than? randomly? selected? leaders.?Thus,?
Levy?et?al.?conclude?that?elected?leaders?might?feel?a?greater?responsibility?towards?their?group?and?
this?could?explain?why?they?are?more?likely?to?encourage?good?policy.?
In?Hamman? et? al.? (2011),?participants? could? delegate? the? contribution?decision? to? another? group?
member.?The?electoral?delegation? institution?proved?to?provide?the?public?good?most?efficiently.? In?
this?experiment?again,?it?is?the?democracy?effect?that?induces?groups?to?“elect?pro?social?leaders?and?
replace? those? who? do? not? implement? full? contribution? outcomes”.? Other? authors? focused? on?
individual? characteristics? explaining? effectiveness? of? endogenously? selected? leaders.? Arbak? and?
Villeval?(2013)?explored?three?relevant?channels?that?drive?people?to?lead?by?example?in?the?context?
of?a?public?good?game.?First,?leaders?can?be?driven?by?personal?gains?of?non?pecuniary?nature?if?they?
expect? others? to? follow? them.? Second,? some? leaders? are? altruistic? and? volunteer? even? if? this?
contradicts? their? personal? interest.? And? third,? some? leaders? derive? a? value? from? maintaining? a?
positive? social? image.? Although? the? authors? find? that? voluntary? leaders? contribute? more? than?
randomly? selected? leaders,? followers? follow? voluntary? leaders? less,? and? therefore? voluntary? and?
randomly?selected?leaders?are?equally?effective.?Cartwright?et?al.?(2013)?study?leadership?by?example?
using?a?minimum?effort?coordination?game.?The? leader? in?their?experiment?acts?publicly?before?the?




The? experimental? design? and? procedures? overlap?much? with? the? design? and? procedures? of? the?
previous? study? in? Chapter? 3,? and? thus? we? describe? only? the? differences? in? more? detail.? Each?
experimental?session?consists?of?26?periods.?At?the?beginning?of?a?session,?participants?are?randomly?
matched? into? groups? of? five? and? are? informed? that? their? group’s? composition? will? not? change?
throughout? the? session.? In?each?period,?every?participant? i ?in?group? k ?simultaneously?chooses?an?
effort?level? ? ?0,10,20,30,40ieffort ? .?Participant? i ’s?earnings?in?a?period?are?equal?to:?
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In? Part? 2,?we? introduce? leaders.? Every? three? periods,?which?we? refer? to? as? leadership? term,? one?
participant? in? each? group? is? selected? to? be? the? group’s? leader,? which? leaves? the? other? group?
members? as? followers.? The? leader? holds? the? position? until? the? end? of? the? third? period? of? the?
leadership?term.?After?the?three?period?leadership?term?the?leader?reverts?to?being?a?group?member,?
and? a? new? leader? is? selected.? Leaders? make? effort? decisions? and? face? the? same? incentives? as?
followers.?The?leader?has?the?option?to?send?a?written?message?visible?to?all?followers.?The?message?
is? sent? in? the? first? period? of? the? three?period? leadership? term,? before? effort? choices? are?made.?
Leaders? can?write? anything? they?wish,? including?nothing,? except? for? content? that? can? be? used? to?
identify?them.?Messages?are?non?binding.?













otherwise.?Whenever? a? participant? believes? that? his? chances? to? get? selected? are? higher? than? the?





The? selection? process? is? the? only? treatment? variation? in? this? study.? The? treatment? variation? is?
whether? the? leader? is? randomly? selected? or? elected? by? the? group? members.? Since? we? assign?








to? least?preferred.?For?example,? if?there?were?three?candidates,?each?group?member?has? to?assign?
one? candidate? the? rank? of? 1? (most? preferred),? another? candidate? the? rank? of? 2? (second? most?
preferred),?and?the?remaining?candidate?to?the?rank?of?3?(least?preferred).?Candidates?have?to?rank?
themselves?too.?The?candidate?with?the?best?average?rank?wins?the?election?and?becomes?the?leader.?








the?election?of? the? leader.?Unlike? the?design? in?Brandts?et?al.? (2015),?we?have?no? trivia?quiz,?and?
neither?do?we?reveal?the?group?members’?previous?average?effort?level.?One?obvious?reason?to?do?so?
is?that?Brandts?et?al.?show?that?the?scores?on?the?trivia?quiz?and?previous?individual?performance?do?
not?matter? for? explaining? the? election? effect.? Since? re?selection? is? possible? in? our? design,? group?
members?can?easily?memorize?the?other?four?group?members’? ID?and? link?this? information?to?their?
relevant?performance?as?leaders?(messages?sent,?for?instance)?in?previous?leadership?terms.?
4.3.2?Procedures?
The? experiment?was? conducted? in?May? 2015? by? local? personnel? at? the? Vernon? Smith? Center? of?
Experimental?Economics? (VSCEE)?at?Francisco?Marroquín?University? in?Guatemala?City,?Guatemala.?

































effectiveness? of? leaders.? Moreover,? we? are? curious? whether? the? selection? process? affects?
volunteering?for?the? leader?position?and?we?will?test?which?channels?mediate?the?effects?on? leader?
effectiveness:?a?difference?in?leader?behavior?or?a?difference?in?follower?behavior.?
Compared? to? Random,? Election? involves? group? members? into? the? selection? process? through?
collective?decision?making,?which?yields?more?legitimate?leaders?(Brandts?et?al.?2015).?The?difference?
in?legitimacy?may?affect?leader?effectiveness?in?the?same?direction.?This?gives?us?our?first?hypothesis.?
Hypothesis? 1:?Minimum? effort? in? Part? 2? is? higher?with? an? elected? rather? than? randomly? selected?
leader.?
When? making? the? volunteering? decision,? participants? face? two? monetary? incentives.? First,? they?
compare?the?chance?of?winning?the?lottery?with?the?chance?of?winning?the?leader?bonus.?In?Random,?
this? incentive?depends?only?on?the?number?of?other?candidates.?Second,?they?expect?the?benefit?of?
having? a? leader? in? the?next? three?periods,? taking? the?probability? into? account? that?nobody?might?
volunteer? for? the? leader?position.? If? the?expected?benefit? is?zero,?which? is? the?minimum?value,?we?
expect?1.78?candidates?to?run.?Similarly,?if?the?expected?benefit?is?40?in?all?three?periods,?which?is?the?





Such? a? preference?would? drive? the? volunteering? frequency? up? in? both? treatments.? Besides? being?




volunteering?as?a? contribution? to? the?public?good?of?making? sure? that? there?will?be?a? leader?who?
establishes? the? payoff?dominant? equilibrium.? Such? willingness? to? contribute? would? drive? the?
volunteering?frequency?up?in?both?treatments.?Compared?to?Random,?elections?might?further?trigger?








that?participants?might?underestimate? the? volunteering? frequency,? they?might?overestimate? their?
chances?to?win?the?election?(Merkle?and?Weber?2011).?Overconfidence?to?have?higher?chances?to?get?




Initially,? we? expect? to? see? more? participants? volunteering? in? Election.? In? later? periods,? group?
members? can? observe? the? previous? leader’s? competence? and? effectiveness,? and? based? on? this?
information? they?can? form?beliefs? that?a?previous? leader?who? failed? is? less? likely? to?get? reelected,?























follower?behavior.? It? is? the?votes?of? followers? that?create? the? increased? legitimacy? for? the?elected?
leaders,?thus,? if?followers?perceive?their? leaders?to?be?more?credible,?they?are?more? likely?to?follow?










leader? effectiveness,? and? subsequently? we? analyze? the? volunteering? behavior? and? whether? the?
democracy?effect?roots?in?leader?behavior?or?in?followers’?reactions.?
4.5.1?Democracy?Effect?on?Minimum?Effort?
We?measure? leader? effectiveness?with? the? group?minimum? effort,?which? is? affected? both? by? the?
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observations?over? time,?we?organize?our?data? as?panel?data.? To? fit?our? regression?models? to? the?





Variable? Model?1? Model?2? Model?3? Model?4? Model?5?



















? ? ? 10.79***?
(3.71)?
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Notes.?Dependent? variable? is? group?minimum? effort? in? a?period.?Regressions? contain? 522?observations?
from?29?groups?over?18?periods.?Standard?errors?(in?parentheses)?are?corrected?for?clustering?at?the?group?








indicates? the? size? of? the? treatment? difference.?Model? 1? confirms? that? the? democracy? effect? on?
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effect?on? follower?behavior,?especially? in? Election,?when? followers?practically? could?not? vote.?The?
overall?effect?of?adding?the?number?of?candidates?to?the?regression?model? is?not?notable?and?does?






Figure? 4.2? depicts? volunteering?measured? by? the?mean? number? of? candidates? in? each? selection?
period?and?depending?on?the?treatment.?Over?every?selection?period,?more?participants?volunteer?in?
Random? rather? than? Election,? and? this? difference? is? significant? at? the? 5%? level? using? the? non?
parametric?Wilcoxon?rank?sum?test?at?the?group? level,?or?using?a?subject?level?random?effects?GLS?




Do? participants? volunteer? too?much?? In? order? to? answer? this? question?we? calculate? the? rational?
amount?of?volunteering?in?each?treatment?given?the?incentives?for?the?volunteering?decision?and?the?
observed?effect?of? leadership.?For?the?observed?effect?of? leadership?we?calculate?the?difference? in?
average? earnings? between? Part? 1? and? Part? 2? in? each? treatment.? In? the? best? case? scenario,? the?
observed?effect?of?leadership?lasts?during?the?three?periods?of?the?leadership?term,?so?that?the?effect?
can?be?multiplied?by?3.?We? substitute? the? resulting?values? into?Equation?2? in?Appendix?3A,?which?
yields? the? rational? volunteering? frequencies.? The? pecuniary? benefits? benchmark? in? Election? is? 2.7?
candidates,?and? in?Random?2.55?candidates.47?In?period?9,?the?mean?number?of?candidates? is?3.8? in?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
46?Although?not?reported?in?Table?4.2,?we?also?used?“waste”?as?a?dependent?variable?to?see?whether?there?are?




47?Alternatively,?we? calculated? the? observed? effect? of? leadership? using? the? difference? in? average? earnings?
between?the? last?three?periods?of?Part?1?and?all?periods?of?Part?2? in?each?treatment.?The?resulting?pecuniary?




all?periods,? the?mean?number?of? candidates? is?2.4? in?Election?and?2.8? in?Random.?We? can? clearly?
observe? a? common? learning? effect? across? treatments,? decreasing? initial? over?entry? over? time.? In?
Election,?participants?converge?towards?the?rational?volunteering?frequency,?and?even?go?below.?In?
Random,? participants? decrease? their? volunteering? frequency,? but? still? stay? above? the? rational?
volunteering? frequency.? Since? we? account? for? the? difference? in? the? leadership? benefits? and?
benchmarks,?the?treatment?difference?in?volunteering?due?to?non?monetary?reasons?is?stronger?than?
it? initially?appears.?We?cannot?rule?out?that?participants?have?different?preferences?for?the?elected?




Initial? over?entry? could? be? justified?with? participants? having? very? strong? beliefs? about? their? own?
probability? to?win,? and? that? followers?would? vote? for? them,? for? instance.? If? such? overconfidence?
would? be? the? case,?we? would? expect? to? see? a? difference? in? the? volunteering? frequency? among?
treatments,?namely?more?candidates?in?Election.?Graphically,?we?do?not?observe?a?rational?behavior?
in? line?with?these?speculations.?There? is?a?slight?difference?with?more?volunteering? in?Election,?but?
3.6? candidates? in? Random? cannot? be? explained? by? overconfidence,? unless? participants? initially?
doubted?our?random?selection?procedure,?which?is?very?unlikely.?
If?candidates?would?have?a?preference?for?competing?for?the?leader?status?and?for?follower?votes,?we?
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Since?we? find? a? democracy? effect? on?minimum? effort,? in? this? section?we? explore? it?more? using?
variation?in?the?number?of?candidates.?Namely,?in?some?of?the?groups?there?was?only?one?candidate?
and?no?election? in?Election,?and?we?are?curious?about?the?democracy?effect? in?those?cases.?We?run?
regressions?analogous? to?Model?1? for?each?number?of?candidates,? to? test?whether? the?number?of?






? Model?6? Model?7? Model?8? Model?9?
RE? RE? FE? FE?
Number?of?candidates? 1? 2?or?more? Random? Election?






















Notes.? Dependent? variable? is? group?minimum? effort? in? a? period.? All? regressions? are? GLS? regressions,?
Models?6?and?7?are?random?effects?(RE),?Models?8?and?9?are?fixed?effects?(FE)?models.?We?collapse?the?
data?by?group?and?period.?The?number?of?observations?in?Models?6?and?7?sums?up?to?507,?and?in?Models?8?
and?9? it?sums?up?to?522?observations? from?29?groups.?We?do?not?report? the?case?when?the?number?of?





In?Model? 6,? we? test? whether? the? democracy? effect? is? still? present? if? only? one? group? member?






In?Models?8? and?9,?we? test?whether? the?number?of? candidates?has? an?effect?on?minimum?effort?












In? this? section?we? investigate?who? runs? for? the? leader?position:? Is? it?always? the? same?or?different?
people? in?the?group?who?volunteer??In?Panel?A?of?Figure?4.3,?we?depict?the?mean?number?of?times?
being? selected? by? the? number? of? times? volunteering.? The? figure? depicts? only? observations? of?




For?example,?only?55%?of? the?participants?who?volunteered?six? times?are?selected?at? least?once? in?
Random,?whereas? in? Election? it? is? 69%.? The? reason? for? the? increasing? trend?might? be? reelection.?
Reelection?can?have? two?explanations.?First,?successful? leaders?are? likely? to?get? reelected.?Second,?
relatively? less?group?members? run? in?Election,?which?might?be?due? to?a?preference?difference.?Of?
course,? successful? leaders?who? volunteer?make? it? needless? for? others? to? volunteer? too,? so? that?
reelection? itself? can? cause? a? further? decrease? in? volunteering.49?The? likelihood? that? somebody? is?







Panel?B?displays? the?mean?guessed? share?of?candidates? in?period?9.?Especially? in?period?9,?before?
participants? learn? about? the? true? volunteering? frequency,? they?might? rely? on? their? beliefs? about?
others? volunteering.? These? beliefs? might? be? another? possible? explanation? for? the? volunteering?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
49?The?possibility?of?reelection?of?successful?leaders?can?make?others?shy?away?from?volunteering.?This?could?be?
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is? relatively?more? attractive? to? participants?who? expect? a? higher? number? of? candidates.? In? other?
words,?we?would?expect?in?both?treatments?that?participants?who?choose?the?lottery?do?so?because?
they? expect? more? candidates? than? participants? who? choose? to? volunteer.? Instead? we? find? that?
participants?who?volunteer?expect?that?around?70%?of?the?other?four?group?members?will?volunteer?
as?well,?while? participants?who? do? not? volunteer? expect? around? 60%? of? others? to? volunteer.? A?
rationale? for? these? beliefs?might? be? that? participants? simply? reflect? their? own? preferences? onto?
others,? thinking? that?others?are?alike? to? the? self,?and?hence,? the? somewhat? lower?guesses?among?
non?candidates.?In?psychology,?such?an?effect?is?called?a?“false?consensus?effect”?overestimating?the?










Using?Models? V1? and? V2,?we? analyze? the? effect? of? the? democratic? regime? on? volunteering.? The?





whether? beliefs? about? the? share? of? candidates? or? group? history? have? different? effects? on?
volunteering?across? treatments.?The?effects?of?beliefs?are?significantly?positive? in?both? treatments.?
Participants,?who?expect?that?all?others?in?their?group?volunteer,?are?more?likely?to?volunteer?as?well.?
Compared? to? Random,? the? effect? of? beliefs? is? twice? as? large? in? Election,? and? this? difference? is?
significant? based? on? the? post?estimation? test? (p? =? 0.02).? The? effects? of? lagged? group? history? are?
significantly?negative?in?both?treatments.?If?groups?do?well,?participants?volunteer?less,?which?means?
that?they?contribute?to? leadership?more?only?as? long?as? it? is?necessary.?This? finding?speaks? for?our?
public?good?explanation?of?the?volunteering?behavior,?and? it? is?evidence?that?participants?take? into?
account? the?benefits?of? leadership? for? their?decision.?We? find?no?statistically?significant?difference?
between?the?effects?of?lagged?group?history?across?treatments.?However,?groups?do?better?under?the?
democratic? regime,? and? this? would? explain? the? lower? level? of? volunteering.? The? results? remain?
unchanged,?if?we?run?a?subject?level?fixed?effects?version?of?the?regression?in?Model?V2.?
Using?Models?L1?and?L2,?we?analyze? the?effects?of? the?democratic? regime?on? the?chance?of?being?
selected? again.? The? dependent? variable? is? whether? each? participant? becomes? a? leader? in? the?
particular?group?and?selection?period.?Model?L1?analyzes?sequential?re?selection?without?controlling?
for?the?previous?success?of?the? leader,?whereas?Model?L2?analyzes?re?selection?after?the?candidate?








Variable? Model?V1? Model?V2? Model?L1? Model?L2?
RE? RE? RE? RE?





















Leader?in?previous?term?in?Random? ? ? 0.12*?
(0.06)?
?





























selection? periods.?We? divided? the? lagged? history? by? factor? 10.? Standard? errors? (in? parentheses)? are?
corrected? for? clustering? at? the? group? level.? ***Statistically? significant? at? the? 1%? level,? **statistically?
significant?at?the?5%?level,?*statistically?significant?at?the?10%?level.?
?





leader? in? the? current? term,? and? this? effect? increases? to? 0.29? in? Election.? Thus,? the? sequential?











estimation? test.?The?effect?of?having?been?an?unsuccessful? leader? in?any?of? the?previous? terms? is?
negligible?under?both?regimes?(p?=?0.78?according?to?the?post?estimation?test?comparing?treatments).?
In? sum,? we? can? say? that? the? volunteering? behavior? is? initially? driven? by? a? preference? for? the?
leadership?position?and?a?willingness? to?provide? the?public?good?of?having?a?beneficial? leader.? It? is?
rather?unlikely?that?the?volunteering?behavior? is?affected?by?biased?beliefs,? like?underestimation?of?
the?number?of?candidates?or?overconfidence? in?being?elected.? In? later?periods,? (successful)? leaders?
get?reselected?in?both?treatments,?and?this?occurs?partly?because?volunteering?decreases?over?time?
and?partly?because?participants?of?successful?groups?volunteer?less,?as?it?becomes?less?necessary?to?
contribute? to? the? public? good.? Since? groups?perform?better? under?democracy,?participants?might?
decrease?their?willingness?to?volunteer,?and?thus?we?observe?less?over?entry?and?volunteering?close?
to?and?even?below?the?pecuniary?benefits?benchmark.?








Conclusion?2:?We? find?partial?support? for?Hypothesis?2.?The? initial?volunteering? frequency?does?not?
differ? across? treatments.? The? overall? volunteering? frequency? is? higher?when? leaders? are? randomly?
selected.?Better?group?history?and?the?possibility?of?reelections?under?democracy?regulate?the?number?
of?candidates?towards?the?pecuniary?benefits?benchmark.?Over?entry?can?be?explained?by?preferences?
for? the? leader?position?and?willingness? to?provide?beneficial? leadership.?Our?evidence? supports? the?
latter?explanation?most.?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
50?If?we?run?the?regression? in?Model?L1?with?a?variable?for?successful?previous? leadership? instead?of?previous?
leadership?only,?we?find?that?the?magnitude?of?the?coefficients?is?higher?for?both?conditions,?but?the?difference?
in?the?effects?remains?unchanged?(p?=?0.24).?
51?A? few? times? (repeatedly? in? two? out? of? fourteen? groups)?we? found?messages? in? Election? containing? the?









In? this? section,? we? examine? whether? the? treatment? affects? leader? behavior,? which? means? the?
leader’s? message? sending? behavior.? First,? we? analyze? democracy? effects? on? message? use,? and?
afterwards?we?will?argue?how?much?of?the?original?democracy?effect?on?minimum?effort?is?explained?
by?a?difference?in?leader?behavior.?
Table? 4.5? provides? an? overview? of? frequent?message? categories? that?we? coded? for? the? content?
analysis,? indicating?description?and?examples,?and? the?percentage? (frequency)?of?all?observations.?
The?content?analysis? includes?all?cases?when?the?group?had?a? leader,?even? if?no?message?was?sent,?
but?we?dropped?5?group?level?observations?when?nobody?volunteered.?All?variables?were?coded?as?
binary:? variables? take? the? value?of?1? if? the?message? contains?a? certain? category?and?0?otherwise.?
Table?A1? in?Appendix?4A?contains?the?full? list?of?all?coded?categories.?The?message?coding,?which? is?










Figure? 4.4? depicts? those? categories? that?we? found? to? be?most? interesting? as? potential? channels?
explaining?the?democracy?effect?on?minimum?effort.?Compared?to?Random,?suggestions?of?forty?(p?=?
0.01),?positive?emotional?content?(p?=?0.00),?and?being?part?of?the?group?(p?=?0.01)?are?significantly?






52?To? filter? interesting? content,?we? ran?a? correlation?analysis?of? the?message? content? categories.?Suggesting?
forty? also? correlated? with? the? mutual? benefit? argument? and? assertive? style.? Moreover,? long? messages?
correlated?with?explanation,?excuses,?and?being?part?of?the?group,?since?leaders?who?tried?to?help?their?teams?
with? explanations? often? expressed? that? they? are? equally? part? of? the? group.? Surprisingly,? orders?were? not?
correlated?with?short?messages,?but?obviously?they?strongly?correlated?with?the?assertive?style.?
53?Though?not?reported,?we?ran?subject?level?OLS?regressions?on?message?use?clustered?on?groups,?similarly?to?
the?analysis? in?Brandts?et?al.? (2015).?Note,? that? their?data?contained?observations?only? from? the? first?period?
after?the?introduction?of?leaders,?which?was?their?only?selection?period.?Our?data?contains?observations?of?all?
the? six? selection? periods.? If? the? dependent? variable? indicates?whether? the? leader? suggested? forty? and? the?
indicator?for?Election?is?the?only?explanatory?variable,?we?find?that?elected?leaders?are?by?16?percentage?points?
more? likely? to?suggest? forty?than?randomly?selected? leaders? (p?=?0.07).?Brandts?et?al.? (2015)?also?control? for?
history? effects?using? lagged?minimum? effort.?Although?history? is? likely? to? affect? subsequent? leaders,? in?our?















12.71? on?minimum? effort.? Forty? explains? about? 20%? of? the? democracy? effect? by? decreasing? its?
coefficient?from?12.30?in?Model?1?to?10.18?effort?units.?The?remaining?80%?of?the?democracy?effect?is?
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The? figure? depicts? followers’?minimum? effort? depending? on? the? treatment? and? holding? constant?
whether?the? leader?requests?forty?or?not.?We? include?data?of?each?period? if?the?average?minimum?
effort? in? the?previous? leadership? term?was? less? than? forty.? In? such?periods,? the? leader’s?ability? to?
affect?outcomes? is?more? important? than? in?periods?with?a?successful?group?history?when?all?group?
members? already? coordinated?on? the? efficient? equilibrium.?We? exclude? effort? choices?of? leaders.?
Note,? that? Brandts? et? al.? (2015)? included? only? observations? from? the? first? period? after? the? only?




























that? elected? leaders? are? followed? to? a? greater? extent? than? randomly? selected? leaders,? holding?
constant?what?leaders?say?(p?=?0.07).55?
Next,?we? jump?back? to?Model?5? in?Table?4.2,?where?we?extend?Model?1?with?another?explanatory?
variable,?the?interaction?of?the?guessed?share?of?followers?with?suggesting?forty?and?the?indicator?for?
Election.? The? interaction? terms? reflect? the? effect? of? beliefs? about? others? following? the? leader’s?




the? minimum? effort? significantly? increases? by? 13.83? units? compared? to? an? elected? leader? who?
suggests?forty?and?followers?expect?will?not?be?followed?by?others.?The?post?estimation?test?reveals?




all?others? to? follow,? then? the?minimum? effort? increases?by?3.68? and? ?7.98?units? respectively,?but?
without?being?significant.?In?other?words,?beliefs?of?followers?matter?only?when?a?message?of?forty?is?
sent,?and?beliefs?matter?in?the?same?way?in?both?Random?and?Election.?
Table?4.6?presents? a?multilevel?mediation? analysis? to? estimate? the? size?of? the?direct? and? indirect?
components? of? the? total? democracy? effect? on? minimum? effort? (Krull? and? MacKinnon? 2001;?
MacKinnon?et?al.?2007;?Shatnawi?et?al.?2011).?The?total?effect?decomposition?is?useful?in?case?of?our?
data,?since? the? treatment?variation?has?direct?effects?on? leader?and? follower?behavior,?and? leader?
behavior?also?mediates?the?democracy?effect? indirectly?towards?followers’?choices.?Thus,?there?are?
two?behavioral? channels? for? the?democracy?effect,? and? the?destination?of? the?democracy?effect’s?









55?Post?estimation? test? results? after? a? random? effects?GLS? regression? for? followers’?minimum? effort? in? each?














and? treatment? have? significant? effects? on?minimum? effort? at? the? 1%? and? 10%? significance? level,?
respectively.? The? effect? size?of? the? treatment?decreases?when? the? regression? contains? suggesting?
forty.?The?output? further? shows? indirect,?direct?and? total?effects,?but? it?does?not?provide?us?with?
standard?errors?or? confidence? intervals.?Therefore,?we? could?use? several?approaches? that? confirm?
the?mediation?effect?statistically,?such?as?the?causal?steps?approach?(the?democracy?effect?decreases?
in?Equation?3),?the?difference?in?coefficients?approach,?and?the?product?of?coefficients?approach?both?




? Equation?1? Equation?2? Equation?3? Bootstrap?
Dependent?variable? Minimum?effort? Suggesting?forty? Minimum?effort? ?

















Indirect?effect? ? ? 2.10? 2.10**?
(1.05)?
Direct?effect? ? ? 10.20? 10.20**?
(5.25)?
Total?effect? 12.30? ? ? 12.30**?
(5.78)?
Notes.?Equations?1?to?3?are?estimated?by?mixed?effects?REML?regressions?and?contain?522?observations?from?29?



















change?of? leaders’?behavior,?our? results? are?mainly?driven?by? a?difference? in? followers’?behavior.?
Followers?follow?elected?leaders’?messages?with?a?higher?probability?than?randomly?selected?leaders’?
messages,? holding? constant?what? leaders? say.? Thus,? followers? perceive? elected? leaders? as?more?
credible?than?randomly?selected?leaders.?In?our?study,?only?around?20%?of?the?democracy?effect?can?
be?attributed?to?a?change? in? leader?behavior,?according?to?the?total?effect?decomposition?analysis.?
Elected? leaders? are?more? active? in? the? sense? that? they? suggest?more? often? to? choose? forty? than?
randomly?selected?leaders.?
Volunteering?is?a?new?feature,?which?we?added?to?the?experimental?design.?Volunteering?might?have?
pre?selected?motivated? leaders,?which?might? explain?why? the? difference? in? leader? behavior?was?
rather? small? across? treatment? conditions.? If? this? were? true,? then? our? results? are? important? in?
understanding?the?drivers?of?the?democracy?effect.?Our?design?might?magnify?the?direct?channel?of?









Another?difference?between?the?study? in?Brandts?et?al.? (2015)?and?our?study? is?the? location?of?the?
experiment?execution.?Authors?of?Brandts?et?al.?(2015)?ran?their?study? in?Florida,?while?we?ran?our?
study? in?Guatemala.?Cultural?and?historical?differences?across? the? subject?pools?might?partially?be?
involved? in?explaining?our?differing? findings.?Guatemalan?people?support?their?political?system?and?
are? satisfied? with? democracy? at? a? similar? rate? than? the? average? of? countries? on? the? American?
continent.?The?political?tolerance?and?support?for?democracy?is?lower,?victimization?by?corruption?is?
higher? than? the?average? in? the? comparative?perspective,?based?on?data? from?2010? (Azpuru?et?al.?
2011).? The? country? has? a? geographically? advantageous? position? with? seaports? on? two? oceans,?
strategically? ideal?for?trade?and?outsourcing.?Due?to?survey?reports?by?the?Global?Entrepreneurship?
Monitor?(GEM),?around?40%?of?Guatemalan?people?would?like?to?become?entrepreneurs?in?the?next?




of?social?enterprises.? In? line?with? this? information?and?using?data? from?our? final?questionnaire,?we?
found?that?80%?of?the?participants?prefers?the?leader?role,?the?average?participant?considers?himself?
to?be?a?better? leader?(average? is?1.5?scores?on?a?scale?from?1?to?5),?and?the?average?willingness?to?








suggestion?of? forty,?whereas?we? find? this? frequency? to?be?almost?80%.?This?means,? that?nearly?all?
leaders?in?our?experiment?suggested?the?highest?effort?level,?which?is?risky?to?follow,?and?risky?if?we?
assume?that?leaders?followed?their?own?suggestions,?which?they?really?do?in?most?of?the?cases?(mean?
leader? effort? is? 33? if? the? leader? suggested? forty).? Studies? comparing? the?willingness? to? take? risks?
across?countries?confirm?that?Guatemalan?people?have?a?higher?risk?tolerance?than?people?in?the?US,?
which? is?negatively?correlated? to?GDP?per?capita? (Vieider?et?al.?2016).? It?might?be? that? the?higher?
willingness? to? take? risks?drives? the?uniformly?high? suggestions,? leaving? less? room? for?a?democracy?
effect?on?leader?behavior.?













investigate? whether? men? and? women? are? equally? effective? leaders? under? two? different? leader?
selection?procedures.?The?random?selection?procedure? is?a?top?down?procedure,?where?employees?
cannot? influence? who? becomes? their? leader.? The? election? procedure? represents? a? bottom?up?
procedure,?when?employees?get? involved? in?choosing?their?group? leaders.?As?a?real?world?example,?
one? could? think? of? a? start?up? team? that? democratically? assigns? the? leader? position? among? the?
candidates,? or? organizations? operating? project?by?project? that? might? have? the? possibility? to? let?
project? teams? decide?who?will? be? the? project? leader.?Our? study? contributes? to? the? literature? on?
laboratory? experiments?using? the? turnaround? game?which?models? leadership.?We? confirm? earlier?
findings?when?we? compare? randomly? selected? to? elected? leaders,? and?we? extend? the? insights? by?
descriptive?results?on?gender?differences?(Brandts?et?al.?2015).?Our?main?interest?is?twofold.?First,?we?




The? weak?link? game,? or? minimum? effort? coordination? game,? models? production? situations? in?
organizations,? where? individuals? are? interdependent,? and? the? lowest? performing? individual?
determines? group? performance? (Van? Huyck? et? al.? 1990).? Individuals? can? choose? among? different?
effort? levels.?However,? in?equilibrium,? all? group?members? choose? the? same? effort? level.? Thus? the?
game?has?multiple?equilibria,?one?at?every?effort?level.?To?choose?the?highest?effort?level?is?the?most?
efficient,?payoff?dominant?outcome?for?all?group?members.?Though,?the?higher?the?individual?effort?
level? choice? is,? the? riskier? it? becomes,? since? the? payoff? loss? one? incurs? if? other? group?members?
choose?a?lower?effort?level?increases.?Strategic?uncertainty?can?therefore?undermine?efficiency?(Van?
Huyck?et?al.?1990)?as? risk?averse? individuals?could?decide? to?secure? themselves?a?certain,?but? low,?





which?usually? results? in? the? group? failing? to? coordinate? at?high? effort? levels? (Brandts? and?Cooper?
2006a).? In? the? second?part,? the?game? introduces? leadership.?The? task?of? the? leader? is? to? lead? the?




2007).? Leaders? are? allowed? to?use? voluntary,?non?binding,? free? form?pre?play? communication.56?If?
leaders? are? credible,? they? can? use? communication? as? a? tool? to?move? group?members? to? choose?
higher?effort? levels,?and? to? reach? the?most?efficient?equilibrium? through?a? coordinated? change,?a?
“turnaround”?(Brandts?and?Cooper?2007).?
Leader?credibility?refers?to?the?beliefs?of?the?followers?who?are? led.?Specifically,?whether?followers?
expect? others?will? follow? the? leader.? A? leader? can? prove? her? credibility? by? sending? the? relevant?
message?content,?and? through?a?successful?group?history.57?However,?besides?credibility? rooting? in?
competence,?the?selection?process? itself?can?be? important.?Election? increases?the?credibility?of?the?
leader,?and?Brandts?et?al.? (2015)?already?showed? that?election?also? increases? leader?effectiveness.?
Further,? since?we? reveal? the? gender? of? the? leader,? credibility?might? be? influenced? by? the? gender?
information.? Followers? might? have? stereotype? beliefs? that? consider? men? to? be? better,? more?
competent,?and?more? credible? leaders,?despite? the? fact? that?both?genders?might?perform?equally?
well? (Ridgeway? 2001;? Day? 2014;? Goldin? 2002;? Akerlof? and? Kranton? 2005;? Reuben? et? al.? 2014).?
Moreover,?even?if?a?follower?does?not?believe?the?stereotype,?he?would?still?act?according?to?it?if?he?
thinks?others?do?believe?it.?
Volunteering? to? be? a? leader? is? an? important? feature? present? in? real?world? environments.? Not?
everyone?wants? to?become?a? leader?and? leaders?are?usually?not? forced? into?a? leader?position.?We?
introduce? this? important? feature? to? the? turnaround?game?by?giving?group?members? the?choice? to?
volunteer?to?run?for?the?leader?position?before?they?are?either?randomly?selected?or?democratically?
elected.?We?think?that?adding?volunteering?to?the?design? is?a?good?change,?reproducing?real?world?
features? in? more? detail? in? the? laboratory? game.58?Independently? of? whether? leaders? differ? in?
effectiveness?or?not,?there?might?be?a?gender?difference? in?the?preference? for?the? leader?position.?
Such? a? potential? gender? difference? might? simply? root? in? differing? preferences? for? authority,?
regardless? of? followership? and? credibility? concerns.? Bartling? et? al.? (2014)? show? that? agents? value?
authority,?the?right?to?make?decisions,?and?if?the?value?for?the?right?to?make?decisions?is?rooted?in?a?
more? general? preference? to? have? more? control? over? an? outcome,? then? we? should? expect? that?
participants?run?more?often?for?the?leader?position?than?would?be?expected?based?on?the?pecuniary?
benefits?of? leadership.?Kanthak?and?Woon? (2014)?show? that?women?are? less? likely? to?volunteer?as?
candidates?in?an?election,?which?suggests?in?a?different?context?that?women?might?be?more?averse?to?
authority,?so?that?we?should?expect?that?men?run?more?often?for?the?leader?position?than?women.?
Bertrand? (2011)? reviews? the? literature?on? factors? that?potentially?explain? the?gender?gap? in? labor?
market? outcomes.? The? author? reports? about? stable? differences? in? some? psychological? attributes,?
such?as?risk?attitudes,?attitudes?towards?competition?and?negotiation,?social?preferences,?and?other?
personality? traits.? Some? of? these? factors? might? be? relevant? for? explaining? a? potential? gender?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
56?Cheap? talk?between?players? improves?coordination?and?efficiency? (Blume?and?Ortmann?2007).?Centralized?
communication?by?a? leader?decreases? the?costs?of?communication?and? is?more?effective? than?expert?advice?
(Brandts?and?Cooper?2007;?Brandts?et?al.?2014).?
57?In?the?text,?we?use?the?personal?pronoun?“she”? if?we?refer?to?a? leader,?and?we?use?“he”? in?all?other?cases?
when?gender?is?not?specified.?








when? they?are? randomly? selected.?Women?are?elected?at?a?similar? rate? than?men.?Elected? female?







emergence,? and? this? election? aversion? is? part? of? the? explanation? for? the? underrepresentation? of?
women? in? legislative? bodies? and? top? political? positions.? In? the? study? by? Kanthak? and?Woon,? the?
abilities?of?participants?were?measured?using?a?problem?solving? task,?and?subsequently?candidates?
were? facing?an?electoral?competition.?Due? to? the?competitive?context,?women?might?have?had?an?
aversion?to?beat?others,?or?might?have?been?reluctant?to?enter?if?they?were?not?self?assured?to?win.?








Studying? leadership? by? example,? and? voluntary? contributions? in? a? public? good? game,? Arbak? and?
Villeval? (2013)? find? that?although?men?are?more? likely? to? lead,?women?with?high?contributions?are?
most? likely? to? volunteer? for? leadership? if? leader? selection? is? endogenous? and? attributes,? like?
generosity?and?gender,?are?hidden.?Kocher?et?al.?(2013)?find?that?leaders?who?focus?on?efficiency?are?
more? likely? to?exert? an? autocratic? leader? style,?while?elected? leaders? are?more? likely? to? lead? in? a?
democratic?style,?accommodating?other?regarding?preferences?even?if?the?preferences?of?others?are?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
59?More? recently,? gender? identity? models? have? been? used? as? theoretical? foundations.? According? to? the?
preference?based?discrimination?model?by?Akerlof?and?Kranton?(2000),?women?might?derive?a?disutility?from?
choosing?a?position?which? is? in?conflict?with?stereotype?behavioral?prescriptions?for?being?a?woman,? like,? for?





outsiders? whose? opinion? drives? stereotype? beliefs.? However,? in? our? study,? followers? can? observe? leader?
effectiveness,?which? can? help? in? overcoming? the? pollution? effect? of? stereotyping? as? productive? individuals?




at? odds? with? the? preferences? of? the? leader.? The? authors? also? find? that? male? leaders? use? the?
democratic?style?more?often? than? their? female?counterparts.? In?contrast,?Eagly?et?al.? (2003)?argue?
that? the? democratic?autocratic? classification? of? leadership? style? does? not? describe? the? leader’s?
behavior,? and? that? the? implications? for? leader? effectiveness? depend?more? on? the? organizational?
structure,?for?example,?whether?participation?in?decision?making?is?feasible?and?allowed?(Foels?et?al.?
2000;?Gastil?1994;?Vroom?and?Yetton?1973).?
Instead,? based? on? their? meta?analysis,? Eagly? et? al.? (2003)? classify? three? leadership? styles:?
transformational,? transactional,? and? laissez?faire? leadership? style.? Transformational? leaders? are?
future?oriented,? innovative? leaders,?who? empower? their? followers? to? contribute?more? capably? to?
their? organization.? They? often? act? as? role? models,? they? emphasize? the? importance? of? the?
organization’s?mission,?and?they?attend?to?the? individual?needs?of?their?followers,?focusing?on?their?
development?and?mentoring.60?Transformational? leaders,? in?our? context,?would?emphasize?mutual?
benefits?along?with?requesting?high?effort.?Transactional? leaders?appeal?to?the?self?interest?of?their?
followers? in?that?they?establish?exchange?relationships?with?them:?the?transactional? leader?clarifies?





that? leader? effectiveness? relates? positively? to? the? transformational? leadership? style? and? some?





transformational? leadership? style? is? effective? in?most? organizational? contexts,? and? women,? who?
engage?in?such?leader?behavior,?gain?at?least?some?advantage.?
The?decision? to?volunteer? could?also?be?affected?by? the?attitude? towards? competitions,?especially?
under? the? election? procedure? when? voters? compare? candidates? to? each? other.61?According? to?
Niederle?and?Vesterlund? (2007),?men?might?prefer?competitions?more?than?women,?and? thus?they?
might? run? too? often? for? the? leader? position,? while? women? might? shy? away? from? the? more?
competitive?environment?under?the?election?procedure?even?though?that?volunteering?has?pecuniary?
benefits.?Using?an?experiment? in?which?group? leaders?compete?against?each?other? in?a? real?effort?
task?that?they?performed?in?the?past,?and?leader?selection?is?based?on?a?group?decision,?Reuben?et?al.?
(2012)? demonstrate? that? women? are? selected? less? often? as? leaders? than? is? suggested? by? their?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
60?Many?features?of?the?transformational?leadership?style?are?in?common?with?charismatic?leadership?(Conger?
and? Kanungo? 1998).? Antonakis? et? al.? (2015)? show? in? a? field? experiment? that? charismatic? speeches? have? a?
performance?effect:?workers?increase?their?costly?effort?input?and?generate?higher?firm?output.?
















whether? the? leader? is? randomly? selected? (Random)? or? elected? by? the? group?members? (Election).?
Since? we? assign? participants? randomly? to? one? of? the? two? selection? procedures,? the? treatment?
variation?has?a?between?subjects?design.?Moreover,?we?study?the?gender?of?the?leader.?The?gender?
of? the? leader? is?used?as?an?additional?explanatory?variable.?However,? it? is?not?a?second? treatment?
variation,? since? leadership? positions? in? Election? are? assigned? endogenously? and? thus? the? leader’s?
gender?does?not?randomly?vary?across?the?groups.?
To? reveal? information? about? gender,?participants?have? to? choose? a?profile?picture? they? identified?
with.? This? occurred? after? they? consented? to? take? part? in? the? study? but? before? they? read? the?
instructions? to?avoid?strategic?selection?of?profile?pictures? (see?Figure?B1? in?Appendix?3B).?We?use?




for? the?election?of? the? leader.? Importantly,?we?decided? to?provide?participants? in?both? treatments?







62?Glass? and? Cook? (2016)? focus? their? study? on? the? conditions? under? which? women? are? promoted? to? top?
positions.? The? authors? find? that,? compared? to?men,?women? are?more? likely? to? be? promoted? if? the? leader?







Leader? effectiveness? has? two? channels:? leader? behavior? and? follower? behavior.? Earlier? laboratory?
experiments?using?the?weak?link?game?and?the?turnaround?game?already?show?that?communication?
from? the? leader? improves? coordination? (Blume? and? Ortmann? 2007;? Brandts? and? Cooper? 2007).?
Without?communication,? it? is? risky? to?choose? the?highest?effort? level,?and?groups? rarely? reach? the?
payoff?dominant?outcome?desired?by?everyone.?Communication?can?put? the?desired?outcome? into?
the?focus?of?all?group?members,?creating?the?expectation?that?the?highest?effort?level?will?be?chosen?
by? every? group?member,? and? consequentially? group?members? indeed? reliably? often? choose? level?
forty.?More?overconfident? leaders?will?tend?to?overestimate?the?number?of?their?followers?and?the?




men,?or? think? that?others?might?be?more? likely? to? follow?men? rather? than?women,?or? both.?Our?
assumption?is?based?on?literature?that?revealed?evidence?about?biased?stereotype?beliefs?related?to?
leadership?and?gender.?According?to?Day? (2014)?and?Goldin? (2002),?some?of?the?stereotype?beliefs?
root? in?history,?since? leader?positions?have?traditionally?been?held?by?men,?and?thus? leadership?can?
be?considered?to?be?a?masculine?domain.?Moreover,?according?to?Grossman?et?al.?(2016),?followers?
are?more?likely?to?follow?men?than?women,?holding?leader?messages?constant.?Even?if?followers?do?
not? hold? biased? beliefs? themselves,? the? incentives? of? the? game? might? cause? them? to? act? in?
accordance?to?the?supposed?gender?bias?in?leader?credibility.?Based?on?this,?we?expect?followers?to?
follow?men?more? than?women,?especially? in?Random.? In?Election,?we?expect? the?gender?gap? to?be?
smaller,?since?elections?might?boost?leader?credibility?(Brandts?et?al.?2015)?irrespective?of?the?elected?
leader’s?gender?or?other?attributes?(Darcy?et?al.?1994;?Lau?and?Redlawsk?1997).?













63?Based?on?earlier? results?by?Brandts?et?al.? (2015),?we?expect? that?elected? leaders?will?be?more?active? than?



















behavior,? the? chance? of? getting? elected,? the? voting? behavior,? and? whether? followers? sabotage?
leaders?they?did?not?vote?for.?
5.5.1?Election?Effect?on?Minimum?Effort?




Complementary? to? the? figure,? Table? 5.1? presents? the? regression? results? of? group?level? random?
effects?GLS?estimations?for?minimum?effort?in?each?period?from?9?to?26?as?the?dependent?variable,?
and? indicators? for?Election,?having?a? female? leader,?and?having?no? leader?as?explanatory?variables.?
Standard? errors? are? clustered? on? groups.?According? to?Model? 1,? compared? to? Random,? elections?
have?a?significant?average?effect?of?12.42.?On?average,?male?leaders?are?significantly?more?effective?
by?2.95?effort?units,?compared?to?female?leaders.?In?Model?2,?the?indicator?for?Election?is?interacted?
with? having? a? female? leader? and? having? no? leader.? In? Random,? the? gender? difference? in? leader?
effectiveness?diminishes?and?becomes? insignificant? (p?=?0.68).? In?Election,?men?are?by?5.93?effort?
units?significantly?more?effective?leaders?than?women?(p?=?0.04).?Compared?to?Random,?elected?men?









































The? control? variable? for? no? leader? controls? for? the? cases? when? nobody? volunteered,? which?
happened? 3? times? in? Random,? and? 2? times? in? Election.? Standard? errors? (in? parentheses)? are?
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?
Taking? a? closer? look? at? the? figure,?we?wondered?whether? the? difference? in? leader? effectiveness?
among? elected? men? and? women? is? driven? by? early? periods.?We? can? see? a? huge? difference? in?




Conclusion? 1:?We? find? partial? support? for? Prediction? 1.? Randomly? selected?men? and?women? are?
equally? effective? leaders.? Elected? men? are? initially? more? effective? leaders? than? elected? women?
because?elections?boost?the?effectiveness?of?male?leaders?more?in?initial?periods.?
5.5.1.1?Message?Sending?Behavior?
In? this? and? the? following? subsection,?we? decompose? the? treatment? and? gender? effects? by? their?
channels.?In?this?subsection?we?examine?the?leader?behavior?channel,?and?in?the?next?subsection?the?
follower? behavior? channel.? Leaders? could? send? free? form?message? content,?which?we? coded? as?






Random:? p? =? 0.83,? in? Election:? p? =? 0.58),? to? argue?with?mutual? benefit? (in? Random:? p? =? 0.63,? in?
Election:?p?=?0.78),?and? to? send?positive?emotional? content? (in?Random:?p?=?0.39,? in?Election:?p?=?
0.64),? according? to? random? effects? GLS? regressions? on? message? content? with? treatment? and?
treatment?in?interaction?with?leader’s?gender?and?standard?errors?clustered?on?groups.?





variable? “relevant? content”.? Figure? 5.2? depicts? the? frequencies? of? suggesting? forty? and? relevant?
messages?in?each?selection?period?by?treatment?and?leader’s?gender.?Graphically,?elected?leaders?are?
more?active? than? randomly? selected? leaders,? in? the? sense? that? they? request?more?often? forty?and?
send? more? often? relevant? messages.? Gender? differences? are? not? consistent? across? treatments.?




65?Since? participants? knew? the? gender? composition? of? their? groups,? we? also? tested? whether? the? gender?
composition? in? interaction?with?the?gender?of?the? leader?has?any?consistent?effect?on?minimum?effort?across?
treatments,?but?our?findings?were?negative.?
66?In?accordance?to?Eagly?et?al.?(2003),?we?could?interpret?expressions?of?being?part?of?the?group?as?a?feature?of?








Model? 3? in? Table? 5.2? presents? the? estimation? results.? The? dependent? variable? is? forty? and? the?




is?22?percentage?points? and? significant? (p? =?0.02).? The?difference?between? elected? and? randomly?
selected?female? leaders? is?only?8?percentage?points?and?not?significant? (p?=?0.56),?according?to?the?







difference? between? elected? and? randomly? selected? female? leaders? is? 17? percentage? points? and?
marginally?significant?(p?=?0.14),?according?to?the?post?estimation?test.68?Since?the?analyses?for?forty?




possible? explanations? of? the? differences? in? suggesting? forty.?We? add? lagged? suggestions? of? forty? to? test?
whether?male?and?female?leaders?differ?in?their?persistence,?but?we?find?no?differences?in?effects.?If?we?extend?
the? interaction? terms?with? the? persistence? of? suggesting? forty? after? a? previous? failure,?we? find? no? gender?
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collapsing? the?data?by? subject?and? leadership? term.?For?Model?4?we?use?a?group?level? random?
effects? GLS? regression? after? collapsing? the? data? by? group? and? period.?Model? 3? contains? 169?








This? section? analyzes? follower? behavior,? and?we? estimate? how?much? of? the? original? election? and?
gender?effect?on?minimum?effort? in?Model?1? is?explained?by? a?difference? in? leader?behavior? and?
follower?behavior? respectively.?Model?4? in?Table?5.2?estimates? the?effects?on?minimum?effort?and?
extends?the?interaction?term?in?Model?2?with?a?dummy?for?forty.?According?to?the?results?of?the?post?
estimation?tests,?we?find?no?differences?in?the?effects?of?forty?on?leader?effectiveness?depending?on?







Initially,?elected?male? leaders,?who? suggest? forty,? increase? the?group?minimum?effort?by?40?units,?
whereas?elected?female?leaders,?who?also?suggest?forty,?increase?the?group?minimum?effort?by?only?
21.11?units.?In?other?words,?initially?every?elected?male?leader,?who?suggests?forty,?is?followed?by?his?




Next,?we?analyze?whether? followers?differentiate?between? their? leaders?based?on?gender? in? later?
periods,?but?after?a?previous?failure?period.?Effectiveness?of?a? leader?becomes? important?especially?
after?the?failure?of?a?previous? leader.?We?are?curious,?whether?followers?still?differentiate?between?
their? leaders,? if? the? previous? leader?was?unsuccessful? to? lead? the? group? to? the?highest? outcome,?
holding?constant?that?leaders?suggest?forty.?Figure?5.3?depicts?the?mean?minimum?effort?of?follower?
choices?by?treatment?and?gender?of?the?leader,?excluding?the?choices?of?leaders.?We?depict?the?cases?











compared? to? their? female? counterparts? (p? =? 0.08).69?In? Random,?male? and? female? leaders,? who?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
69?Post?estimation?test?results?after?group?level?random?effects?GLS?regression?for?followers’?minimum?effort.?






































suggest? forty,?are? followed? to? the? same?extent? (p?=?0.32).? In?a? further?analysis,?we?add? followers’?
























effort? level?below?forty.?Anyway,?over?time,?elected?male?and?female? leaders?do?not?differ? in?their?
message?sending?behavior.?
Over?time?followers?differentiate?less?between?their?leaders?based?on?gender,?so?that?we?observe?a?





This? section? investigates? the? volunteering? frequency? of? participants? and? selection? outcomes? by?
treatment? and? gender.? Figure? 5.4? shows? the? results? at? a? glance.? First,?we? calculate? the? rational?
amount?of?volunteering?in?each?treatment?given?the?incentives?for?the?volunteering?decision?and?the?
observed?effect?of? leadership.?For?the?observed?effect?of? leadership?we?calculate?the?difference? in?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????






average? earnings? between? Part? 1? and? Part? 2? in? each? treatment.? In? the? best? case? scenario,? the?
observed?effect?of?leadership?lasts?during?the?three?periods?of?the?leadership?term,?so?that?the?effect?
can?be?multiplied?by?3.?We? substitute? the? resulting?values? into?Equation?2? in?Appendix?3A,?which?
yields? the? rational? volunteering? frequencies? 0.54? in? Election? and? 0.51? in? Random.? Expressed? in?
number? of? candidates,? the? pecuniary? benefits? benchmark? in? Election? is? 2.7? candidates? and? in?
Random?2.55?candidates.?Entry?for?the?leader?position?above?the?pecuniary?benefits?is?more?likely?in?
Random,? and? it? is? driven? by?men? entering? too?much.? Initial? entry? above? the? pecuniary? benefits?
decreases? over? time? for? both? men? and? women? in? both? Random? and? Election,? and? the? curves?
approach?the?respective?benchmarks.?Except? in?case?of?men? in?Random,?the?curves?even?go?below?










To? put? our? graphical? analysis? on? a? statistically?more? solid? ground,? we? run? random? effects? GLS?
regressions?for?volunteering?and?being?a?leader?respectively.?Explanatory?variables?are?the?indicator?
for?Election?and?the?interaction?of?Election?and?gender?of?the?subject.?Standard?errors?are?clustered?
on?groups.?Table?5.3?presents? the?estimations.?Volunteering,? in?Model?5,? is?a?binary?variable? that?
takes?the?value?of?1?if?the?subject?runs?for?the?leader?position?and?0?otherwise.?We?find?that?men?in?





72?During? the?6?selection?periods,? the?14?groups? in?Election?had?84?open? leader?positions,?of?which?45?were?
filled?by?men,?37?by?women,?and?2?were?not?filled.?The?15?groups?in?Random?had?90?open?leader?positions,?of?
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Notes.?For? the?estimations?we?use?subject?level? random?effects?GLS? regressions?after?collapsing? the?data?by?
subject?and?leadership?term.?Both?models?are?clustered?into?29?groups.?Model?5?contains?870?observations?of?
145?subjects?over?6?selection?periods.?Model?6?contains?456?observations?over?6?selection?periods?of?subjects?




How? can?we? explain? the? observed? volunteering? behavior?? Originally?we? hypothesized? that?men?
might?have?a?stronger?preference? for? the? leader?position,?but?we?do?not?observe?an? initial?gender?
difference? in?the?volunteering?frequency?between?men?and?women.?Thus,?we?rule?this?explanation?
out.?We? also? hypothesized? that? women? would? shy? away? from? volunteering,? while? men? would?
volunteer?too?much?in?Election,?but?in?fact?we?find?no?gender?difference.?Thus,?we?also?rule?out?this?
second?explanation?related?to?underlying?gender?differences?in?preferences.73?Our?third?expectation?
was?that?gender?differences? in? leader?effectiveness?might?drive?the?decisions?to?run?for?the? leader?
position.?We?find?support?for?this?expectation?in?Election,?as?the?overall?gender?difference?in?leader?




is? that? they?might? underestimate? the? number? of? competing? candidates.? Since?we? elicited? beliefs?
about?the?number?of?candidates,?we?can?test?this?possibility?by?adding?beliefs?to?the?interaction?term?
in?Model?5.74?Model?5A? in?Table?A2? in?Appendix?4A?contains?our?estimation?using?a?random?effects?
GLS? regression?clustering?standard?errors?on?groups.?We? find? that?beliefs?have?positive?and?highly?
significant?effects?on?the?decision?to?volunteer.?The?more?a?participant?believes?others?will?volunteer,?
the?more?he?is?willing?to?volunteer?too.?In?other?words,?the?participant?might?view?volunteering?as?a?
contribution? to? the? public? good?of?having? a? leader?who? achieves?more? efficient?outcomes? for? all?
group?members,?and?the?more?others?contribute?too,?the?more?willing?he?is?to?contribute?as?well,?as?
others?observe?candidacy.?When? looking?at?the?differences? in?the?effects?of?beliefs?on?volunteering?
between? men? and? women,? we? find? almost? equal? effects? in? Election,? which? is? in? line? with? the?
observed?volunteering?behavior?(p?=?0.97).?Men?and?women?seem?to?be?equally?willing?to?contribute?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????





to? the? public? good? of? having? a? beneficial? leader.? In? contrast,? in? Random,? the? effect? of? beliefs? in?
volunteering? is? 0.42? for?men? and? 0.25? for?women,? and? the? result? of? the? post?estimation? test? is?
significant?(p?=?0.02).?In?other?words,?men?are?more?willing?than?women?to?contribute?to?the?public?
good.?These? findings?are? in? line?with? literature.?Kocher?et?al.? (2013)? find? that?elected? leaders?are?
more? likely? to?accommodate?other?regarding?preferences?even? if? the?preferences?of?others?are?at?
odds?with?the?preferences?of?the?leader.?Moreover,?the?authors?also?find?that?this?holds?stronger?for?
male? leaders? compared? to? female? leaders.?Our? findings? support? the? view? that? initially?men? and?
women? are? equally?willing? to? contribute? to? the? public? good,? even? above? the? pecuniary? benefits?




What? remains? is? to?disentangle?whether? the?volunteering?behavior?decreases?due? to?an? improved?
group? history,?which?makes? it? less? necessary? to? contribute? to? the? public? good,? or? reelections? of?
successful? leaders.?The? latter?we?are?going?to?analyze?after?Conclusion?2? in?this?section.?We?extend?
Model? 5? by? adding? group? history? to? the? interaction? term.?Model? 5B? in? Table?A2? in?Appendix? 4A?
contains?our?estimation?using?a?random?effects?GLS?regression?clustering?standard?errors?on?groups.?
For?group?history?we?use? the?average?group?minimum?effort?of? the? three?periods? in? the?previous?
leadership?term.?A?one?unit?change? in?group?history? indicates?a?change?of?10?effort? level?units,?for?
example,? an? increase? from? effort? level? 0? to? 10.?Group? history? has? significant? negative? effects? on?
volunteering.?The?more?the?group?history? improves,?the?fewer?participants?volunteer.?For?example,?
the? coefficient? of? the? history? effect? for? men? in? Election? means? that? a? participant? decreases?
volunteering?by?0.08? if? the? group?had? an? average?minimum?effort? increase?of?10? in? the?previous?
three?periods.?The?history?effects?in?Random?are?almost?identical?for?men?and?women,?so?the?result?
of?the?post?estimation?test?is?far?from?significant?(p?=?0.93).?The?same?holds?for?the?history?effects?in?
Election? (p? =? 0.78).? Thus,? the? effect? of? group? history? has? the? same? impact? on? the? volunteering?
decision?of?men?and?women,?and?does?not?help?us?understanding?the?gender?difference?in?Random.?
At? least? we? find? that? the? history? effects? are? slightly? larger? in? Election,? the? result? of? the? post?
estimation?test?comparing?treatments?is?close?to?significance?(p?=?0.17).?Combined?with?better?group?
history? in? Election,? this? might? be? a? hint? that? group? history? has? a? regulatory? effect? driving? the?
volunteering?frequency?closer?to?the?pecuniary?benefits?benchmark.?




the? interaction? term? the?previous?volunteering,? the?previous? leadership,?and? the?previous?success.?
For?this,?we?use?dummies?whether?the?subject?volunteered?in?the?previous?selection?period,?whether?
the? subject?was?a? leader? in? the?previous? term,?and?whether? the?group?was? successful? in? the? first?
period? of? the? previous? term.? Table? A3? in? Appendix? 4A? contains? post?estimation? test? results? and?
estimation?results?using?a?random?effects?GLS?regression?clustering?standard?errors?on?groups.?
For? Random? we? find? the? following:? Men? and? women,? who? did? not? volunteer? previously,? will?
volunteer? less? if? the?group?became? successful.?There? is?no?gender?difference? in? the?proportion?of?




men,? compared? to? “passive”?women,?will? increase?more? their? contribution? to? the?public? good?of?
having? a? leader? who? might? turn? around? the? bad? group? history.? If? the? group? failed,? men? who?
volunteered?previously,?but?were?not?selected,?will?not?change?their?volunteering?behavior?and?thus?
volunteer?again,?while? their? female?counterparts?will?volunteer? somewhat? less? from?one? selection?
period? to? the? next.? This? gender? difference? is? close? to? significance? (p? =? 0.11).? If? the? group? was?
successful,?men?and?women?who?volunteered?previously?but?did?not?get?selected?will?volunteer?less.?




slightly? less? if? the?group?became?successful,?without?any?gender?difference? in?effects.? If? the?group?
failed,?women?who?did?not?volunteer?previously?are?by?0.16?less?likely?to?volunteer?than?their?male?
counterparts? (p? =? 0.04).? However,? this? gender? difference? is? smaller? and? less? significant? than? in?
Random.?This?means?that?elections?make?“passive”?women?relatively?more?willing?to?contribute?to?
the?public?good?of?having?a?leader?who?might?turn?around?the?bad?group?history.?If?the?group?failed,?
both? men? and? women? who? volunteered? previously,? but? were? not? selected,? will? increase? their?




this? respect?between? them.?Previous? leaders,?who?became? successful,? increase? their?volunteering?
behavior,?without?any?gender?difference? in?this?respect.?Previous? leaders,?who?failed,?also? increase?












previous? leader,? if? this? leader? failed.? If? the? previous? leader? became? successful,?men? significantly?
decrease?their?volunteering?frequency,?as?it?becomes?less?necessary?to?contribute?to?the?public?good?
of?leadership.?On?top?of?that,?men?seem?to?be?chivalrous?to?previously?successful?female?leaders,?as?
they? decrease? their? volunteering? significantly?more? than? in? case? of? successful?male? leaders.? The?
coefficient?in?case?of?a?previously?successful?female?leader?is??0.49,?significant?at?the?1%?level,?and?in?






volunteering? frequency? by? 0.13.? Although? this? coefficient? is? not? significant,? the? effects? differ?
significantly?at?the?10%? level.? It?seems?that?women?who?observed?or?experienced?failure?of?female?
leadership?become?slightly?reluctant?to?run?for?the?leadership?position.?
In? sum,? elections? relatively? boost? the?willingness? of?women? to? contribute? to? the? public? good? of?
having?a?leader,?especially?after?failure?periods.?Elected?female?leaders,?whose?groups?decreased?in?
performance,? seem? to? take? responsibility? and? volunteer? again? more? often? than? their? male?
counterparts,?although?women?who?observed?or?experienced? failure?of? female? leadership?become?
slightly?reluctant?to?run?for?the?leadership?position.?We?conclude?as?follows.?
Conclusion? 2:?We? find? support? for?Prediction?3? in?Random.?Men? run? for? the? leader?position?more?
often? than?women.? Since?men? volunteer?more?often? than? the?pecuniary?benefits?benchmark,? they?
might?be?more?willing? to?contribute? to? the?public?good?of?having?a?beneficial? leader,?compared? to?
others?who?contribute? less?over? time.?We? find?no? support? for?Prediction?3? in?Election,?as?men?and?




be? elected? more? often? than? women.? For? the? estimation? we? restrict? our? data? to? subjects? who?
volunteered?and?use?a?random?effects?GLS?regression?clustering?standard?errors?on?groups.?Model?6?
in?Table?5.3?contains?the?estimation?of?being?a?leader,?conditional?on?volunteering,?as?the?dependent?
variable.?Being?a? leader? is?a?binary?variable?that?takes?the?value?of?1? if?the?subject? is?elected?as?the?
leader?and?0?otherwise.?Explanatory?variables?are? the? indicator? for?Election?and? the? interaction?of?
Election?and?gender?of? the?subject.?We? find?no?significant?differences? in? the?effects?of?becoming?a?




originally?speculated?about? two?possible?explanations?of? the?outcomes.?First,?voters?might? initially?









elections? (see? the? procedures? in?Appendix? 3B).?We?had? three? different? scenarios.? In? the? first? scenario,?we?
showed?one?female?and?two?male?candidates.?Subjects?rated?that?the?candidates?have?equal?chances?to?win?an?
election:?the?chance?that?the?leader?would?be?female?was?rated?as?30%,?and?the?chance?to?have?a?male?leader?




Are?women? challenged?more? during? elections??We? investigate?whether? persistent?women,?who?
repeatedly?volunteer?after?not?having?been?elected,?or?after?unsuccessful?leadership,?are?challenged?
more? than?men?during?elections.?We? extend?Model?6,? and? add? to? the? interaction? term?dummies?
whether?the?subject?volunteered? in?the?previous?selection?period,?whether?the?subject?was?elected?
in?the?previous?selection?period,?whether?the?previous?leader?was?female,?and?whether?the?previous?
leader?was? successful.? Thus,?we? analyze? sequential? reelection? from? one? selection? period? to? the?
next.76?Table? A5? in? Appendix? 4A? contains? post?estimation? test? results? and? estimation? results? of?
random?effects?GLS?regressions?clustering?standard?errors?on?groups.?We?focus?on?Election.?
Among? followers,? both?men? and?women? have? decreasing? chances? to? get? elected? during? a? new?
selection? period? after? the? group?was? lead? by? a?male? or? female? leader?who? failed? or? succeeded.?
Gender? differences? in? these? effects? are? far? from? significant.? Seemingly,? voters? do? not? connect? a?
change? in? the? gender? of? the? leader?with? a? change? in? equilibrium? outcomes.77?Among? successful?
leaders,?the?chance?to?get?reelected?does?not?change,?neither?for?men,?nor?women.?The?only?gender?
difference? that? we? reveal? is? among? unsuccessful? leaders.? Both? male? and? female? leaders? have?
decreasing? chances? to? get? reelected? after? they? failed,?but? the? effect? is?much? stronger? for? female?
leaders,?who? are? less? likely? to? get? reelected? than? their?male? counterparts.? The?magnitude?of? the?
difference?is?0.43?and?significant?(p?=?0.03).?
If?we?interpret?votes?as?evaluations?of?previous?leader?performance,?then?our?results?point?to?voters?
evaluating? female? leaders?who? failed?harsher? than?male? leaders?who? failed.?Of?course,? in?order? to?
make?such?a?statement,?we?have?to?decompose?the?observed?effects?by?the?messages?sent.?Table?A5?
in?Appendix?4A?contains? the?modified?estimation.?The?new?explanatory?variables?are? the? indicator?
for? Election? and? the? interaction? of? Election?with? the? subject’s? gender? and? dummies?whether? the?
subject?was?elected? in? the?previous? selection?period,?whether? the?previous? leader?was? successful,?
and?whether?the?suggestion?was?forty.?We?find,? if?the?failed? leaders?suggested?forty,?the?chance?to?
get?reelected?still?increases?for?men?(0.12),?whereas?women?lose?much?of?their?reelection?chance?(?





female? leader.?There?were?no?differences? in? the? ratings?by?subject?gender.?Opinions?suggest? that?men?have?
better?chances?to?get?elected,?especially?if?there?are?fewer?men?in?the?candidate?pool.?In?the?third?scenario,?we?
showed?one? female?and?one?male? candidate.?Women? rated?equal? chances? for?both? candidates.?Men? rated?
higher?chances?for?the?male?candidate:?they?rated?60%? for?a?male? leader?and?40%? for?a?female? leader.?Men?
think? that? they?have? slightly?higher?chances? to?win?elections? than?women,?whereas?women? think? that?both?
genders? have? equal? chances.? Of? course,? we? cannot? know? how? subject? responses? and? perceptions? are?
influenced?by?their?experience?in?the?game.?However,?the?stereotype?beliefs?do?not?seem?to?be?strongly?biased,?
which? is? in? line?with?men?and?women?volunteering?equally?often? in?Election?and?having?equal?chances?to?get?
elected.?
76?We? also? analyze? reelection? in? any? period,? taking? into? account? any? previous? leadership? position? and?
successfulness?of?the?leader.?For?example,?it?might?be?that?the?successor?of?a?successful?leader?“A”?was?leader?
“B”? in?the?subsequent? term,?and?two?terms? later? leader?“A”?was?reelected.?Although?we?ran? this?analysis,? it?
does?not?add?much?additional?insights.?
77?Glass? and? Cook? (2016)? find? that? the? opposite? gender? of? the? leader? can? signal? a? higher? possibility? of?




be?attributed? to? their? leader?behavior,?but? rather? to? followers?who?prove? the?stereotype?belief?of?
men?being?better?leaders?(Ridgeway?2001;?Glass?and?Cook?2016;?Grossman?et?al.?2016).78?
Conclusion?3:?We?find?no?support?for?Prediction?2.?Conditional?on?the?gender?rate? in?the?candidate?
pool,?men?and?women?have?equal? chances? to?get?elected.? In?general,? followers?do?not? stereotype?
between? genders?when? voting.? The? slight? difference? in? leader? effectiveness? does? not? give? rise? for?
voters? to? differentiate? among? candidates? based? on? their? gender.? We? find? some? traces? of?





a? previous? leadership? failure.?We? are? curious,?whether? there? is? a? bias? in? the? voting? behavior? of?
subjects.?Who?does? the? subject? vote? for,? given? the? gender?of? the? subject?? Is? loyalty? to? a? leader,?
reelection? dependent? on? subject? gender?? Since? group? members? could? observe? the? gender?
composition? of? the? group,? the? gender? of? voters? might? matter? for? election? outcomes.79?Since?
candidates?are?likely?to?vote?for?themselves,?who?do?non?candidates?vote?for??
In? this? section,?we? take? a? closer? look? at? the? voting?behavior? in? Election.? For? our? analysis?we?use?







candidates?was:? 49? times?mixed? candidates,? 6? times? only? female? candidates,? 5? times? only?male?
candidates.?
In?Figure?A2,?the?dependent?variable?is?the?best?rank?for?the?self,?conditional?on?volunteering.?Almost?
every? second? subject? runs? for? the? leader?position.?Men?and?women?are?equally? likely? to? vote? for?
themselves.? In?more? than? 80%? of? all? observations,? candidates? vote? for? themselves.? Over? time,?
women?are?less?likely?than?men?to?vote?for?the?self.?
In?Figure?A3,?the?dependent?variable?is?the?best?rank?for?the?previous?leader,?conditional?on?success.?
In?Panel?B,? if?the?previous? leader?was?successful,?men?are?more? likely?than?women?to?vote? for?the?
same? candidate.? The? difference? is? 8? percentage? points,? with? a? robust? standard? error? of? 0.05,?










previous? leader?failed,?women?are?slightly?more? likely?than?men?to?vote?again?for?the?failed? leader,?
but?this?result?is?not?significant.?The?difference? is?5?percentage?points,?with?a?robust?standard?error?





cases? for?a? female? leader,?but?over? time,? they?decrease? this?high? frequency?down? to?around?40%.?
Male?voters?quite?constantly?vote,?in?20%?of?the?cases,?for?female?leaders.?Since?candidates?are?likely?
to?vote? for? themselves,?we?exclude? candidates? in?Panel?B.?Among?non?candidates,?men?are?more?
likely? than?women? to? vote? for?a? female? leader.?The?difference?of?18?percentage?points? is,?with? a?
robust?standard?error?of?0.06,?significant?at?the?1%? level.?Women?quite?constantly?vote,? in?20%?of?
the?cases,?for?female?leaders.80?In?contrast,?initially,?men?vote?in?any?case?for?a?female?leader.?Over?
time,?men?decrease? this? high? voting? frequency? down? to? 20%,? similar? to? the? frequency? of? female?









the? candidates?were? of?mixed? gender.?We? end? up?with? 245? subject?level? observations? from? 14?
groups?over?6?selection?periods.?We? run?a? random?effects?GLS? regression? for? the?“best? rank? for?a?
female? leader”?as? the?dependent?variable?and?cluster? standard?errors?on?groups.?The?explanatory?










80?In? the? section? on? volunteering? behavior? above,? we? could? observe? that? elections? relatively? boost? the?
willingness? of?women? to? contribute? to? the? public? good? of? having? a? leader,? especially? after? failure? periods.?









a?new? female? leader?after?a?previously? female? leader? failed.?The?difference? is?0.29?and,?with?a?p?
value? of? 0.14,? close? to? significance.? These? findings? reinforce? the? corresponding? statements? in?
Conclusion? 3,? and? they? show? that? discrimination? against? female? leaders?might? be? driven? by? non?
candidate?women?who?are?more?reluctant?to?vote?for?a?female?leader?after?a?previous?leader?failed.?
After?a?previous? coordination? failure,? the? leader? task?becomes? riskier? if? the? leader? is?expected? to?
coordinate? the? group? towards? the? most? efficient? equilibrium.? Our? results? suggest? that,? after?
experiencing?coordination?failure,?women,?who?do?not?volunteer?themselves,?might?magnify?default?
stereotype? beliefs? about? higher? leadership? competence? of? men.? These? women? are? even? more?






that? female?majority? groups? with?male? leaders? achieve? higher? coordination? equilibria? than? with?
female? leaders.?The?difference?between? the?effects? is?7.28?effort?units? significant?at? the?5%? level,?




This? section? investigates? sabotage,? since?we? found? that?elections?boost? the?effectiveness?of?male?
leaders?more,? compared? to? female? leader? effectiveness,? although?men? and? women? have? equal?
chances?to?get?elected.?It?puzzled?us,?why?we?find?a?difference?in?effectiveness?once?followers?were?
the? ones?who? gave? credibility? to? their? leaders.? Leader? credibility? roots? in? consensual? rank? voting?
(Borda?Count).?However,?in?the?coordination?game?followers,?who?voted?for?somebody?else?than?the?
elected? leader,? could? sabotage? the? elected? leader? by? simply? acting? as? a?weak? link.? To? test? this?
speculation,?we?estimate?the?effect?of?“voting?for?a?candidate?who?wins”?on?“subject?effort”? in?the?
first? period? of? the? leadership? term.? Thus,? the? estimation? tells? us? how? subject? effort? depends? on?
whether? the?candidate,?whom? the?subject?voted? for,?won?or?not.?We?predict? that?subject?effort? is?
higher,? if? the?candidate,?whom?the?subject?gave?the?best?rank,?won?the?election.?We? focus?on?the?
happenings? in? the? first? period? of? the? three?periodic? leadership? term,? because? this? is? the? most?




GLS? regressions? clustered? on? groups,? and? restricted? to? followers.?We? exclude? leaders,? since?we?
assume? that? leaders?gave? the?best?rank? for? the?self?and? they?are?unlikely? to?sabotage? themselves.?









the?effort? is? lower?by?2.28?units? if? the? leader? is? female,?but? this? latter?effect? is?not?significant? (p?=?
0.55).?We? interpret? this? result,? as? women? not? directly? sabotaging? female? leaders,? but? also? not?
supporting?them.?Women?support?a?male?leader?more?than?a?female?leader.?Further,?we?run?a?set?of?
post?estimation? tests,? combining? gender? information.?When?we? compare? the?behavior?of?women?
who?voted?for?a?man?who?was?elected?to?women?who?voted?for?a?man,?but?a?woman?was?elected,?
we? find?a? significant?difference?of?7.11?effort?units? (p?=?0.01).?Women? significantly? increase? their?
effort?by?4.83?units? if?the?man?they?voted?for?wins?(p?=?0.08),?whereas?they?tend?to?decrease?their?
effort?by?2.28?units? if?a?woman?wins? instead?of? the?man? they?voted? for? (p?=?0.55).?Again,?not? the?
sabotage?act?against? female? leaders? is? significant,?but? rather? the?positive? support?of?male? leaders?
drives?the?difference.?None?of?the?other?post?estimation?tests?is?significant.?
Finally,?we?repeat?our?estimation?and?the?post?estimation?tests?while?restricting?to?cases?when?the?
elected? leader? fails? in? the? first?period?of? the? leadership? term.?We?do? this? in?order? to? test?whether?






Our? study? shows? that? elected? men? are? slightly? more? effective? leaders? than? elected? women.?
Compared? to? female? leaders,?elections?boost? the?effectiveness?of?male? leaders?more.?Half?of? the?
total?gender?effect?can?be?attributed?to?leader?behavior,?and?the?other?half?to?follower?behavior.?The?
gender?effect?is?small,?both?in?magnitude?and?significance,?and?thus?it?might?drive?the?gender?equal?
election? outcomes.? The? higher? effectiveness? of? elected? leaders? might? drive? the? willingness? to?
contribute? to? the? public? good? of? having? an? effective? leader? down,? and? thus? men? and? women?
volunteer? equally? often? for? the? leader? position,? close? to? and? even? below? the? pecuniary? benefits?
benchmark.?Randomly?selected?men?and?women?are?equally?effective? leaders,?which? is? in? line?with?
findings? of? our? earlier? studies? with? a? similar? topic.? By? nature,? the? random? selection? procedure?
provides?gender?equal?chances? to?become?a? leader.?Nevertheless,?we?observe? that?men?volunteer?
more?than?women,?and?their?volunteering?frequency?is?above?the?pecuniary?benefits?benchmark.?
In? general,? followers?do?not?differentiate?between?genders?when? voting.?However,?we? find? some?
traces?of?the?possible?existence?of?stereotype?beliefs,?such?as?men?being?more?competent,?or?more?
credible,?or?simply?better?leaders?than?women.?It?is?women?who?reinforce?such?or?similar?stereotype?









and?Cook? (2016)? and? Eagly? et? al.? (2003)?name? the? lack?of? support? as?one?of? the?biggest?barriers?








literature,?men?have?already?been? found? to?be?more? task?oriented,?and? in?our?study?as?well,? they?
seem? to? focus? on? successfulness,? rather? than? being? influenced? by? the? gender? of? the? leader? and?
stereotype?beliefs? (Bem?1974;?Bem?1993;?Merchant?2012).? If? the?previous? leader?was? successful,?
men?are?more?likely?than?women?to?vote?persistently.?Overall,?women?are?more?likely?than?men?to?
vote? for?a? female? leader,?which? could? falsely?be? interpreted?as? “solidarity”?among?women,?when?
comparing? our? findings? to? the? findings? in? Eckel? and? Grossman? (2001)? who? report? about? true?
“solidarity”? and? “chivalry”.?We? have? to? take? into? account? that? candidates? are? likely? to? vote? for?
themselves,?and?that?we?found?that?elections?relatively?boost?the?female?willingness?to?contribute?to?
the?public?good?of?leadership,?especially?after?failure?to?coordinate?on?the?most?efficient?equilibrium.?
Among?non?candidates,?men?are?more? likely? than?women? to?vote? for?a? female? leader.?Of? course,?
seemingly? “chivalrous”? acts? might? root? is? beliefs? about? the? difficulty? of? the? leader? task,? since?
otherwise?non?volunteering?men?might?have?run?for?the?leader?position?themselves.?
Thus,? we? observe? both? support? and? lack? of? support? for? women? who? volunteer? and? fill? leader?
positions.?Our? study? shows? that?a? learning? tendency?drives? initially?more?differentiated?outcomes?
towards? more? equality? in? followership? and? effectiveness.? In? period? 9,? elected? women? are? less?
effective?leaders?than?elected?men,?and?the?difference?is?bigger?than?10?effort?units.?Later,?in?period?
12?already,?women?and?men?are?equally?effective? leaders.?One?plausible?explanation?might?be?that?




authors? find? that?“female?evaluators?are?not?significantly?more? favorable? towards? female?candidates”,?while?





problem?of? lacking?support,?since? the? increase? in?credibility? is?much?greater? than? the?gender?effect.?Besides?
increasing? leader?effectiveness,?another?advantage?of?elections? is?that?the?pool?of?candidates?gets?filled?with?
more?skilled?and?more?diverse?people,?and?more?women?get?naturally?into?leadership?positions.?






known? that? men? are? represented? more? among? innovators,? start?up? entrepreneurs,? or? serial?
entrepreneurs.? In? contrast,? from? period? 18? onwards,? women? develop? their? groups? even? more?
effectively? than?men.?We? basically? observe? that?women? are? the? better? “developers”? and? perfect?
candidates? to? overtake? inherited? leadership,? for? example,? mature? enterprises? from? serial?
entrepreneurs,?or?second?generation?leadership?in?family?businesses.85?Cohoon?et?al.?(2010)?show?in?
their? study? about? female? entrepreneurs? that? women? believe? prior? experience? is? crucial? for?












One? limitation? of? our? study? might? be? the? flat? organizational? structure? that? we? model? in? the?
turnaround?game.?The?game?design?does?not?account?for?possible?“turf?wars”,?competition?between?
divisions,?what?might?have?been?a?reason?that?we?did?not?observe?a?gender?gap?in?the?volunteering?
frequency,? in? election?outcomes,? and? leader? effectiveness? (Herrera? et? al.? (forthcoming)).? In? a? flat?
hierarchy? the? leader? is? closer? to? the? group,? and? elections? decrease? social? distance? between? the?
leader? and? the? followers? even? more,? which? increases? credibility? of? the? leader? (Brandts? et? al.?






political? hierarchy.? The? authors? show? that? “competition? between? political? parties? substantially?
improves?women’s? relative?performance”,?yet? they?also? find?“evidence? for?a?negative?bias?against?
women?in?the?recruitment?process?being?a?major?contributor?to?women’s?high?turnover?rate”.?Using?
data?from?Spain,?Esteve?Volart?and?Bagues?show?that?women?are?strategically?nominated?to?poorer?
positions? in?election?campaigns,?and? they? find?evidence? that? this? is?due? to?party?bias,? rather? than?
voter? bias.? The? authors? also? show? that? women? get? nominated? to? better? positions? if? political?
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gender?equality? in? leadership?positions.?According? to? the? final?questionnaire,?our?participants? are?
very?risk?taking,?overconfident,?and?they?have?a?strong?preference?for?the? leader?position,?without?
any?gender?differences.88?Besides?the?obvious?school?effect,?the?location,?Guatemala?City,?might?also?
play? a? role? in? explaining? our? gender?neutral? results.? According? to? a? survey? by? the? Global?
Entrepreneurship? Monitor? (GEM),? around? 40%? of? Guatemalan? people? would? like? to? become?
entrepreneurs?in?the?next?three?years,?64%?of?the?people?think?that?they?have?the?right?capabilities,?
and? the? fear? of? failure? is? around? 33%.? Guatemalans? are? optimistic,? and? experience? a? self?
employment?wave.?To?this?adds?that?–?in?line?with?trends?in?Central?and?South?America?–?Guatemala?
ranks?on?place? 8?with?women? filling? 45%?of?managerial?positions? according? to? a? study? by? Expert?
Market.?
The? low?number?of?observations? limits? the?explanatory?power?of?our? study.?We? can? replicate? the?
previously?studied?election?effect? (Brandts?et?al.?2015),?and?we?can?show?a? less? important?gender?
gap?in?effectiveness?among?elected?leaders.?However,?our?study?revealed?a?row?of?interesting?open?
questions? for? future? research.?What? implications?do?our? findings? suggest??Our? control? treatment,?
random? selection,? represents? the? case? of? appointing? a? leader? externally,? whereas? the? election?
condition? represents? promoting? a? leader? within? the? organization.? If? the? leader? gets? randomly?
selected,? slightly? less?women?will? become? leaders,? but? only? because? the? candidate? pool? has? less?
women?to?offer?for?the?selection?process.?If?the?leader?gets?elected,?both?the?volunteering?frequency?
and? election? outcomes? will? be? gender? balanced.? Therefore,? elections? result? in? a? more? gender?
balanced?distribution?of? top?positions.?As?a? consequence,?employee?participation? in? the? selection?
process? of? a? leader? can? be? a? useful? tool? in? decreasing? gender? imbalance? of? top? positions? in?
organizations.? Is? there?any? room? for? sabotage??There?might?be?a?difference? in? the? support?of? the?
leader,?but?sabotage?acts?are?less?likely,?since?employees?had?the?chance?to?let?their?voice?be?heard,?
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Notes.? The? table? reports? the?mean,? standard?deviation? (in?parentheses),? and?p?values?of?non?parametric?
Wilcoxon? rank?sum? test? results.?We? test? for? treatment?differences?with? the?null?hypothesis? that? the? two?
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T?=?1? 1? 2? 3? 4? 5? 6? 7? 8? 9? 10? ?
Female? 6? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 6,9?
? 6? 7*? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 6*? 6,8?
Female? 4? 1? 1? 1? 4? 4? 2? 1? 1? 1? 2?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Male? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
Female? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
Male? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Female? 7? 7? 4? 0? 1? 1? 1? 0? 0? 7? 4?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Male? 3? 1? 7? 1? 1? 1? 1? 7? 1? 0? 2,6?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
T?=?0? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Male? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
Female? 7? 7? 7? 0? 1? 3? 7? 0? 0? 0? 5,3?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Female? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
? 4? 3*? 1*? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1,5?
Male? 7? 1? 0? 2? 2? 2? 2? 2? 2? 2? 2,4?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Female? 7? 7? 7? 7? 0? 7? 7? 5? 7? 7? 6,8?
? 4? 4? 4? 4? 4? 4? 4? 4? 4? 4? 4?
Male? 1? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 6,4?
? 1? 7*? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 6,4?
Female? 7? 7? 7? 0? 7? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 3,7?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Male? 1? 1? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 5,8?











T?=?1? 11? 12? 13? 14? 15? 16? 17? 18? 19? 20? ?
Male? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 4*? 1*? 1? 1? 4,9?
Male? 7? 1? 0? 1? 1? 0? 0? 1? 1? 1? 1,9?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Female? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
Male? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 6*? 7*? 7? 7? 6,9?
Female? 7? 7? 0? 0? 1? 1? 1? 1? 7? 1? 3,3?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Male? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Female? 7? 4? 1? 0? 0? 7? 1? 1? 1? 1? 2,9?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
T?=?0? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Female? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
Male? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Male? 1? 7? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1,6?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Female? 0? 2? 1? 1? 2? 2? 0? 1? 2? 2? 1,6?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Male? 7? 1? 7? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 7? 7? 3,4?
? 4? 1*? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1,3?
Female? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7?
Male? 7? 1? 1? 1? 1? 0? 4? 6? 5? 2? 3,1?
? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1? 1?
Female? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 7? 0? 7?

















































Notes.? The? table? reports? the?mean,? standard?deviation? (in?parentheses),? and?p?values? from? the? test?
results.?We?test?for?treatment?differences?using?the?non?parametric?Wilcoxon?rank?sum?test,?with?the?
null?hypothesis?that?the?two?samples?come?from?the?same?population.?Answer?key?for?evaluations?is?a?






















































Thank?you? for?participating? in? this? session.?You?are?participating? in?a? study?on?economic?decision?
making?and?will?be?asked?to?make?a?number?of?decisions.?For?your?participation?you?will?receive?a?
show?up? fee? of? $5.? Please? read? these? instructions? carefully? as? they? describe? how? you? can? earn?
additional?money.?




During?the?study?your?earnings?will?be?expressed? in?dollars.?The?study? is?divided? into?two?parts.?
You?will?read?the?instructions?for?Part?1?below.?You?will?read?the?instructions?for?Part?2?once?Part?1?














7? 6? 5? 4? 3? 2? 1?
Your?
number?
7? $0.60? $0.50? $0.40? $0.30? $0.20? $0.10? $0.00?
6? $0.575? $0.475? $0.375? $0.275? $0.175? $0.075?
5? $0.55? $0.45? $0.35? $0.25? $0.15?
4? $0.525? $0.425? $0.325? $0.225?






The?Earnings?Table?shows?how?your?earnings?are?determined.?Note? that? the?Earnings?Table? is? the?
same? for? every? participant.? Your? earnings? in? each? period? are? found? by? looking? across? from? the?
number?you? chose?on? the? left?hand? side?and?down? from? the? smallest?number? chosen?by?a?group?
member.?For?example,? if?you?choose?4?and? the? smallest?number? in? the?group? is?4,? then?you?earn?
$0.525.?




After? the?message? stage,? every? group?member?will? see? the?Message? Sender’s? suggestion.? In?
addition,?the?Message?Sender’s?profile?picture?will?be?shown?alongside?his/her?suggestion.??





At? the?end?of?each?period?we?will?ask?you?one?short? interim?question.?Namely,?we?will?ask?you? to?
guess?how?many?of?the?seven?other?group?members?follow?the?number?suggested?by?the?Message?
Sender.?If?your?guess?is?correct,?you?will?earn?$0.05?per?question?at?the?end?of?the?experiment.?






Message?Sender? first?has? the?opportunity? to? suggest?a?number? to?all?group?members.?Thereafter,?
every? group?member,? including? the?Message? Sender,? chooses? a? number? between? 1? and? 7.? The?
number?you?choose?and?the?smallest?number?chosen? in?the?group?will?determine?your?earnings? in?
that?period.?The?Earnings?Table? is?also?the?same?as? in?Part?1.?Finally,?your?group’s?composition?has?
not?changed.? In?other?words,? in?Part?2?you?will? interact?with?the?same?group?of?eight?people?as? in?
Part?1.?
The?only?difference?between?Part?1?and?Part?2? is? that? someone?else? in?your?group?will?be? the?
Message?Sender.?Specifically,?one?of?the?group?members?who?was?not?the?Message?Sender?in?Part?1?
will?be?selected?at?random?to?be?the?Message?Sender?throughout?Part?2.?The?Message?Sender?from?



























































































































































Notes.? The? table? contains? descriptive? statistics? for? all? 18? periods? of? Part? 2.? The? table? shows? the?mean,? the?
standard?deviation?in?brackets?and?p?values?from?test?results,?containing?observations?for?all?18?periods?of?Part?2,?
and?only?every?third?period?in?case?of?message?variables?and?belief?variables?respectively.?Leader?specific?data?is?
shaded? grey.?We? are? testing? for? gender? and? communication? treatment? differences? using? the? non?parametric?
Wilcoxon? rank?sum? test,?with? the?null?hypothesis? that? the? two? samples? come? from? the? same?population.?The?
message?value?variable?contains?only?numeric?suggestions?and?has?missing?values? if?no?message?was?sent.?The?
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No?message?sent? ? 0.131? 0.331?










































Forty? 1.00? ? ? ? ? ?
Positive?emotions? 0.46? 1.00?
Mutual?benefit? 0.18? ?0.12? 1.00?
Being?part? 0.20? 0.16? 0.49? 1.00?
Assertive?style? 0.72? 0.32? 0.12? 0.14? 1.00?
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One-way, male leader One-way, female leader



















































































Thank?you? for?participating? in? this? session.?You?are?participating? in?a? study?on?economic?decision?
making?and?will?be?asked?to?make?a?number?of?decisions.?Please?read?these?instructions?carefully?as?
they?describe?how?you?can?earn?money.?




























the? left?hand? side? and? down? from? the? minimum? number? of? hours? chosen? in? the? firm? by? any?
employee.?For?example,?suppose?you?spend?10?hours?on?the?bonus?project.?Suppose?the?other?four?







40? 30? 20? 10? 0?
Your?
hours?
40? 240? 180? 120? 60? 0?
30? 230? 170? 110? 50?







also? provides? a? summary? of? this? information? for? preceding? periods.? At? no? point? in? time?will?we?
identify?the? identity?of?any?employees? in?the?firm.?In?other?words,?the?actions?you?take?will?remain?








your?firm’s?composition?has?not?changed.? In?other?words,? in?Part?2?you?will? interact?with?the?same?
firm?of?five?people?as?in?Part?1.?
The? difference? between? Part? 1? and? Part? 2? is? that? one? person? in? your? firm?will? be? randomly?




the?message? stage,? first? the?employees?will?be?able? to?send?a?written?suggestion? to? the?Manager.?
Only? the?Manager?will?be?able? to? see? these? suggestions,?other?employees?will?not?be?able? to? see?
them.?After?the?employees?made?their?suggestions?to?the?Manager,?the?Manager?will?be?able?to?send?
a?written?suggestion?to?all?employees.?Both?employees?and?Managers?can?alternatively?decide?not?to?
send? any? suggestion.? The? suggestion? cannot? contain? information? that? can? be? used? to? identify?
participants,? such?as?a?name,?nickname,?or?any?other? identifying? feature? like?clothing,?or? the?desk?
number.?Other?than?these?restrictions,?participants?may?write?anything?that?they?wish.?
After?the?message?stage,?every?employee?will?see?the?Manager’s?suggestion.?Subsequently,?each?














possibility? to? communicate? yields,?with?a?high?probability,? low? individual?earnings? close? to?200? in?
each? period.? An? effective? leader? can? reach? high? individual? earnings? of? 240? in? each? period.? Not?
running? for? the? leader? position? yields? a? lottery? bonus? of? 50?with? the? probability? of? 0.5,?whereas?







? ?? ? ??? ? ?? ? ??
???
Expected?payoff?from?choosing?to?volunteer:?
??? ? ??? ? ??? ? ???? ? ??? ? ????? ? ??? ? ???? ? ?? ?
?
? ?
?? ?? ? ??
For?any?value?of??,?we?can?then?solve?for?the?value?of???that?makes?both?choice?options?equal:?
? ???? ? ???? (1)?
? ?? ? ???? ? ??? ? ??? ? ??? ? ?? ? ?? ? ??? ? ?? ? ???????? ? ?? (2)?
For?example,?if?? ? ?,?which?is?the?minimum?value?for?the?expected?benefit,?the?equation?becomes:?
? ? ? ??? ? ?? ? ??? ? ?? ? ?????? (3)?




? ? ? ??? ? ???? ? ????? ? ????? ? ?????? (4)?









and? before? reading? the? instructions,? everybody? answered? a? short? general? questionnaire? about?
gender,? race,? age,? years? of? study,? and?major? field? of? studies.?Next,? participants? had? to? choose? a?




pictures?had? the?same?clothing,? facial?expression,? face? form,?and?eye?color.?We?varied?hair? length,?





to?each?part.?To? facilitate?calculations? for? the?participants,?we?handed?out?printed?versions?of? the?
instructions?for?Part?1,?which?contained?the?Earnings?Table?showing?how?earnings?were?determined?
in? each? period.? The? same? table? applied? in? Part? 2.? Instructions?were? displayed? on? the? computer?
screens? and? were? read? aloud? by? the? experimenter.? After? reading? the? instructions? for? Part? 1,?
participants? completed? a?payoff?quiz? to? check?whether? everybody?understood? the? game’s?payoff?
structure.?After?reading?the?instructions?for?Part?2,?participants?completed?a?questionnaire?about?the?
volunteering?and?selection?process.?Instructions?and?screenshots?can?be?found?below.?
The? game? was? described? using? a? workplace? context? to? be? in? line? with? earlier? papers,? ease?
comprehension?of?the?task,?and?enrich?the?wording?and?analysis?of?the?free?form?messages?(Cooper?
2007;?Brandts?et?al.?2015).?As?in?Brandts?et?al.?(2015),?individual?group?members?were?referred?to?as?











number?of?other?group?members?who?will? run? for? the? leader?position?by?asking? “Out?of? the? four?
other?participants? in? your? firm,?how?many?will? run? for? the?Manager?position?”?Participants? could?
enter?guesses?from?0?to?4.?Also?in?Part?2,?after?participants?made?their?effort?choice,?we?elicited?their?
belief? concerning? the? number? of? other? group?members?who?will? follow? the? leader’s?message? by?
asking? “Out? of? the? four? other? participants? in? your? firm,? how? many? will? follow? the? Manager’s?
suggestion?”?Participants?could?enter?guesses?from?0?to?4,?or?they?could?indicate?“Not?applicable”?for?
cases?where? the? leader?did?not?make?any?suggestion.?Belief?questions?were?only?asked? in? the? first?
period?of?each?leadership?term.?
At? the? end? of? each? period,? participants? saw? their? effort? choice,? the? group?minimum? effort,? their?
earnings? in? that?period,?and? their?accumulated?earnings.?Participants?could?not?observe? individual?
effort?choices.?At?the?end?of?each?selection?process,?participants?saw?the?selection?results,?including?






Specifically,?we? asked? “In? your? opinion,?what? is? the? probability? that? each? employee? runs? for? the?
manager? position?”? Participants? could? enter? a? number? between? 0? and? 100? next? to? the? text?
“Employee? ‘ID1’?will? run? for? the?manager?position?with?a?probability?of? (in?%)”.?We?had? five? such?
answer?lines,?one?for?each?group?member.?We?also?asked?three?questions?related?to?the?probabilities?
of?men? and?women?winning? elections.? The? questions?were? the? same? for? all? participants.? In? the?








Further,?we?asked?which? role?assignment? (“Manager”?or? “Employee”)?participants?would?prefer? if?
they?could?choose?(“Imagine?you?can?appoint?someone?for?the?manager?position.?Whom?would?you?
choose?? Yourself? or? someone? else? who? is? equally? capable.”).? Next,? we? asked? their? subjective?
evaluation? about? their? own? leader? competences? on? a? five?point? scale? (“Suppose? that? you? are?
appointed? to? be? the?manager.? Compared? to? the? average?manager,? is? your? performance? as? the?
manager?much?better,?a?little?bit?better,?equal,?a?little?bit?worse,?much?worse.”).?Finally,?we?asked?a?






Upon?completion?of? the? final?questionnaire,?participants?were?shown? their?earnings?separately? for?
each? part? and? in? total? including? leader? and? lottery? bonuses.? Participants?were? thanked? and? paid?
individually?for?their?participation.?
Instructions?
Thank?you? for?participating? in? this? session.?You?are?participating? in?a? study?on?economic?decision?
making?and?will?be?asked?to?make?a?number?of?decisions.?Please?read?these?instructions?carefully?as?
they?describe?how?you?can?earn?money.?




During? the? study?your?earnings?will?be?expressed? in?points.?Upon?completion?of? the? session,?your?


























40? 30? 20? 10? 0?
Your?
hours?
40? 240? 180? 120? 60? 0?
30? 230? 170? 110? 50?











firm,? your? payoff? for? the? latest? period,? and? your? accumulated? payoffs? for? the? current? part.? The?
computer?also?provides?a?summary?of?this?information?for?preceding?periods.?At?no?point?in?time?will?
we? identify? the? identity? of? any? employees? in? the? firm.? In? other?words,? the? actions? you? take?will?





how?many?hours? to?devote? to? the? firm’s?bonus?project.?Available?choices?are?0,?10,?20,?30?and?40?
hours.?The?number?of?hours?you?choose?and?the?minimum?number?of?hours?chosen?in?the?firm?will?












? Thereafter,? all?employees? (both? candidates? and?non?candidates)? vote? to?elect? a?manager.?
During?the?vote,?employees?can?identify?the?candidates?by?a?randomly?assigned?id?(a?number?
between?1?and?5)?and?their?chosen?profile?picture.?
? Employees? vote? by? ranking? the? candidates? from?most? preferred? to? least? preferred.? For?
example,?if?there?are?three?candidates,?each?employee?has?to?assign?one?candidate?the?rank?
of?1? (most?preferred),? another? candidate? the? rank?of?2? (second?most?preferred),? and? the?
remaining?candidate?to?the?rank?of?3?(least?preferred).?Note?that?candidates?must?also?rank?
themselves?when?they?vote.?
? The?candidate?with? the?best?average?rank?wins? the?election?and?becomes? the?manager.? In?
case?of?a?tie,?the?winner?will?be?chosen?randomly?among?the?tied?candidates.?







? First,?all?employees?decide?whether?they?wish? to?run? for?the?manager?position.?Employees?
who?run?are?referred?to?as?candidates.?


















After? the? vote? [selection],? you?will?be? informed?whether? you?have?been? assigned? the? role?of? the?





contain? information? that? can?be?used? to? identify? the?Manager,? such?as?a?name,?nickname,?or?any?




the?Manager?enter? the?number?of?hours? they?wish? to? choose.?Note? that? the? suggestion?does?not?
commit? you? to? any? particular? choice.? That? is,? neither? the?Manager? nor? the? other? employees? are?
required?to?choose?the?number?of?hours?indicated?in?the?suggestion.?























































































Notes.?For? the?estimations?we?use?subject?level? random?effects?GLS? regressions?after?collapsing? the?data?by?
subject?and?leadership?term.?Both?models?are?clustered?into?29?groups.?The?models?contain?870?observations?
of?145?subjects?over?6?selection?periods.?Standard?errors?(in?parentheses)?are?corrected?for?clustering?at?the?
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Notes.?For? the?estimations?we?use?subject?level? random?effects?GLS? regressions?after?collapsing? the?data?by?
subject?and?leadership?term?and?restricting?to?observations?of?followers?in?Election.?Both?models?are?clustered?
into?14?groups.?The?models?contain?338?observations?of?70?subjects?over?6?selection?periods.?Standard?errors?
(in? parentheses)? are? corrected? for? clustering? at? the? group? level.? ***Statistically? significant? at? the? 1%? level,?
**statistically?significant?at?the?5%?level,?*statistically?significant?at?the?10%?level.?
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